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Small States, Great Power Theory, and Institutionalized Influence: Pacific Island Diplomacy at the United Nations

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ABSTRACT

Structural realism posits that material capabilities determine influence in international politics, with great powers structuring outcomes while small states adapt to constraints. Small Pacific Island States present a hard case for such expectations. Despite negligible military and economic resources, Pacific members of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) achieved procedural and normative outcomes in UN climate governance: explicit recognition in the 1992 UNFCCC, the 1.5°C goal in the 2015 Paris Agreement, the loss and damage funding mechanism at COP27, and the 2025 ICJ advisory opinion on climate obligations. Integrating Barnett and Duvall's (2005) power taxonomy with Long's (2017) framework, the analysis demonstrates that institutional and productive power can generate procedural gains under specific conditions: high institutionalization with consensus rules, stark moral asymmetries, long time horizons, and cross-cutting coalitions. Substantive implementation remains constrained by material power asymmetries. The article refines great power theory by specifying domain-specific scope conditions in which institutionalized settings mediate the effects of material power, while acknowledging that small states cannot compel behavioral compliance when vital interests are at stake.

INTRODUCTION

Structural and offensive realism place material capabilities at the center of international outcomes (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001). These theories generate clear predictions: states with negligible military and economic resources should exercise minimal influence on consequential global governance outcomes, particularly in domains involving substantial distributional costs. Great powers structure the system through their interactions; small states respond to those structures rather than shaping them.

Small Pacific Island States pose a theoretically demanding puzzle for this expectation. Pacific members of AOSIS, representing less than 0.03% of global GDP and 0.1% of greenhouse gas emissions, have demonstrably influenced the architecture and normative content of the international climate regime. They secured explicit recognition of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and their vulnerabilities in Article 4.8 of the 1992 UNFCCC. They anchored the 1.5°C temperature goal in Article 2 of the 2015 Paris Agreement, despite initial preference by major emitters for a 2°C threshold. They sustained a three-decade advocacy campaign for loss and damage recognition that culminated in the establishment of a dedicated funding mechanism at COP27 in 2022. Most recently, Vanuatu led a coalition resulting in the UN General Assembly's 2023 request for, and the ICJ's 2025 delivery of, an advisory opinion establishing that the 1.5°C threshold constitutes a legally relevant benchmark under international law.

Research Question and Argument

How do Small Pacific Island States exercise influence in UN-based climate diplomacy, and what does this reveal

about the scope conditions and limits of great power theory? This article argues that Small Pacific Island States leverage institutionalized forms of power—coalition-based voting influence, agenda-setting capacity, and normative entrepreneurship—operating through UN rules of sovereign equality, consensus procedures, and shared legal-moral principles. These strategies have enabled procedural and normative gains that challenge materialist assumptions about who shapes global governance rules. However, these gains remain bounded: AOSIS secures textual commitments and institutional platforms but cannot compel substantive behavioral compliance by major emitters when vital domestic interests are at stake.

Theoretical Contribution

This article makes three specific theoretical contributions to International Relations scholarship. First, it refines great power theory by specifying institutional and issue-area scope conditions where material power operates indirectly rather than determinatively. It identifies four enabling conditions: high institutionalization with consensus or supermajority rules, stark moral asymmetries between perpetrators and victims, long time horizons enabling reputation-building, and availability of cross-cutting coalitions with sympathetic powers. Second, it extends Long's (2017) framework on small state power by demonstrating how derivative, collective, and particular-intrinsic power interact synergistically in highly institutionalized domains. Third, it bridges Barnett and Duvall's (2005) abstract typology of power with concrete mechanisms in global environmental governance by operationalizing institutional power as coalition-based agenda control and productive power as norm entrepreneurship.

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LITERATURE REVIEW

Great Power Theory and Material Power

Structural realism locates the causes of international outcomes in the system's anarchic structure and the distribution of material capabilities across states (Waltz, 1979). Anarchy, the absence of central authority, creates a self-help system in which survival depends on relative power. Great powers, defined by their ability to compete across multiple domains and project influence globally, structure the system through their interactions. Small states operate within constraints established by great power competition, balancing or bandwagoning but unable to reshape fundamental rules.

