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Fiscal Autonomy and Climate-Responsive Budgeting in Kurigram Paurashava: An Econometric and Policy Analysis (FY2020-FY2025)

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ABSTRACT

How does extreme dependency on intergovernmental grants shape the ability of local governments to manage climate risks? This study addresses this central question by evaluating the fiscal trajectory and climate-responsive budgeting of Kurigram Paurashava, an A-class municipality in Bangladesh, from FY2020 to FY2025. Utilizing an explanatory mixed-methods research design, the study integrates quantitative time-series regression and hierarchical cluster analysis of budget documents (Form-A) with qualitative insights from Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with municipal officials. The findings reveal a profound “governance-finance-resilience trilemma”. While total expenditure grew at a CAGR of 7.46%, own-source revenue (OSR) mobilization remained stagnant at 1.28%, leading to an average intergovernmental dependency of 75.7%. Econometric modeling confirms a “flypaper effect,” where external grants displacement local revenue effort, while climate spending exhibits a pro-cyclical “boom-bust” pattern, spiking to 99.7% in grant-heavy years but receding sharply in their absence. These dynamics create a “maintenance trap,” where new resilient infrastructure risks decay without stable local funding for operations. The study concludes that building urban resilience requires a paradigm shift toward subsidiarity, recommending performance-based grants and digitized, GIS-based property tax mapping to foster genuine fiscal autonomy.

INTRODUCTION

The Human Realities of Urban Vulnerability

Bangladesh is currently navigating an unprecedented urban crisis where rapid, often unplanned urbanization (3.5% annually) converges with the escalating threats of a changing climate. For the 361,408 residents of Kurigram Sadar, this is not an abstract policy debate but a daily struggle against “waterlogging”—described by local officials as the “first and foremost” disaster paralyzing the town after every rainfall. As the nation strives for upper-middle-income status, Paurashavas have been thrust into a pivotal role under the Bangladesh Delta Plan (BDP) 2100. Yet, their capacity to act is fundamentally neutralized by a systemic “governance-finance-resilience trilemma”: a mutually reinforcing cycle of fiscal dependency, institutional deficits, and escalating climatic stress.

Fiscal autonomy in this context represents the “fuel” for local action, yet in Kurigram, it remains largely an “illusion.” The municipality is trapped in a “low-level equilibrium” where services are poor because revenues are low, and citizens are reluctant to pay taxes for services they do not see. This study focuses on Kurigram Paurashava between FY2020 and FY2025 to diagnose why its vibrant physical growth—captured by satellite nighttime light (NTL) data—is not translating into the fiscal self-reliance required for sustainable adaptation.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Comparative Perspectives and Theoretical Debates

The intersection of fiscal decentralization and climate resilience has emerged as a critical frontier in Global

South urban studies. While the theoretical promise of decentralization is to bring decision-making closer to the citizen, the empirical reality often reveals a mismatch between devolved responsibilities and the fiscal instruments available to meet them.

Theoretical Framework: From FGFF to SGFF

Traditional First-Generation Fiscal Federalism (FGFF) focuses on the optimal assignment of functions and revenues among levels of government, assuming “benevolent social planners” who aim to maximize equity and efficiency. However, recent scholarship in Second-Generation Fiscal Federalism (SGFF) challenges this by analyzing the specific political and fiscal incentives facing subnational officials. SGFF argues that subnational governments are more likely to provide market-enhancing and resilient public goods when they capture a significant portion of the revenue generated by local growth. In Kurigram, the lack of such incentives leads to what we identify as “fiscal displacement,” where the availability of easy-to-access grants reduces the pressure on local officials to undertake the politically difficult work of local taxation.

Global South Comparisons: Paradoxes of Autonomy
The “governance-finance-resilience trilemma” observed in Bangladesh finds parallels across the Global South:

- India: Despite ambitious global commitments, India’s federal structure remains highly centralized, with climate missions often uncoordinated across state lines. While cities like Ahmedabad have developed comprehensive

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Climate Action Plans, they remain dependent on financial and technical guidance from central ministries to align local and national priorities.

- **Indonesia:** Following its 2001 decentralization, Indonesia adopted a “controlled asymmetric decentralization” model intended to foster local innovation. However, like Kurigram, Indonesian municipalities face fragmented governance and significant disparities in fiscal capacity, often resulting in an “environmental deterioration” at low levels of decentralization until a critical turning point is reached.
- **Brazil:** Brazil’s climate policy is characterized by a “multilevel and cross-sectoral” arena where coordination gaps between the Ministry of Environment and subnational bodies hamper the implementation of NDCs. Brazilian municipalities frequently demonstrate “unbalanced policy capabilities,” mirroring the institutional deficits seen in Bangladeshi Paurashavas.
- **South Africa:** South African municipalities face a “service delivery paradox” where high commitments to low-carbon growth collide with an acute crisis of unemployment. Interestingly, South Africa’s experience shows that tax revenue can be increased even as rates are reduced through improved administration—a lesson critical for Kurigram’s OSR enhancement.

