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Principal-Agent Perspectives on Payment Strategies and Motivation: A Case Study of University of Cape Coast CoDE Weekend Online Distance Learning Programme

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ABSTRACT

This research investigates the influence of payment practices on tutor motivation within the University of Cape Coast's College of Distance Education (CoDE) Weekend Online Distance Learning Programme, employing the Principal-Agent Theory as an analytical framework. The study addresses how strategic delays and rushed payments may create opportunistic behaviors among tutors, affecting their effort, commitment, and overall programme effectiveness. Thus, recognizing the potential for opportunistic behaviors arising from delayed or hurried payments, the research investigates how such payment strategies influence tutors' effort, commitment, and overall performance. A mixed-methods approach is utilized, combining quantitative surveys administered to tutors and qualitative interviews with administrators and tutors to gain nuanced insights into their perceptions and experiences. The study aims to identify the extent to which payment timing and structure affect motivation and engagement, and how these factors subsequently impact the quality and effectiveness of the distance learning programme. Anticipated findings are expected to reveal critical links between incentive alignment and tutor effort, offering evidence-based recommendations for designing sustainable payment systems that enhance motivation and accountability. The research contributes to the broader understanding of contractual incentive mechanisms in distance education and provides practical policy implications for optimizing payment strategies to foster long-term engagement and educational quality.

INTRODUCTION

The rapid expansion of distance education has become a vital component of higher learning institutions worldwide, offering flexible learning options to a diverse student population. The University of Cape Coast (UCC), through its College of Distance Education (CoDE), has been at the forefront of providing accessible, high-quality distance learning programmes, including the weekend online distance learning initiative. While these programmes have increased educational opportunities, they also pose unique challenges related to the management of tutor motivation and performance.

One critical aspect influencing the effectiveness of distance education delivery is the motivation and effort of tutors, who serve as the backbone of the programme. Unlike traditional classroom settings, distance education relies heavily on contractual relationships between institutions and tutors, often characterized by payment practices that may be delayed or inconsistently administered. These payment strategies can significantly influence tutor motivation, effort, and ultimately, the quality of instruction delivered to students.

The principal-agent theory provides a useful lens to understand these dynamics. Rooted in the concepts of contractual incentives and opportunistic behaviors, the theory explains how misaligned interests between principals such as the institution and agents namely, the tutors can lead to suboptimal outcomes. Payment practices, as key incentive mechanisms, can either motivate tutors to

perform effectively or induce behaviors that undermine the programme's success.

Given these considerations, this study seeks to explore how payment practices influence tutor motivation within the UCC CoDE weekend online distance learning programme. It aims to understand the perceptions of tutors regarding the timeliness and adequacy of payments, as well as how these payment strategies impact the quality of instruction. Ultimately, the research hypothesizes that strategic and timely payment practices are likely to positively influence tutor motivation and effort, which in turn enhances instructional quality.

This article is organized into four main sections. The first reviews existing literature on incentive mechanisms, motivation, and principal-agent theory, establishing the theoretical foundation for the study. The second details the research methodology, including data collection and analysis approaches. The third section presents and discusses the findings, linking them back to the research questions and hypotheses. Finally, the concluding part offers policy recommendations aimed at improving payment practices and fostering better motivation among tutors, thereby strengthening the overall effectiveness of the distance education programme.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The success of distance education heavily depends on the motivation and commitment of tutors, who

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play a pivotal role in delivering quality instruction in remote settings (Moore & Kearsley, 2011). Numerous studies emphasize that motivation among distance tutors is influenced by a range of factors, including financial incentives, institutional support, workload, and recognition (Kaufman & Watkins, 2014; Moore, 2018). Among these, payment practices such as timeliness, sufficiency, and consistency are particularly influential because they directly affect tutors' perceptions of fairness and professional obligation (Perry & Wise, 1990).

Research indicates that delayed or irregular payments can lead to decreased motivation, reduced effort, and lower instructional quality (Guskey, 2002; VanderMerwe & Moalosi, 2015). Conversely, prompt and adequate compensation fosters higher motivation, greater engagement, and a stronger sense of professional responsibility (Eisenberger & Rhoades, 2002). In distance learning environments, where supervision is limited and tutors often work independently, incentive mechanisms become crucial to sustain motivation and accountability (Moore & Kearsley, 2011).

Furthermore, the literature underscores the importance of aligning incentives with institutional goals through well-designed contractual arrangements. Incentive theory suggests that extrinsic motivators, such as financial rewards, can significantly influence behavior, especially when intrinsic motivation is insufficient (Deci & Ryan, 1985). In resource-constrained settings, effective incentive structures are vital to ensuring tutors remain committed and maintain the programme's quality and credibility (Laffont & Martimort, 2002).