Offensive realism intensifies these claims (Mearsheimer, 2001). Because states can never be certain of others' intentions, rational actors seek to maximize their share of world power to ensure survival. International institutions have minimal independent effects; they serve as arenas for great power competition rather than autonomous constraints on behavior. Concessions to weak states reflect either low costs to great powers or strategic bargaining within great power coalitions, not genuine small state leverage.

These frameworks generate specific predictions for small states in climate governance. Major emitters (China, United States, EU, India) bear the largest mitigation costs and possess greatest capacity to resist obligations. Their preferences should dominate negotiated outcomes. Small Island States contribute negligibly to emissions and lack economic leverage to induce or coerce behavioral change. They should accept outcomes determined by great power bargaining, possibly receiving symbolic recognition but not substantive influence over distributional rules.

Small States, Asymmetry, and Strategies of the Weak

Contemporary scholarship emphasizes asymmetric relationships rather than fixed size categories (Long, 2017; Womack, 2001). Asymmetry exists along multiple dimensions: military, economic, diplomatic capacity, information access. States may be small on some dimensions but not others, and smallness varies by issue area. Long (2017) provides a synthetic framework conceptualizing small state power as emerging from three sources: derivative power (influence gained through relationships with stronger states), collective power (aggregated influence through coalitions), and particular-intrinsic power (assets specific to the small state such as moral authority or technical expertise).

Empirical studies demonstrate that small states can exercise influence under specific conditions. Nordic states shaped humanitarian intervention norms through sustained advocacy and coalition-building (Ingebritsen, 2002). Small EU members influenced European integration through prioritization and administrative excellence (Panke, 2011; Thorhallsson & Wivel, 2006). Caribbean states shaped international drug policy through CARICOM coordination (Braveboy-Wagner, 2008). Constraints persist. Small states face higher transaction

costs, maintaining smaller delegations with less expertise across multiple negotiations (Cooper & Shaw, 2009). Resource limitations force prioritization, accepting reduced influence in non-priority areas.

Multilateralism, Institutional Power, and Norm Entrepreneurship

Liberal institutionalism challenges realist skepticism about institutional autonomy (Keohane, 1984; Ruggie, 1992). Institutions reduce transaction costs, provide information, make commitments credible, and enable monitoring. Multilateral institutions organized around generalized principles (sovereign equality, diffuse reciprocity) create opportunities for small states unavailable in bilateral settings where material asymmetries dominate more directly.

Barnett and Duvall (2005) conceptualize power multidimensionally as "the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate." They distinguish four forms: compulsory power (direct control through coercion), institutional power (indirect control through rules and procedures), structural power (differential positioning defining identities and capacities), and productive power (constitution of subjects through discourse). For small states, compulsory power is limited by definition. Potential influence arises through institutional and productive power.

Constructivist work on norms emphasizes how norm entrepreneurs promote new standards of appropriate behavior, working through international organizations to socialize states (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Small states can act as norm entrepreneurs when they possess moral authority derived from legitimate claims to victimhood, technical expertise establishing credibility, or institutional positions enabling sustained advocacy.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Research Design and Case Selection

This study employs structured, focused comparison of four diplomatic episodes (UNFCCC emergence 1990–1992, Paris Agreement 2013–2015, loss and damage 1991–2022, ICJ opinion campaign 2019–2025), analyzing each through three mechanisms: coalition formation, agenda-setting, and norm entrepreneurship. The methodological strategy is analytical process tracing aimed at demonstrating plausibility rather than definitive causation.

Pacific SIDS represent a hard case for small state influence. Their material capabilities are negligible even relative to other small states. Their existential vulnerability should, in realist logic, produce desperation rather than leverage. If influence occurs here, it suggests that institutional and normative mechanisms can operate even under extreme power asymmetries. The four episodes are selected because they represent major institutional milestones in climate governance, have sufficient documentary record for analysis, span the full period of AOSIS activity (1990–

2025), and exhibit variation in enabling conditions and outcomes.

Climate governance is selected because it combines high institutionalization (dense treaty regimes, consensus procedures) with major distributional stakes (trillions in mitigation costs, fundamental economic restructuring). This differs from human rights, where normative consensus is higher but enforcement weaker, and from trade, where material bargaining power correlates more directly with market size.