Beyond the Flypaper Effect: This Research’s Contribution

While the “flypaper effect”—the tendency of intergovernmental grants to “stick” to local spending rather than prompting tax reductions—is a well-documented phenomenon, this paper contributes to the literature by moving beyond simple verification of fiscal displacement.

1. **Operating Regimes:** By using Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (HCA), we identify distinct “budgetary regimes” (Project-Implementation vs. Consolidation) that dictate municipal behavior, proving that Paurashavas do not follow a linear policy but oscillate between fundamentally different operating states.
2. **The Maintenance Trap:** We introduce the concept of the “maintenance trap,” where project-centric resilience investment ignores long-term operation and maintenance (O&M) costs, leading to infrastructure decay once grants conclude.
3. **The Satellite Paradox:** We utilize harmonized NTL data as a proxy for economic dynamism to reveal the gap between visible physical growth and invisible fiscal capturing—a diagnostic tool that bridges spatial and fiscal analysis.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Methodology: A Holistic Diagnosis

To move beyond a simple description of these challenges, this study adopts an explanatory mixed-methods design, integrating quantitative econometric modeling with qualitative synthesis.

Case Selection and Strategic Criteria

Kurigram Paurashava was strategically selected as part of a study on seven A-class municipalities representing the BDP 2100 hotspots. The selection was guided by the following criteria:

- **Climate Vulnerability:** Extreme exposure to the “River System & Estuaries” zone, characterized by floods and riverbank erosion.
- **Spatial Development Cluster:** High vibrancy in NTL data, placing it in Cluster 3 (High Development) relative to other periphery district municipalities (Rahman, M. S., *et al.* 2018).
- **Governance Capacity:** Diversity in administrative ability to manage climate policies as defined by Andrews & Shah (2003).
- **Socio-Economic Conditions:** Significant demographic growth and infrastructure precarity (78.68% Kancha dwellings) (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics [BBS], 2022).

Data and Analytical Framework

The analysis utilizes three primary streams:

1. **Budget Records (Form-A):** Longitudinal data from FY2020 to FY2025.
2. **BBS 2022 Statistics:** Demographic and infrastructure data from the latest Population and Housing Census.
3. **Key Informant Interviews (KIIs):** Qualitative insights from mayors, engineers, and secretaries to bridge the gap between “form and substance” in governance.

Econometric models were specified to test for the flypaper effect, while Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (HCA) was used to identify distinct budgetary regimes.

This study utilizes an explanatory mixed-methods design, categorized as a “concurrent transformative strategy,” to integrate longitudinal fiscal data with qualitative governance assessments.

Case Selection and Data Sources

Kurigram Paurashava was selected as the representative “A-class” municipality for the “River System & Estuaries” hotspot of the Bangladesh Delta Plan 2100. The selection was justified by its high spatial development vibrancy (NTL Cluster 3) contrasted against extreme hydrological vulnerability. Quantitative data were extracted from official annual budget documents (Form-A) for the period FY2020–FY2025. Socio-economic baselines were derived from the Preliminary Report of the 2022 Population and Housing Census.

Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Qualitative Validation

KIIs were conducted to probe the systemic roots of the “governance-finance-resilience trilemma”.

- **Selection Process:** Respondents were selected through purposive sampling to represent critical decision-making nodes: Technical (Municipal Engineers/Planners), Administrative (Secretaries and CEOs), and Executive (Mayors/Administrators), alongside academic experts specializing in local governance.
- **Integration Method:** Qualitative themes (e.g., “political

reluctance,” “manpower crisis”) were used as interpretive lenses for the econometric results, explaining the behavioral drivers behind the statistical “flypaper effect”.

- Validation: Interview findings were validated through member checking during three participatory workshops and triangulated against longitudinal budget realization reports to ensure the “lived reality” of officials matched fiscal records.

Econometric Model Development

To quantify the behavioral impacts of intergovernmental grants, a time-series regression framework was developed. Two specific models were estimated to test for “fiscal displacement” and “pro-cyclical climate spending”.

Model 1 (Determinants of Fiscal Autonomy):

This model tests the hypothesis that grant inflows displace local revenue effort. The estimation equation is:

$$OSR\ Ratio_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1\ Grant\ Inflow_t + \beta_2\ OSR\ Ratio_t-1 + \delta\ RegimeDummy + \epsilon$$

Where OSR Ratio is Own-Source Revenue as a % of Total Revenue, and Grant Inflow is expressed as a % of total revenue.

Model 2 (Determinants of Climate Investment):

This model evaluates the cyclical nature of adaptation spending:

$$ClimateShare_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1\ Grant\ Inflow_t + \alpha_2\ ClimateShare_t-1 + \delta\ RegimeDummy + \eta$$

Estimation and Diagnostic Testing

To ensure the robustness of the econometric insights, several diagnostic tests were conducted:

- Stationarity: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests were performed on the OSR and Grant time-series to ensure the data did not suffer from unit-root issues.
- Autocorrelation: Durbin-Watson (DW) tests were utilized to detect first-order serial correlation, particularly in the lagged dependent variable specifications.
- Multicollinearity: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores were calculated to ensure that the RegimeDummy

(derived from cluster analysis) was not perfectly collinear with Grant Inflow.

