Battlefield Nuclear Thresholds and the 2025 India–Pakistan War
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54536/jpsir.v3i1.8399Keywords:
Escalation, Full-spectrum Deterrence, India–Pakistan, Operation Sindoor, Tactical Nuclear WeaponsAbstract
Is limited or battlefield nuclear employment re-emerging as a usable instrument of statecraft? This article takes the four-day India–Pakistan confrontation of May 2025 as its empirical anchor for that question. The study is a theory-guided interpretive single-case analysis that draws on official statements and briefings issued by both governments, post-crisis reconstructions by research institutions, and contemporaneous reporting, read against the established scholarly literature on deterrence thresholds. It argues that Pakistan’s investment in tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) under the doctrine of full-spectrum deterrence has not stabilized the subcontinent. It has instead produced a signaling environment in which thresholds are deliberately left ambiguous so that crises will attract international intervention. The crisis that followed the Pahalgam terror attack of April 22, 2025, tested those thresholds. India’s Operation Sindoor combined precision conventional strikes with disciplined escalation management, and Pakistan, despite reports that its National Command Authority was convened, never moved toward battlefield nuclear use. The article reads that outcome against the classic literature on deterrence thresholds, the logic of limited nuclear options, and India’s declaratory policy of massive retaliation. It concludes that any Pakistani resort to TNW employment would court disproportionate nuclear punishment rather than a negotiated pause. The 2025 case does not prove that TNWs stabilize anything. It shows that restraint was a contingent political choice, and that battlefield nuclear use remains the most volatile variable in South Asian strategic stability.
References
Ahmed, A. (2014). India’s doctrine puzzle: Limiting war in South Asia. Routledge. https://openlibrary.org/works/OL21070457W
Ahmed, M. (2016, June 30). Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons and their impact on stability. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2016/06/pakistans-tactical-nuclear-weapons-and-their-impact-on-stability
Akhtar, R. (2023, October). Pakistan’s evolving nuclear doctrine. Arms Control Today. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-10/features/pakistans-evolving-nuclear-doctrine
Al Jazeera. (2025a, May 7). Operation Sindoor: What’s the significance of India’s Pakistan targets? https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/7/operation-sindoor-whats-the-significance-of-indias-pakistan-targets
Al Jazeera. (2025b, May 7). Why did India strike Pakistan? All we know about Operation Sindoor. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/7/why-did-india-strike-pakistan-all-we-know-about-operation-sindoor
Basrur, R. M. (2006). Minimum deterrence and India’s nuclear security. Stanford University Press. https://openlibrary.org/works/OL5829539W
Brodie, B. (Ed.). (1946). The absolute weapon: Atomic power and world order. Harcourt, Brace. https://openlibrary.org/works/OL89433W
Business Today. (2025, May 15). Nuclear weapons not safe with Pakistan, should be under IAEA supervision: Rajnath Singh in Srinagar. https://www.businesstoday.in/india/story/nuclear-weapons-not-safe-with-pakistan-should-be-under-iaea-supervision-rajnath-singh-in-srinagar-476385-2025-05-15
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2015, March 23). A conversation with Gen. Khalid Kidwai [Transcript]. Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/03-230315carnegieKIDWAI.pdf
Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2024). Nasr (Hatf 9). Missile Threat. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hatf-9/
Clary, C. (2013). Deterrence stability and the conventional balance of forces in South Asia. In M. Krepon & J. Thompson (Eds.), Deterrence stability and escalation control in South Asia (pp. 135–160). Stimson Center. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/175015/Deterrence_Stability_Dec_2013_web.pdf
Clary, C., & Narang, V. (2019). India’s counterforce temptations: Strategic dilemmas, doctrine, and capabilities. International Security, 43(3), 7–52. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00340
CNN. (2025, May 10). Vance called Indian prime minister to encourage ceasefire talks after receiving alarming intelligence, sources say. https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/10/politics/vance-modi-india-pakistan-intelligence
Council for Strategic and Defence Research, & India’s World. (2025, July). Operation Sindoor and India’s new doctrine of deterrence. https://indiasworld.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Op-Sindoor-E-Book_CSDR_IW_2025.pdf
Dalton, T., & Krepon, M. (2015). A normal nuclear Pakistan. Stimson Center & Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/NormalNuclearPakistan.pdf
Das, D. (2025, November 29). The illusion of deterrence: Why India isn’t buying Pakistan’s nuclear threats. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://thebulletin.org/2025/11/the-illusion-of-deterrence-why-india-isnt-buying-pakistans-nuclear-threats/
DD News. (2025, July). India will not be deterred by nuclear blackmail: CDS General Anil Chauhan. https://ddnews.gov.in/en/india-will-not-be-deterred-by-nuclear-blackmail-cds-general-anil-chauhan/
ETV Bharat. (2025, May 26). 413 drone attacks, zero casualties: How India’s defence system foiled Pakistan offensive along western border. https://www.etvbharat.com/en/!bharat/413-drone-attacks-zero-casualties-how-indias-defence-system-foiled-pakistan-offensive-along-western-border-enn25052602787
Fearon, J. D. (1997). Signaling foreign policy interests: Tying hands versus sinking costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(1), 68–90. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002797041001004
Feaver, P. D. (1992). Command and control in emerging nuclear nations. International Security, 17(3), 160–187. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539133
Fravel, M. T., & Medeiros, E. S. (2010). China’s search for assured retaliation: The evolution of Chinese nuclear strategy and force structure. International Security, 35(2), 48–87. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00016
Freedman, L., & Michaels, J. (2019). The evolution of nuclear strategy (4th ed.). Palgrave Macmillan. https://openlibrary.org/works/OL76945W
Futter, A., & Zala, B. (2021). Strategic non-nuclear weapons and the onset of a third nuclear age. European Journal of International Security, 6(3), 257–277. https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2021.2
Ganguly, S., & Hagerty, D. T. (2005). Fearful symmetry: India-Pakistan crises in the shadow of nuclear weapons. University of Washington Press. https://openlibrary.org/works/OL21225810W
Hoodbhoy, P. (2019, October 12). Beware the nuclear con man. Dawn. https://www.dawn.com/news/1507802
Hoodbhoy, P., & Mian, Z. (2014). Nuclear fears, hopes and realities in Pakistan. International Affairs, 90(5), 1125–1142. https://sgs.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/2020-01/hoodbhoy-mian-2014.pdf
Inter-Services Public Relations. (2011, April 19). Press release no. PR94/2011-ISPR [Press release]. Government of Pakistan.