Data Sources and Evidence

The analysis draws on peer-reviewed scholarship on climate negotiations, official UN and UNFCCC documents (COP decisions, treaty texts, UNGA resolutions), the 2025 ICJ advisory opinion, AOSIS statements where available in UNFCCC archives, and accounts by negotiation participants and observers. For each episode, the analysis identifies: (1) pre-negotiation baseline positions; (2) AOSIS strategies and coalition dynamics; (3) observable shifts in outcomes; (4) evidence linking strategies to shifts; (5) assessment distinguishing procedural from substantive success.

Analytical Framework

The study integrates Barnett and Duvall's (2005) power taxonomy with Long's (2017) account of small state power sources. This integration clarifies how derivative, collective, and particular-intrinsic power operate through institutional and productive dimensions in highly institutionalized settings. Three mechanisms translate AOSIS power resources into influence: (1) coalition-based institutional power through AOSIS coordination creating veto capacity in consensus negotiations; (2) agenda-setting through resolution sponsorship and committee leadership; (3) norm entrepreneurship through moral, scientific, and legal framing that redefines obligations and responsibilities.

Four scope conditions enable small state influence through institutional and productive power: high institutionalization with consensus or supermajority rules, stark moral asymmetries generating reputational costs, long time horizons enabling reputation and norm diffusion, and availability of cross-cutting coalitions with sympathetic powers. The framework distinguishes procedural success (agenda placement, textual inclusion, institutional creation) from substantive success (behavioral change, adequate resources, physical protection).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Empirical Context: Pacific Small Island Developing States Pacific Small Island Developing States comprise 14 states and territories including Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Palau, Samoa, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Population ranges from 11,000 (Tuvalu) to 9 million (Papua New Guinea). Combined GDP totals approximately \$35 billion (0.04% of global GDP). Greenhouse gas emissions are negligible (<0.1% of global total). They participate in UN climate

negotiations through AOSIS (39 members across Pacific, Caribbean, Indian Ocean regions founded 1990).

Pacific SIDS face acute vulnerabilities. Sea level rise threatens territorial integrity of low-lying atolls under 2°C warming. Saltwater intrusion degrades freshwater and agriculture. Intensifying cyclones cause catastrophic infrastructure damage. Economic constraints include small populations limiting economies of scale, geographic dispersion raising transaction costs, and narrow economic bases creating volatility. Diplomatic capacity is limited: Fiji maintains approximately 250 personnel globally while Tuvalu and Nauru rely on minimal missions. Great power competition (US–China rivalry) securitizes the Pacific, pressuring states to align.

Facing structural constraints, Pacific states developed strategic responses including regional identity-building through the “Blue Pacific” concept, coalition institutionalization through AOSIS formalized coordination, issue prioritization focusing on climate and oceans, normative leadership as principled defenders of international law, and strategic partnerships balancing relationships with competing powers.

Episode 1: UNFCCC Negotiations and SIDS Recognition (1990–1992)

Prior to 1990, small islands had minimal visibility in environmental governance. Climate change discourse focused on developed versus developing country responsibilities with no recognition of differential vulnerability among developing countries. Following a 1989 Maldives conference on sea level rise, AOSIS formed at the Second World Climate Conference (1990) bringing together 43 small island and low-lying coastal states.

AOSIS strategies included maintaining coalition unity despite economic heterogeneity, leveraging early IPCC findings (1990 First Assessment Report) on sea level rise to establish vulnerability as technical fact, positioning islands as innocent first victims warning of broader catastrophe, and drafting language for UNFCCC explicitly recognizing small island states. The 1992 UNFCCC included Article 4.8 requiring Parties to give “full consideration” to funding, insurance, and technology transfer to meet “specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties especially on small island countries and countries with low-lying coastal areas.”

Scholarship on UNFCCC negotiations documents that SIDS recognition was not in early drafts but appeared after sustained AOSIS advocacy (Ashe *et al.*, 1999; Betzold, 2010). EU and Nordic countries supported inclusion, providing derivative power. Major developing countries accepted the language as it expanded developing country claims on adaptation finance. This represents procedural success: AOSIS secured textual recognition establishing SIDS as category deserving special consideration, creating foundation for subsequent advocacy. However, “full consideration” lacked enforcement mechanisms and financial commitments remained unspecified.