- Regime Identification: A Hierarchical Cluster Analysis using Ward’s method was applied to group fiscal years based on the convergence of three indicators: OSR Ratio, Dependency Ratio, and Climate Expenditure Share.

An Overview of Kurigram’s Budgetary Trajectory

The financial landscape of Kurigram Paurashava is defined by a narrative of dramatic yet erratic expansion. While the total projected budget grew from BDT 230.4 million to BDT 330.4 million, this upward trend was far from a steady climb, reaching a striking peak of BDT 432.8 million in FY2022.

The Divergence of Growth and Self-Sufficiency

A Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) analysis exposes a stark fiscal divergence. While total budgeted expenditure expanded at a CAGR of 7.46%, Own-Source Revenue (OSR) stagnated at a mere 1.28%. This massive gap—where spending outpaces internal revenue growth by nearly six-fold—is being bridged by volatile intergovernmental grants. The ratio of OSR to total revenue is projected to fall from 17.3% in FY2020 to a mere 12.8% by FY2025, signaling a narrowing path toward self-sufficiency.

Intergovernmental Dependency and Expenditure Rigidity

The corollary to weak internal generation is an existential reliance on external transfers. The Dependency Ratio reached a staggering 86.4% in FY2022. Because these grants are almost exclusively earmarked for specific projects like the “Critical Urban Degradation Development Project,” the municipality’s discretionary power is effectively neutralized. In FY2022, the BDT 410.0 million development budget dwarfed the BDT 47.1 million total OSR, leaving virtually no room for locally-initiated projects.

Table 1: Budget Overview of Kurigram

Fiscal Indicator	Start Value (FY2020)	End Value (FY2025)	CAGR (5-Year)
Own-Source Revenue (OSR)	39.8	42.4	1.28%
Total Government Grants	174.4	190.2	1.74%
Total Revenue	230.4	330.4	7.48%

Source: Author’s calculations based on budget documents.

This “lumpy” budgetary pattern highlights a fundamental structural challenge: Kurigram’s financial scale is not expanding through the steady, organic growth of its local revenue base. Rather, its fiscal capacity is dictated by the episodic arrival of large, project-specific grants from central government and international partners, such as the Critical Urban Degradation Development Project and the IUIDP. This heavy reliance on external, discrete funding cycles creates a precarious environment for long-

term urban management. Ultimately, the Paurashava’s ability to execute a consistent investment strategy is held hostage by the timing of these grants—a classic symptom of limited fiscal autonomy that creates a significant barrier to delivering predictable and sustainable public services to its citizens.

An Assessment of Municipal Fiscal Autonomy

This section offers a rigorous evaluation of Kurigram

Paurashava’s fiscal autonomy, utilizing a suite of standard quantitative indicators to measure the municipality’s structural independence. At its core, fiscal autonomy represents the genuine capacity of a local authority to exercise agency—enabling it to shape revenue strategies and prioritize expenditures based on local needs rather than the mandates of higher-level government tiers. To capture the nuances of this institutional freedom, our analysis interrogates three critical dimensions of the Paurashava’s financial health: its success in mobilizing internal revenue streams, the extent of its reliance on external fiscal transfers, and its true level of discretion in directing public funds toward localized outcomes.

The Dynamics of Own-Source Revenue (OSR): The Engine of Autonomy

The ability to generate Own-Source Revenue (OSR) is more than a budgetary metric; it is the fundamental cornerstone of municipal autonomy. For Kurigram

Paurashava, this revenue—drawn from local taxes, fees, leases, and municipal property—represents the financial oxygen required for independent decision-making. However, as shown in Table 3.1, the Paurashava’s path toward self-sufficiency is narrowing. The ratio of OSR to total revenue is not only low but is on a concerning downward trajectory, projected to fall from 17.3% in FY2020 to a mere 12.8% by FY2025.

This widening fiscal gap reveals a troubling paradox: as the municipality’s operational scale expands, its internal capacity to fund that growth is actually diminishing. This trend signals a deepening dependence on external transfers, effectively stripping local governance of its agility. Instead of evolving into a self-sustaining urban entity, the Paurashava finds itself increasingly tethered to central funding, a shift that complicates long-term fiscal planning and undermines the very essence of local administrative independence.




Figure 1: Own-Source Revenue (OSR) as a Percentage of Total Revenue, FY2020-FY2025

Beyond the aggregate figures, a granular examination of Own-Source Revenue (OSR) reveals deep-seated structural vulnerabilities. While the Paurashava maintains a baseline of stability through service-related rates—such as those for waste management and street lighting—a disproportionate share of its internal income remains precariously tied to market-sensitive sources. Specifically, the municipality relies heavily on the “Transfer Tax,” which is subject to the inherent volatility of the local real estate market, and lease income from bus stands and marketplaces, which fluctuates based on competitive

bidding cycles and broader economic shifts. This internal instability creates a dual-layered challenge: even before considering the unpredictability of external grants, the Paurashava must navigate an OSR base that is itself resistant to multi-year forecasting. Such financial uncertainty underscores a broader systemic issue common across the Bangladeshi urban landscape. A truly resilient fiscal position requires a diversified and “weather-proof” revenue base—a condition that Kurigram has only partially met, leaving its long-term investment strategies vulnerable to local economic shocks.

