Adverse Selection and Moral Hazards: Information Asymmetry as a Source of Market Failures in Insurance and Finance
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54536/ajase.v5i1.6099Keywords:
Adverse Selection, Affordable Care Act (ACA), Financial Markets, Health Insurance, Information Asymmetry, Market Failures, Moral HazardAbstract
Adverse selection and moral hazard are two central manifestations of information asymmetry that distort the efficiency of insurance and financial markets. Adverse selection arises prior to contract formation when high-risk individuals disproportionately seek coverage or credit, crowding out low-risk participants and destabilizing risk pools. Conversely, moral hazard emerges after contracts are signed, as insured or financed parties engage in riskier or concealed behaviors such as excessive claims, strategic defaults, or reckless risk-taking. Using evidence from the health insurance market particularly before and after the enactment of the U.S. Affordable Care Act (ACA) and from patterns of loan default in financial markets, this paper demonstrates how information asymmetry contributes to systemic instability. The 2008 Global Financial Crisis exemplifies the destructive consequences of these dynamics, were poor screening and irresponsible lending magnified market failures. Consequently, policy interventions such as mandates, subsidies, deductibles, monitoring mechanisms, and regulatory reforms remain essential in promoting market stability, equity, and sustainability
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