Episode 2: Paris Agreement and the 1.5°C Goal (2013–2015)

The Copenhagen Accord (2009) and Cancun Agreements (2010) established 2°C as the global temperature goal. Most major emitters considered 1.5°C politically and economically infeasible. AOSIS made 1.5°C central to its Paris campaign through the “1.5 to stay alive” symbolic campaign, lobbying for IPCC special report on 1.5°C impacts, forming the High Ambition Coalition with LDCs, CVF, EU and 79 developing countries, and arguing 2°C violated human rights and Law of the Sea obligations.

Paris Agreement Article 2.1(a) commits Parties to “holding the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.” Documentary evidence shows position evolution: October 2014 draft contained “below 2°C”; May 2015 draft “below 2°C or 1.5°C”; December 2015 final “well below 2°C and pursuing 1.5°C.”

Multiple sources document AOSIS’s role. Ourbak and Magnan (2018) credit AOSIS and High Ambition Coalition with shifting EU position from 2°C to 1.5°C endorsement. US Secretary of State John Kerry stated: “We could not have gotten a Paris Agreement without the incredible efforts and hard work of the island nations.” The 2025 ICJ advisory opinion further elevated 1.5°C, stating obligations “require States Parties to take the necessary measures to achieve the long-term temperature goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C. This threshold is not merely aspirational but constitutes a legally relevant benchmark.”

This represents significant procedural and normative success. AOSIS secured textual embedding of 1.5°C, IPCC scientific validation, and legal reinforcement through ICJ. However, substantive implementation remains inadequate. Current nationally determined contributions imply 2.5–3°C warming by 2100, illustrating limits of small state influence over compliance.

Episode 3: Loss and Damage Institutionalization (1991–2022)

In 1991, Vanuatu proposed on behalf of AOSIS an insurance mechanism to compensate small island states for climate damages. Major developed countries categorically rejected the concept, fearing open-ended liability for historical emissions. The term “loss and damage” did not appear in UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol. AOSIS strategies evolved across three decades.

Phase 1 (1991–2007) involved persistent advocacy maintaining loss and damage on informal agendas despite developed country resistance and framing shift from “insurance” to “loss and damage” reducing liability connotations. Phase 2 (2007–2013) achieved institutional foothold: the 2010 Cancun Agreements established work programme on loss and damage, and 2013 Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage was

created providing AOSIS with institutional platform but without dedicated funding. Phase 3 (2013–2022) secured funding: continuous advocacy framing loss and damage as third pillar alongside mitigation and adaptation, coalition with LDCs and CVF eventually joined by G77 broadly, culminated in 2022 COP27 establishing loss and damage fund.

COP27 Decision 2/CP.27 established “new funding arrangements for assisting developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, in responding to loss and damage.” Roberts and Pelling (2018, 2020) document AOSIS’s central role in sustaining advocacy across three decades. An AOSIS representative stated in 2021 submission: “Loss and damage is not a future scenario, it is a present-day reality for SIDS. We have advocated for three decades for recognition that some impacts cannot be adapted to and require dedicated support.”

This represents major procedural success achieved through extraordinary persistence. AOSIS converted a rejected 1991 proposal into institutionalized funding mechanism by 2022. However, substantive adequacy is severely limited: \$700 million in initial pledges against estimated annual needs of \$150–300 billion represents approximately 0.3% of required funding.

Episode 4: ICJ Advisory Opinion on Climate Obligations (2019–2025)

International law on climate obligations remained ambiguous. UNFCCC and Paris Agreement created treaty commitments but left unclear how these related to broader international law. The campaign for an ICJ advisory opinion originated with Pacific law students (2019) and was adopted by Vanuatu’s government. Vanuatu led coalition securing UNGA Resolution 77/276 (adopted March 29, 2023 by consensus) requesting ICJ opinion, co-sponsored by over 130 countries.