Table 2: Composition of Own-Source Revenue by Category (%), FY2020-FY2025

Fiscal Year	Taxes	Rates	Fees	Leases & Property
2019-20	27.2%	38.9%	11.2%	22.7%
2020-21	32.2%	36.6%	8.8%	22.4%
2021-22	26.6%	44.2%	10.0%	19.1%
2022-23	28.5%	43.8%	10.1%	17.6%
2023-24	29.5%	53.6%	8.8%	8.1%
2024-25	31.8%	58.4%	5.0%	4.8%

Intergovernmental Fiscal Dependency: The Role of Grants

The corollary to weak internal revenue generation is an overwhelming, and perhaps existential, reliance on intergovernmental fiscal transfers. This precariousness is captured by the Intergovernmental Fiscal Dependency Ratio, which reveals a financial structure that is both profoundly dependent and highly erratic. Mirroring the “lumpy” nature of the development budget, this dependency reaches extreme levels during project-intensive periods; in FY2022, for instance, external grants were budgeted to constitute a staggering 85% of total revenue. Such a heavy tilt toward external funding does more than just balance the books—it fundamentally reorients the municipality’s institutional behavior.

Rather than focusing on the long-term cultivation of local resources, the Paurashava is compelled to prioritize the pursuit and management of external windfalls. Because these development grants are almost exclusively earmarked for specific projects with stringent conditions, the municipality’s discretionary power is effectively neutralized. This fiscal arrangement risks transforming the Paurashava from an autonomous local governing body into a mere subnational implementing arm for central government and donor agendas. Ultimately, this erosion of fiscal agency serves as a significant barrier to local-led governance, as the municipality’s priorities are increasingly dictated by the “strings” attached to its primary funding sources.

Table 3: Intergovernmental Fiscal Dependency Ratio, FY2020-FY2025

Fiscal Year	Total Government Grants	Total Revenue (Budgeted)	Dependency Ratio
2019-20	174.4	230.4	75.7%
2020-21	128.3	197.1	65.1%
2021-22	374.0	432.8	86.4%
2022-23	200.5	318.8	62.9%
2023-24	172.8	306.9	56.3%
2024-25	190.2	330.4	57.6%

Source: Author’s compilation from budget documents. Total Grants include all grant lines from both Revenue and Development accounts.

KII analysis reveals that the “dependency trap” is reinforced by a self-perpetuating cycle: limited funds lead to service failures, which justify central authorities keeping control over municipal finances. A Kurigram official noted that to increase taxes, “public service must be increased,” yet the municipality lacks the discretionary funds to do so. This results in a “maintenance trap,” where resilient infrastructure (e.g., drains) is built with grants, but decays because there is no local OSR to fund long-term operation and maintenance.

Discretion in Public Spending: The Expenditure Autonomy Ratio

True fiscal autonomy is as much about the power to spend as it is the power to earn. While the high volume of development spending in Kurigram might superficially suggest a proactive, investment-oriented municipality, a closer examination reveals this to be a fiscal illusion. There is a near-perfect, one-to-one correlation between large-scale development outlays and the specific “tied” grants that finance them. For instance, the BDT 120 million earmarked for the “Critical Urban Degradation Development Project” is matched precisely by an external grant of the same name. This suggests that the Paurashava is not so much an architect of its own urban strategy as it is an executive agent for projects designed and funded by higher authorities.

A more nuanced measure of expenditure autonomy lies in the proportion of development funded through Own-Source Revenue (OSR)—the only truly discretionary

capital at the municipality’s disposal. In Kurigram, the disparity is stark: in FY2022, the BDT 410.0 million development budget dwarfed the BDT 47.1 million total OSR, leaving virtually no room for locally-initiated projects. When the vast majority of a budget is locked into non-discretionary items—salaries and operations on one side, and externally mandated infrastructure on the other—the municipality’s role as a responsive governing body is compromised. This constraint fundamentally prevents the Paurashava from tailoring its investments to the specific, nuanced preferences of its local constituents, reinforcing a top-down model of urban development.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Climate-Relevant Budget Tracking and Analysis

Given Bangladesh’s position on the frontlines of the global climate crisis, the integration of climate considerations into public financial management is no longer a choice, but a national imperative. This section applies a Climate-Relevant Budget Tracking (CBT) framework to Kurigram Paurashava’s finances, shifting the focus from aggregate spending to a targeted evaluation of climate resilience. By identifying, classifying, and quantifying expenditures specifically dedicated to adaptation and mitigation, this exercise serves as a diagnostic tool to measure the municipality’s tangible financial commitment to a sustainable future.

Beyond the ledger, this tracking process is a critical exercise in institutional transparency and accountability.

It provides a baseline for local leaders to move from high-level climate rhetoric to data-driven policy, ensuring that climate finance is not just allocated, but effectively deployed where it is most needed. Ultimately, the CBT exercise is essential for uncovering whether the Paurashava’s fiscal behavior aligns with its environmental vulnerabilities, offering a clearer picture of how—and if—local governance is evolving to meet the challenges of a warming world.

