Anti-Corruption Institutions without an Anti-Corruption Curve: Assessing Ghana’s Governance Architecture, 2019–2025
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54536/jpp.v2i1.6305Keywords:
Accountability, Anti-Corruption Efforts, Ghana, Governance, Office of The Special Prosecutor, Public Financial Management, Right to InformationAbstract
Ghana has expanded its anti-corruption efforts from 2019 to 2025 in ways that, in theory, should lead to an apparent decrease in corruption levels and an increase in global governance scores. The establishment and operation of the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), the activation of the Right to Information (RTI) Commission, and repeated audits of payroll and public financial management (PFM). The ongoing presence of the Auditor-General, EOCO, CHRAJ, and Parliament’s Public Committee all suggest a growing network of accountability. However, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) shows Ghana remaining between 42 and 43 points out of 100 for most of this period, dropping to 42 in 2024. Citizen data from Afrobarometer also indicates declining trust in key public institutions. This paper explores this paradox. Through qualitative analysis of official reports, survey data, and secondary literature on African anti-corruption agencies, it argues that Ghana’s issue is not a lack of institutions but a weak capacity to turn investigations, audits, and administrative findings into visible, enforceable outcomes. The paper recommends shifting from creating many institutions to strengthening and consolidating existing ones. It suggests that performance-based funding, RTI–budget integration, and judicial expedited processing of OSP cases are the next steps for Ghana’s governance reform.
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