Persistent Oversight Failures in State-Administered Federal Grant Programs:A Longitudinal Analysis of Single Audit Findings and the Case for Risk-Based Compliance Reform

Authors

  • Eric Acheampong Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity, University of Illinois Springfield, United States Author
  • Tobias Kwame Adukpo Department of Accounting, University for Development Studies, Ghana Author
  • Judith Tekyi Mensah Georgia State University, J. Mack Robinson College of Business, USA Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54536/ajhrpa.v1i2.8434

Keywords:

COSO, Federal Grant Compliance, Fraud Prevention, Improper Payments, Internal Controls, Public Administration, Payment Integrity, Risk-Based Monitoring, Single Audit, State Agenciesw

Abstract

State-administered federal grant programs distribute over $700 billion annually, yet improper payments reached $161.5 billion in fiscal year 2024 and GAO estimates annual fraud losses between $233 billion and $521 billion. Despite three decades of Single Audit oversight, there is limited empirical evidence on whether current monitoring structures interrupt persistent noncompliance. This paper presents a longitudinal analysis of Single Audit finding patterns using Federal Audit Clearinghouse data from 2016 to 2023 (N = 7,147 state-program-year observations across 955 unique entities in 56 states and territories). We find that compliance failures are highly concentrated: the top 12.40% of uniquely identified entities account for 90% of all finding-years, with a Gini coefficient of 0.8902. Fixed-effects regression using a two-year lagged predictor, which is definitionally independent of the outcome, shows that prior finding history is associated with a 9.48 percentage point increase in finding persistence probability (SE = 0.026, p = 0.0002), confirming genuine organizational persistence beyond the mechanical structure of the immediate lag. Finding rates remained stable at approximately 47% across the full analytical period with no descriptive evidence of improvement. Descriptive post-finding trajectories show no sustained improvement below baseline, consistent with symbolic compliance dynamics in which formal oversight artifacts are produced without reliable compliance improvement. Drawing on these findings, we propose a risk-stratified compliance reform framework grounded in COSO Internal Control principles. Policy implications for Congress, OMB, and state practitioners are discussed.

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Published

2026-09-16

How to Cite

Acheampong , E. ., Adukpo, T. K. ., & Mensah, J. T. . (2026). Persistent Oversight Failures in State-Administered Federal Grant Programs:A Longitudinal Analysis of Single Audit Findings and the Case for Risk-Based Compliance Reform. American Journal of Human Resources and Public Administration, 1(2), 55-70. https://doi.org/10.54536/ajhrpa.v1i2.8434

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