In July 2025, ICJ delivered advisory opinion concluding states have obligations under general international law to protect the climate system, these obligations extend to preventing harm to other states and protecting rights of future generations, the 1.5°C threshold constitutes a legally relevant benchmark, and states causing significant harm through emissions may incur international responsibility. The opinion stated: “The obligation to protect the climate system is not limited to the specific provisions of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement but arises from customary international law. The 1.5°C threshold constitutes a legally relevant benchmark for assessing whether States have fulfilled their obligations.” The advisory opinion’s convening and content reflect AOSIS influence. The request originated from Pacific SIDS and secured support from majority of UN members despite initial skepticism from major emitters. ICJ reasoning cited SIDS submissions extensively. Legal scholars note the opinion strengthens SIDS positions in future litigation (Bodansky, 2025; Rajamani, 2025). This represents procedural and normative success providing

legal foundation for future litigation, though advisory opinions lack binding force and direct enforcement mechanisms.

Conditions of Success and Structural Limits

The four episodes demonstrate that Pacific SIDS achieve procedural and normative gains under specific conditions. Coalition cohesion was maintained across heterogeneous membership through intensive consultations. Cross-cutting alliances multiplied influence when aligned with sympathetic powers like EU in High Ambition Coalition. Long-term persistence over 31 years for loss and damage illustrates that small states can prevail through sustained advocacy. Existential vulnerability generated moral standing constraining what positions major emitters could publicly defend. AOSIS used procedural opportunities to force issues onto agendas.

Counterfactual analysis suggests observed outcomes would differ absent AOSIS. The 1.5°C scenario indicates Paris Agreement would likely have retained only 2°C threshold, as pre-2013 international consensus centered

on 2°C and major emitters initially resisted 1.5°C language. Loss and damage institutionalization clearly originated with AOSIS (1991 Vanuatu proposal) with developed countries consistently rejecting until 2022. The ICJ opinion request clearly originated with Pacific SIDS with no other actor having comparable incentive to pursue judicial interpretation.

However, influence remains bounded by material power asymmetries. Implementation gaps persist: current NDCs imply 2.5–3°C warming despite 1.5°C normative goal; loss and damage funding is 0.3% of estimated needs. Great powers retain veto capacity when vital interests are engaged, demonstrated by US withdrawal from Paris 2017–2021. Bilateral coercion through aid conditionality and investment flows constrains Pacific autonomy. Coalition fragmentation risks increase as economic heterogeneity creates tensions. SIDS influence operates in climate governance where specific enabling conditions obtain but remains limited in trade, security, or financial governance domains.

This pattern illustrates AOSIS consistently achieves

Table 1: Procedural Versus Substantive Success

Outcome	Procedural Success	Substantive Success	Gap Assessment
SIDS recognition (UNFCCC)	Full: Explicit textual recognition	Partial: Some finance flows but far below needs	Normative foundation created, implementation inadequate
1.5°C goal (Paris + ICJ)	Full: Treaty language, IPCC report, legal status	Failed: NDCs imply 2.5–3°C, emissions rising	Major normative victory, negligible behavioral impact
Loss and damage fund	Full: Institution established, operationalized	Minimal: \$700M vs \$150–300B annual needs (0.3%)	Institutional breakthrough, financial inadequacy
ICJ advisory opinion	Full: Opinion secured, favorable reasoning	Unknown: Impact still emerging, no enforcement	Normative success, substantive impact uncertain

procedural success—shaping texts, creating institutions, establishing norms—while substantive success remains elusive, reflecting limits of institutional and productive power when compulsory enforcement power is absent.

Implications for Great Power Theory

The empirical analysis demonstrates that great power theory’s explanatory power is domain-specific rather than universal. The findings refine rather than reject realism by specifying when material power operates directly versus when it is mediated by institutional and normative factors. Realism retains primacy in bilateral bargaining without institutional constraints, crisis negotiations requiring immediate resolution, security domains involving military force, short time horizons preventing reputation effects, and contexts lacking moral asymmetries. Institutionalized power supplements material power in highly institutionalized domains with consensus rules, long time horizons enabling reputation and norm diffusion, issues with stark moral asymmetries, availability of cross-cutting coalitions, and procedural

dimensions distinguishable from enforcement.