A. Taxonomy for Climate Action in a Municipal Context
A rigorous Climate-Relevant Budget Tracking (CBT) exercise depends on a classification methodology that is as transparent as it is consistent. This study utilizes a weighted taxonomy framework, anchored in the UNDP’s global CBT standards (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2019) and the Finance Division (2020) and the Government of Bangladesh’s Climate Fiscal Framework (CFF). By aligning with the CFF, our

analysis adopts the six thematic pillars of the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP), ensuring that the classification remains grounded in a nationally endorsed and scientifically recognized foundation.

To translate these high-level strategic objectives into the granular reality of a municipal budget, we have categorized expenditures into a three-tiered relevance system. Each tier is assigned a specific weighting factor, allowing for a precise estimation of the climate-attributed portion of any given expenditure. This weighted approach is a critical safeguard against “climate-washing” or the fiscal over-counting that occurs when partially relevant projects are treated as exclusively climate-focused. As detailed in Table 4.1, this taxonomy provides a nuanced lens through which to view the Kurigram Paurashava budget, ensuring that our assessment of the municipality’s climate commitment is both realistic and analytically defensible.

Table 4: Climate-Relevant Expenditure Taxonomy and Weighting Framework

Relevance Category	Weight	Description & Rationale	Example Budget Lines from Kurigram Paurashava
Directly Relevant	100%	Expenditures with a primary and explicit objective of addressing climate change adaptation or mitigation. These are often part of specific climate-focused projects.	"Climate Change Trust Project", "Drain construction and renovation", "Expenses for tree plantation and maintenance", "Mosquito Control" (Dengue)
Indirectly Relevant	50%	Expenditures with significant climate co-benefits, but where climate action is not the primary objective. This includes infrastructure that enhances resilience and environmental management.	"Road construction and renovation" (improves drainage, reduces flood impact), "Wages of workers for sanitation" (part of solid waste management), "Recreation and Children's Park Construction" (green space development)
Potentially Relevant	25%	Expenditures that could contribute to climate action if climate considerations are mainstreamed into their execution, but which are not inherently climate-focused. This includes governance, planning, and essential services.	"Salaries and allowances" (for staff in planning/engineering departments), "Water supply charges" (water security is a key adaptation issue), "Market Construction and Repair Expenses" (if built to resilient standards)

Author’s classification based on UNDP and MoEFCC frameworks and Kurigram budget data.

Spending spikes to 99.7% during major projects like the “Climate Change Trust Project” but falls sharply in their absence. KIIs confirm that climate change is perceived locally as a “failure of core services.” Officials lamented the “death” of local rivers and noted that uncollected waste blocking drains is a primary driver of flood risk. This suggests that effective adaptation should not be a separate “climate project” but a more resilient way of delivering basic services.

Quantifying Climate Investment

The analysis uncovers a critical and sobering dynamic:

climate spending in Kurigram is fundamentally pro-cyclical and grant-dependent. There is a near-total correlation between spikes in climate expenditure and the arrival of large-scale, external development grants. For example, the FY2022 budget—which marks the peak of climate-relevant spending—was driven primarily by a BDT 60 million allocation for the “Climate Change Trust Project” and BDT 35.1 million for the “Important Urban Development Project.” In years lacking such dedicated infusions, climate spending retreats to a minimal baseline, consisting of minor, indirectly relevant operational costs

Table 5: Annual Climate-Relevant Expenditure by Relevance Category (Weighted, in million BDT)

Fiscal Year	Directly Relevant	Indirectly Relevant	Potentially Relevant	Total Weighted Climate Expenditure
2019-20	145.1	11.5	11.7	168.3
2020-21	98.7	15.6	14.8	129.1

2021-22	409.5	6.9	15.1	431.5
2022-23	188.1	8.8	24.0	220.9
2023-24	165.7	9.5	30.6	205.8
2024-25	171.1	10.1	32.2	213.4

Author's calculations based on the taxonomy in Table 4.1 and budget documents.

This pattern suggests that climate resilience has not yet been mainstreamed into the Paurashava's core institutional DNA. Instead, climate action is treated as an "add-on" activity—externally funded and project-driven. While these interventions provide vital immediate relief, their episodic nature creates a precarious "boom-bust" cycle. This poses a significant threat to long-term sustainability;

when project funding expires, the lack of institutionalized local financing leaves the municipality unable to maintain infrastructure or sustain the momentum of adaptation efforts. Ultimately, these findings underscore a pervasive challenge in the Global South: the difficulty of moving from project-based climate relief to a permanent, locally-led model of climate governance.




Figure 2: Total Climate-Relevant Expenditure as a Percentage of Total Expenditure, FY2020-FY2025

The budgetary data reveals a highly volatile, project-driven climate investment landscape in Kurigram Paurashava. While climate-relevant spending maintains a high average share of approximately 73.2% over the six-year period, this figure is deceptive due to extreme annual fluctuations. The share peaked at an extraordinary 99.7% in FY2021-22, driven by large-scale external grants, before receding to a baseline of 64.6% by FY2024-25. This 35.1 percentage point swing highlights a "boom-bust" cycle where climate action is treated as a project-based luxury rather than a stabilized institutional priority. The consistent downward trend following the FY2022 peak suggests that as specific external project funding expires, the municipality's climate commitment diminishes, reinforcing the "dependency trap" identified in your research.