Jervis, R. (1989). The meaning of the nuclear revolution: Statecraft and the prospect of Armageddon. Cornell University Press. https://openlibrary.org/works/OL2620296W
Joshi, S. (2013). Pakistan’s tactical nuclear nightmare: Déjà vu? The Washington Quarterly, 36(3), 159–172. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2013.825557
Kahn, H. (1965). On escalation: Metaphors and scenarios. Praeger. https://openlibrary.org/works/OL5255272W
Kampani, G. (2014). New Delhi’s long nuclear journey: How secrecy and institutional roadblocks delayed India’s weaponization. International Security, 38(4), 79–114. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00158
Kapur, S. P. (2007). Dangerous deterrent: Nuclear weapons proliferation and conflict in South Asia. Stanford University Press. https://openlibrary.org/works/OL8444380W
Khan, F. H. (2012). Eating grass: The making of the Pakistani bomb. Stanford University Press. https://openlibrary.org/works/OL16626954W
Khan, Z. (2015). Pakistan’s nuclear policy: A minimum credible deterrence. Routledge. https://openlibrary.org/works/OL21266664W
Kidwai, K. (2020, February 6). Keynote address [Conference presentation]. IISS–CISS Workshop on South Asian Strategic Stability, London, United Kingdom. https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/nuclear-deterrence-and-stability-in-south-asia---perceptions-and-realities.pdf
Krepon, M., & Thompson, J. (Eds.). (2013). Deterrence stability and escalation control in South Asia. Stimson Center. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/175015/Deterrence_Stability_Dec_2013_web.pdf
Kristensen, H. M., Korda, M., Johns, E., & Knight-Boyle, M. (2025). Pakistan nuclear weapons, 2025. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 81(5), 386–408. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2025.2543685
Ladwig, W. C., III. (2025a, May). Calibrated force: Operation Sindoor and the future of Indian deterrence [Commentary]. Royal United Services Institute. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/calibrated-force-operation-sindoor-and-future-indian-deterrence
Ladwig, W. C., III. (2025b, May). Operation Sindoor and the evolution of India’s military strategy against Pakistan. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2025/05/operation-sindoor-and-the-evolution-of-indias-strategy-against-pakistan/
Lieber, K. A., & Press, D. G. (2017). The new era of counterforce: Technological change and the future of nuclear deterrence. International Security, 41(4), 9–49. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00273
Long, A. (2008). Deterrence: From Cold War to long war. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG636.html
McCausland, J. D. (2015, March 10). Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons: Operational myths and realities. Stimson Center. https://www.stimson.org/2015/pakistans-tactical-nuclear-weapons-operational-myths-and-realities/
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2025a, April 23). Transcript of special briefing by Foreign Secretary. https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2025b, May 7). Transcript of special briefing on Operation Sindoor. https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm
Narang, V. (2010). Posturing for peace? Pakistan’s nuclear postures and South Asian stability. International Security, 34(3), 38–78. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2010.34.3.38
Narang, V. (2014). Nuclear strategy in the modern era: Regional powers and international conflict. Princeton University Press. https://openlibrary.org/works/OL20349569W
National Security Advisory Board. (1999, August 17). Draft report on Indian nuclear doctrine. Government of India. https://nuke.fas.org/guide/india/doctrine/990817-indnucld.htm
The News Minute. (2025, May 10). Reuters report says Pak PM convened meeting of body overseeing nuclear arsenal. https://www.thenewsminute.com/news/reuters-report-says-pak-pm-convened-meeting-of-body-overseeing-nuclear-arsenal
Newsweek. (2025, May 12). Trump on India-Pakistan: We stopped “a bad nuclear war.” https://www.newsweek.com/trump-india-pakistan-we-stopped-bad-nuclear-war-2070976
Outlook Business. (2025, May). Pakistan denies convening Nuclear Command Authority meeting amid tensions with India. https://www.outlookbusiness.com/news/pakistan-denies-convening-nuclear-command-authority-meeting-amid-tensions-with-india
Panag, H. S. (2025, May). India inflicted a psychological defeat on Pakistan—by the skin of its teeth. ThePrint. https://theprint.in/opinion/india-inflicted-a-psychological-defeat-on-pakistan-by-the-skin-of-its-teeth/2626200/
Peri, D. (2025, October 6). Military lessons from Operation Sindoor. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/10/military-lessons-from-operation-sindoor