The analysis validates Barnett and Duvall’s insight that power is multidimensional. Material capabilities do not automatically translate into agenda control or normative authority in highly institutionalized settings. Small states lacking compulsory power can access other dimensions. Hierarchies are domain-specific: Pacific SIDS occupy subordinate positions in economic and military hierarchies but central positions in climate-normative hierarchies. Structural positioning is bidirectional: subordination constrains while simultaneously enabling moral standing through victimhood. Agency exists within structural constraints: small states make strategic choices that shape outcomes within bounds set by material power.

Defensive realist rejoinders merit consideration. The claim that 1.5°C and loss and damage are “cheap talk” underestimates reputational and legal costs. Major emitters resisted 1.5°C language for years precisely because they recognized normative commitments constrain future policy space. The ICJ’s legal interpretation demonstrates “cheap talk” can acquire legal force. The claim that great

powers conceded as part of intra-great-power bargains is partially valid but incomplete. Great power bargaining created openings SIDS exploited, but SIDS agency shaped how those openings translated into specific outcomes. The High Ambition Coalition required AOSIS entrepreneurship to construct. The claim that implementation failures prove SIDS influence is illusory correctly identifies limits but overstates the case. Procedural and normative gains create constituencies for compliance, enable litigation, and ratchet ambition over time.

Comparative Analysis and Generalizability

Systematic comparison to other small state coalitions suggests mechanisms generalize with important variations. Nordic states in humanitarian norms achieved high procedural and medium substantive success through high institutionalization, moral authority, long horizons, and supportive powers. Caribbean SIDS in financial regulation achieved medium procedural and low substantive success with medium institutionalization, weak moral asymmetry, and great power pressure. Small EU members in EU governance achieved high procedural and substantive success through very high institutionalization and formal equality. African LDCs in development finance achieved medium procedural and low substantive success.

Patterns identified include: institutionalization correlates with procedural success as small states achieve greatest influence in highly institutionalized settings with consensus rules; moral asymmetry amplifies but does not determine outcomes; substantive success requires additional factors like supranational enforcement mechanisms available in EU but not intergovernmental settings; time horizons matter consistently as all successful cases involve decades-long engagement; and cross-cutting coalitions multiply influence.

The framework generates testable predictions. If US–China rivalry intensifies and climate becomes more securitized, AOSIS influence on COP outcomes should decline after 2025 relative to 2015–2025 period. If domestic courts cite the 2025 ICJ advisory opinion, AOSIS influence in post-2025 negotiations should increase. If loss and damage fund remains undercapitalized below \$5 billion by 2030, AOSIS will shift strategy from institution-building to litigation-based enforcement. If China increases bilateral climate finance conditioned on reducing AOSIS coordination, coalition cohesion should weaken. AOSIS mechanisms should prove more effective in ocean governance than in trade or security domains.

CONCLUSION

This article examined how Small Pacific Island States exercise influence in UN-based climate diplomacy and what this reveals about the scope conditions and limits of great power theory. The analysis demonstrates that under specific conditions—high institutionalization with consensus rules, stark moral asymmetries, long time horizons, and cross-cutting coalitions—small states

leverage institutional and productive power to shape procedural and normative outcomes despite negligible material capabilities.

Pacific SIDS achieved notable successes: UNFCCC recognition of SIDS vulnerabilities (1992), the 1.5°C goal in the Paris Agreement (2015), creation of a loss and damage funding mechanism (2022), and an ICJ advisory opinion elevating climate obligations to legal benchmarks (2025). These victories reflect strategic deployment of coalition-based institutional power, agenda-setting capacity, and norm entrepreneurship operating through AOSIS coordination, cross-cutting alliances, persistent advocacy, and moral authority derived from existential vulnerability.

But, influence remains bounded. Procedural and normative gains do not translate automatically into substantive behavioral change. Current emissions trajectories, inadequate climate finance, and implementation gaps illustrate that small states cannot compel compliance when great power domestic interests resist. The gap between commitment and compliance reflects persistent material power asymmetries.

The article makes three theoretical contributions. First, it refines great power theory by specifying institutional and issue-area scope conditions where material power is mediated by formal rules and normative structures. Second, it extends Long's framework by demonstrating synergistic interactions among derivative, collective, and particular-intrinsic power. Third, it operationalizes Barnett and Duvall's power taxonomy by specifying causal mechanisms in global environmental governance.

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