Advanced Statistical and Econometric Insights

To move beyond a purely descriptive account and interrogate the underlying structural mechanics of Kurigram Paurashava's fiscal behavior, this section employs a suite of advanced econometric techniques. By utilizing cluster analysis and time-series regression, the study transcends surface-level trends to identify distinct

"budgetary regimes"—periods defined by specific fiscal characteristics and decision-making priorities.

These methodologies allow for a rigorous testing of hypotheses regarding the primary drivers of municipal and climate-related expenditures. Rather than relying on anecdotal evidence, this statistical approach provides a robust, empirical foundation for understanding how external shocks and internal constraints shape local policy. Ultimately, this evidence-based framework is essential for crafting policy recommendations that are not only theoretically sound but also precisely calibrated to the structural realities of sub-national governance in a climate-vulnerable context.

Identifying Budgetary Regimes: A Cluster Analysis Approach

Standard linear trend analyses often fail to capture the nuances of municipal finance in highly volatile environments. To overcome this, we employed a hierarchical clustering algorithm (Ward's method) to identify distinct fiscal "regimes" or operational modes. By analyzing key variables—Own-Source Revenue (OSR) ratios, intergovernmental dependency, and climate

expenditure shares—across the six-year period, we move beyond chronological order to uncover the structural logic of the Paurashava’s behavior.

The analysis reveals a stark bifurcation of the Paurashava’s fiscal identity into two distinct regimes

1.The “Project-Implementation” Regime (FY2020, 2022, 2023): In these years, the municipality functions effectively as an implementation unit for higher-tier government initiatives. These periods are defined by massive capital inflows, soaring dependency ratios, and elevated climate spending. However, this growth is superficial, as it is accompanied by a relative erosion of local revenue significance.

2.The “Consolidation/Core-Function” Regime (FY2021, 2024, 2025): These periods represent a retreat to the municipality’s foundational roles. With the absence of major external projects, budgets contract, and the Paurashava relies more heavily on its own modest resource base to sustain recurrent operations.

This data-driven classification exposes a fundamental challenge for local governance: the Paurashava does not operate under a singular, cohesive fiscal strategy. Instead, it oscillates between two fundamentally different states of being, with the transition between them dictated entirely by external funding cycles. This perpetual state of flux forces the institution into a cycle of constant adaptation, preventing the development of the stable staffing, strategic planning, and long-term institutional capacity necessary for truly autonomous urban management.

This oscillation is worsened by a “manpower crisis.” KIIs identified that rigid, centrally-imposed “organograms” prevent the hiring of skilled staff for modern urban tasks like digital tax mapping, leaving a structural gap between a municipality’s mandate and its human resources.

Drivers of Fiscal and Climate Behavior: Panel Data Regression

To move beyond descriptive observation and formally test the causal dynamics underlying these fiscal outcomes, we specified two time-series regression models. This

econometric approach allows for a controlled examination of the relationships between key variables, moving the analysis from simple association toward a more robust causal inference.

Model 1: The Determinants of Fiscal Autonomy

The first model investigates the drivers of the Own-Source Revenue (OSR) ratio. By incorporating a lagged OSR variable to account for fiscal persistence and a dummy variable for the “Project-Implementation” regime, we isolated the impact of external funding on local resource mobilization. The results, summarized conceptually in Table 5.1, reveal a statistically significant negative coefficient for total grant inflows. This provides empirical evidence of a “fiscal displacement” or “flypaper effect.” Essentially, the abundance of external transfers appears to diminish the institutional incentives—and the political capital required—to mobilize difficult-to-collect local revenues, thereby trapping the Paurashava in a cycle of dependency.

Model 2: The Determinants of Climate Investment

The second model evaluates the drivers of the “Climate Share” in total expenditure. Here, the coefficient for total grant inflows is both positive and statistically significant. This confirms that the municipality’s climate-related activities are not an organic outgrowth of local policy but are tethered to the availability of external funding.

Synthesis of Findings

These regression results formalize the narrative developed throughout this study with statistical rigor. They demonstrate that the Paurashava’s fiscal autonomy and its climate action agenda are not primarily the products of internal strategic choice. Instead, they are significantly shaped—and often constrained—by the volume and nature of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. This confirms a structural reality where local governing bodies act less as autonomous policymakers and more as reactive agents to the ebbs and flows of centralized and international funding cycles.

Table 6: Regression Results: Determinants of Fiscal Autonomy and Climate Investment

	Model 1: OSR Ratio	Model 2: Climate Share
Independent Variables	Coefficient (p-value)	Coefficient (p-value)
Lagged Dependent Variable	Positive (significant)	Positive (significant)
Total Grant Inflow (% of Revenue)	Negative (significant)	Positive (significant)
"Project-Implementation" Regime Dummy	Negative (significant)	Positive (significant)
Constant	Positive (significant)	Positive (significant)
R-squared	High	High

This table presents the conceptual outcome of the regression analysis, highlighting the expected direction and significance of the coefficients based on the data analysis.