Press Information Bureau, Government of India. (2025, May 14). Operation Sindoor: India’s strategic clarity and calculated force [Press release]. https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=2128748
Prime Minister’s Office, Government of India. (2003, January 4). The Cabinet Committee on Security reviews operationalization of India’s nuclear doctrine [Press release]. https://archive.pib.gov.in/archive/releases98/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html
Prime Minister’s Office, Government of Pakistan. (2025, April 24). Prime Minister chairs meeting of the National Security Committee [Press release]. https://pmo.gov.pk/
Rajagopalan, R. (2016, June 30). India’s nuclear doctrine debate. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2016/06/indias-nuclear-doctrine-debate
Rej, A. (2019, August). Is India “creatively reinterpreting” its no-first-use policy? Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. https://thebulletin.org/2019/08/is-india-creatively-reinterpreting-its-no-first-use-policy/
Roberts, B. (2016). The case for U.S. nuclear weapons in the 21st century. Stanford University Press. https://openlibrary.org/works/OL20311972W
Sahgal, A., & Sahu, A. (2026). Operation Sindoor establishes India’s new response doctrine towards Pakistan. British American Security Information Council. https://basicint.org/operation-sindoor-establishes-indias-new-response-doctrine-towards-pakistan/
Saleem, F. (2025, May 11). The 87-hour war: $1 billion an hour. The News International. https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1310466-the-87-hour-war-1-billion-an-hour
Salik, N. (2009). The genesis of South Asian nuclear deterrence: Pakistan’s perspective. Oxford University Press. https://openlibrary.org/works/OL15029754W
Salik, N. (2016, June 30). Pakistan’s nuclear force structure in 2025. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2016/06/pakistans-nuclear-force-structure-in-2025
Saran, S. (2013, April 24). Is India’s nuclear deterrent credible? [Address]. India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, India. https://capssindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Shyam-Saran.pdf
Saxena, A. (2026, March). India’s drone strategy in Operation Sindoor. In Operation Sindoor: Military performance and effectiveness (ORF Special Report No. 299). Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/research/operation-sindoor-military-performance-and-effectiveness
Schelling, T. C. (1966). Arms and influence. Yale University Press. https://openlibrary.org/works/OL2259854W
Snyder, G. H. (1965). The balance of power and the balance of terror. In P. Seabury (Ed.), The balance of power (pp. 184–201). Chandler. https://openlibrary.org/works/OL4652544W
Stimson Center. (2025, May 28). Four days in May: The India-Pakistan crisis of 2025. https://www.stimson.org/2025/four-days-in-may-the-india-pakistan-crisis-of-2025/
Tannenwald, N. (1999). The nuclear taboo: The United States and the normative basis of nuclear non-use. International Organization, 53(3), 433–468. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081899550959
Tasleem, S. (2016, June 30). Pakistan’s nuclear use doctrine. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2016/06/pakistans-nuclear-use-doctrine
Tellis, A. J. (2001). India’s emerging nuclear posture: Between recessed deterrent and ready arsenal. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1127.html
ThePrint. (2019, August 16). India committed to no first use nuke policy, but “future depends on circumstances”: Rajnath. https://theprint.in/defence/india-committed-to-no-first-use-nuke-policy-but-future-depends-on-circumstances-rajnath/277860/
ThePrint. (2025a, May). Did India hit “nuke storage” facility in Pakistan’s Kirana Hills? Here’s what IAF ops chief said. https://theprint.in/defence/did-india-hit-nuke-storage-facility-in-pakistans-kirana-hills-heres-what-iaf-officer-said/2623385/
ThePrint. (2025b, August 11). Pakistan Army chief Asim Munir’s nuclear remarks in Florida spark controversy. https://theprint.in/world/pakistan-army-chief-field-marshal-asim-munir-florida-speech-nuclear-threat-india/2718095/
U.S. Department of State. (2025, May 10). Announcing a U.S.-brokered ceasefire between India and Pakistan [Press release]. https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/05/announcing-a-u-s-brokered-ceasefire-between-india-and-pakistan
Yost, D. S. (2011). The US debate on NATO nuclear deterrence. International Affairs, 87(6), 1401–1438. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01043.x
Yusuf, M. (2018). Brokering peace in nuclear environments: U.S. crisis management in South Asia. Stanford University Press. https://openlibrary.org/works/OL21315167W
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2026 Ravi Kumar, Sivakumar M V
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