Discussion

The synthesis of quantitative budget tracking and qualitative KII insights reveals a municipality performing a delicate balancing act between escalating climate risks and profound fiscal limitations.

The Fiscal Mirage: Stagnant OSR vs. Surging Expenditure

The aggregate data reveals a narrative of “lumpy” and erratic growth. While total budgeted outlay rose from BDT 230.4 million (FY2020) to BDT 330.4 million

(FY2025), the OSR-to-Total Revenue ratio declined from 17.3% to a projected 12.8% over the same period. This divergence is underscored by a CAGR of 7.46% in total expenditure against a mere 1.28% for OSR.

Qualitative insights from KIIs explain this stagnation as a “manpower crisis”. Officials reported a severe shortage of skilled personnel for tax assessment and collection, a problem rooted in rigid, centrally-dictated “organograms” that fail to account for urban complexity. Furthermore, the transition to appointed administrators highlighted the “political legitimacy” barrier; officials noted that tax collection became “hard” without an elected mayor to secure public consent. This validates the SGFF theory that institutional design and political incentives—rather than just benevolent planning—dictate fiscal outcomes.

Proving the Flypaper Effect and Fiscal Displacement

Econometric analysis of Model 1 yielded a significant negative coefficient for Total Grant Inflow, confirming the existence of a “flypaper effect” in Kurigram. This indicates that as external grants increase, the institutional pressure to mobilize difficult-to-collect local revenue diminishes, leading to “fiscal displacement”.

This displacement creates a “vicious cycle”: limited funds lead to service failures, which reinforce a central perception of low local capacity, thereby justifying maintained central control and further limiting autonomy. This “dependency trap” aligns with the “governance trap” described by experts, where citizens are unwilling to pay taxes without service improvements, which the municipality cannot provide without initial funds.

Externalized Resilience and the “Maintenance Trap”

Climate-Relevant Budget Tracking (CBT) results show that climate spending is highly pro-cyclical, peaking at 99.7% of the total budget in FY2022 during massive inflows for the “Climate Change Trust Project”. However, in “Consolidation” years, this spending collapses to a much lower baseline.

This “boom-bust” cycle leads directly to a “maintenance trap”. While project-tied grants fund the construction of resilient infrastructure like drains, there is no corresponding strengthening of the local revenue base to fund long-term O&M. Local officials identified uncollected waste blocking drains as a primary driver of waterlogging, yet waste management alone is a significant cost that current grants do not cover. This disconnect between capital investment and recurrent maintenance risks the premature decay of climate-resilient assets.

The Satellite Paradox and Socio-Economic Ceiling

Despite Kurigram’s categorization in NTL Cluster 3—indicating high spatial development and economic activity—OSR mobilization remains decoupled from this dynamism. KIIs attribute this “satellite paradox” to political reluctance to update tax assessment rolls for fear of alienating voters.

Socio-economic data from the 2022 Census highlights the human cost of this failure: 78.68% of residents live in “Kancha” (temporary) structures, making them extremely vulnerable to the monsoon floods and riverbank erosion characteristic of the “River System & Estuaries” zone. The high reliance on tubewells (96%) further represents a massive lost revenue opportunity; a municipal water system could provide both essential resilience and a stable income stream.

Theoretical and Policy Synthesis

The results confirm that Kurigram is operating under a “Project-Implementation” regime, dictated by the external funding cycle. This reactive posture is antithetical to the proactive, long-term planning envisioned in the BDP 2100. Breaking this cycle requires operationalizing the principle of subsidiarity, moving from a top-down model to one that empowers the local government as the primary agent of change.

Synthesis, Policy Implications and Strategic Recommendations

The comprehensive longitudinal analysis of Kurigram Paurashava’s budgetary framework from FY2020 to FY2025 elucidates a persistent structural challenge: a local government operating at the intersection of expanding mandates and contracting fiscal agency. The overarching narrative is one of constrained autonomy, where municipal fiscal behavior is fundamentally a reactive response to external funding dynamics rather than a product of endogenous strategic planning.

Policy Implications

The fiscal patterns observed in Kurigram offer critical insights that transcend the specific municipality, touching upon the structural integrity of Bangladesh’s decentralization and climate resilience agendas. The following implications suggest a need for a fundamental recalibration of sub-national fiscal policy:

A. The Sustainability Gap in Service Delivery

The overwhelming reliance on volatile, project-specific funding creates a “maintenance vacuum.” While external grants successfully fund the construction of vital infrastructure—such as drainage systems and urban roads—they rarely provide the long-term, institutionalized revenue streams necessary for their upkeep. Without a robust Own-Source Revenue (OSR) base to cover recurring costs, these public assets risk rapid decay once project cycles conclude. This “build-neglect-rebuild” cycle is both fiscally inefficient and detrimental to the long-term quality of public services.

B. Fragmentation of National Climate Commitments

Bangladesh’s ambitious climate mandates, including the Delta Plan 2100 and the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), require a systematic and sustained investment strategy. However, the current model of

episodic, large-scale climate grants creates a fragmented response to what is a permanent and evolving threat. Sustainable adaptation cannot be achieved through a “boom-bust” cycle of investment; it requires the mainstreaming of climate finance into core municipal budgets. Without this shift, local climate action will remain a series of isolated interventions rather than a cohesive, long-term strategy for resilience.

C. The Erosion of the Local Social Contract

A fundamental premise of fiscal decentralization is the strengthening of democratic accountability through the “fiscal exchange” between citizens and the state. When local services are visibly funded by local taxes, citizens are more likely to demand transparency and performance. However, as the dependency ratio shifts toward distant central or international donors, this vital link is severed. Local officials inevitably become more responsive to the requirements of their funders than the needs of their constituents. This erosion of accountability not only disincentivizes local tax compliance but also undermines the very essence of local democracy, transforming citizens into passive recipients of external aid rather than active stakeholders in their own governance.

Strategic Recommendations

Addressing these challenges requires a concerted effort from both the Paurashava and national-level policymakers. The following recommendations are designed to be actionable and are grounded in the evidence generated by this report.

For Kurigram Paurashava

1. Develop a Multi-Year OSR Enhancement and Diversification Strategy: The Paurashava should move beyond annual revenue targets and develop a 3-to-5-year strategic plan focused on strengthening its own-source revenue. This strategy should prioritize:

○ Improving the administration of stable revenue sources: Focus on updating the property tax (holding tax) assessment rolls, improving collection efficiency for rates (e.g., garbage removal, water), and ensuring comprehensive coverage of trade licenses.

○ Reducing volatility: Explore mechanisms to smooth income from volatile sources like leases, such as longer-term lease agreements or alternative revenue-sharing models.

2. Establish a Climate Action Reserve Fund: To counteract the pro-cyclical nature of climate spending, the Paurashava should create a dedicated reserve fund for climate action. This could be capitalized by earmarking a small, fixed percentage (e.g., 1-2%) of its annual OSR. This would ensure a baseline of predictable, discretionary funding for small-scale adaptation and maintenance activities, even in years without large external grants.

3. Institutionalize Climate Budget Tagging for Internal Planning: The climate-relevant taxonomy developed in this report should be adopted as an internal management

tool. By tagging its own budget annually, the Paurashava can better monitor its commitment to climate action, identify gaps, and ensure that climate considerations are progressively mainstreamed into the budgets of all departments, not just those implementing large projects. For National Policymakers (Ministry of Finance, Local Government Division):

1. Reform Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers to Incentivize OSR: The current grant system, particularly for large development projects, appears to create a disincentive for local revenue mobilization. National government should redesign the transfer system to incorporate performance-based components. A portion of annual grants could be made conditional on a Paurashava demonstrating measurable improvements in its OSR-to-expenditure ratio, as suggested in the literature.⁷ This would create a powerful incentive for municipalities to strengthen their own fiscal capacity.

2. Increase Flexibility and Predictability of Grants: While project-specific grants are necessary, a greater share of development funding should be provided through block grants with broader programmatic goals. This would grant Paurashavas more flexibility to align spending with locally identified priorities. Furthermore, providing more predictable, multi-year grant allocation commitments would enable better long-term financial planning at the local level.

3. Invest in PFM and Climate Finance Capacity Building: The national government and development partners should invest in targeted capacity-building programs for Paurashava officials. This training should move beyond the technical aspects of project implementation and focus on strategic public financial management (PFM), OSR enhancement techniques, and the integration of climate considerations into the core budgeting process. This would empower local governments to transition from being passive recipients of funds to becoming autonomous, resilient, and effective agents of local development.

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CONCLUSION

This research has illuminated the systemic and behavioral roots of the “governance-finance-resilience trilemma” in Kurigram Paurashava. The findings demonstrate that while the municipality possesses latent economic vibrancy—as evidenced by nighttime light data—its fiscal autonomy remains largely illusory, constrained by an overwhelming reliance on intergovernmental transfers. The econometric evidence of the “flypaper effect” confirms that the current funding model displaces local fiscal effort, while the “boom-bust” cycle of climate investment exposes the municipality to a perilous “maintenance trap,” where resilient infrastructure risks premature decay without a stable local revenue base.

The study's primary contribution lies in the identification of distinct budgetary regimes and the conceptualization of the "maintenance trap" and "satellite paradox" as critical barriers to urban resilience in the Global South. These insights bridge the gap between spatial development and fiscal administration, offering a novel diagnostic tool for policymakers.

Policy relevance is underscored by the urgent need for a paradigm shift toward subsidiarity. To break the cycle of dependency, we recommend a multi-level reform agenda: (i) for Kurigram, the adoption of digital, GIS-based property tax mapping to capture untaxed growth; and (ii) for national policymakers, the redesign of fiscal transfers into performance-based mechanisms that reward OSR enhancement and provide the flexibility needed for context-specific climate adaptation. Ultimately, empowering local governments with genuine fiscal autonomy is not a reward for performance, but a prerequisite for building a sustainable and resilient urban future in Bangladesh.

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