Also, the design of effective incentive systems is a central concern in economics, management, and organizational psychology. At its core, the problem involves aligning the interests of individuals (agents) with those of the organizations or parties that delegate tasks to them (principals). This alignment is complicated by information asymmetry, divergent risk preferences, and the complex interplay between extrinsic rewards and intrinsic motivation. This review synthesizes the extant literature on incentive mechanisms, motivation, and principal-agent theory. It begins by outlining the foundational principal-agent framework, then examines the psychological theories of motivation that inform incentive design and finally explores how these two streams of research have been integrated in recent interdisciplinary work. The goal is to provide a comprehensive overview of the key theoretical perspectives, empirical findings, and remaining gaps in this vibrant field.

Principal-Agent Theory and the Foundation of Incentive Mechanisms

Principal-agent theory (PAT), also known as agency theory, provides the dominant economic framework for analyzing incentive problems. The theory originated in the 1970s with the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), who formalized the concept of agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and control. In their seminal paper, they defined the agency relationship as a contract

under which a principal engages an agent to perform some service on their behalf, delegating some decision-making authority to the agent. The central problem is that the agent's interests may not fully align with those of the principal, leading to moral hazard (shirking, opportunism) and adverse selection (hidden information).

Eisenhardt's (1989) influential review clarified the core propositions of agency theory. She highlighted that the theory essentially addresses two issues: the agency problem (conflicting goals and the difficulty of monitoring the agent) and the risk-sharing problem (different risk preferences between the principal and the agent) (pp. 30-31). The principal's challenge is to design a contract that balances the cost of measuring behavior against the cost of measuring outcomes and transferring risk to the agent (Gneezy, 2005, p.385). Contracts can be behavior-oriented (e.g., fixed salary) or outcome-oriented (e.g., commission, stock options). Outcome-based contracts place more risk on the agent but can better align incentives when outcomes are measurable and effort is unobservable.

Subsequent extensions of PAT have refined the model. Holmstrom (1979) demonstrated how moral hazard can be mitigated through performance-based incentives when effort is not directly observable. Laffont and Martimort (2002) systematized the theory of incentive design under asymmetric information, introducing concepts such as mechanism design and the revelation principle. These contributions form the bedrock of modern incentive theory, emphasizing that optimal contracts must trade off risk, information, and incentive intensity.

Motivation Theories and the Psychology of Incentives

While principal-agent theory focuses on contractual solutions, psychological research on motivation provides a deeper understanding of how incentives actually influence behavior. A key distinction is between "extrinsic motivation" (driven by external rewards) and "intrinsic motivation" (driven by inherent interest or enjoyment). Bruno, Faggini, and Parziale (2017), in their interdisciplinary review, note that the relationship between incentives, motivation, and performance is far from straightforward. They identify three critical issues: the distinction between intrinsic and prosocial motivation, the link between motivation and performance, and the potential for incentives to produce perverse crowding-out effects that undermine intrinsic motivation (pp. 29-32).

Self-Determination Theory (SDT) posits that intrinsic motivation flourishes when three basic psychological needs—autonomy, competence, and relatedness—are satisfied. External rewards that are perceived as controlling can undermine autonomy and reduce intrinsic motivation, whereas rewards that are informational and support competence can enhance it. Expectancy Theory (Vroom, 1964) suggests that motivation is a function of the expectation that effort will lead to performance, the instrumentality of performance for obtaining rewards, and the valence (value) of those rewards. This theory highlights the importance of linking rewards clearly to desired outcomes.

Empirical evidence on the effects of monetary incentives is mixed. While financial rewards can boost effort and performance in simple, routine tasks, they may impair creativity, ethical behavior, and intrinsic interest in complex tasks. For example, Gneezy (2005) showed that monetary incentives can encourage deception when the stakes are high. Park, Park, and Barry (2022) reviewed the ethical consequences of incentives, finding that high-powered incentives can lead to unethical behavior when they create excessive pressure. Conversely, non-monetary incentives (e.g., recognition, feedback, autonomy) can often sustain motivation without triggering crowding-out effects.

Recent literature has sought to integrate economic and psychological perspectives. Behavioral principal-agent models incorporate social preferences (e.g., fairness, reciprocity) and intrinsic motivation into traditional contract theory. For instance, experiments have shown that agents often reciprocate generous wage offers even when it is costly to do so, a phenomenon not predicted by standard PAT (Holmstrom, 1979, p. 76).

Crowding-out effects are a major area of interdisciplinary research. Bruno *et al.* (2017) conclude that there is little evidence of crowding-out when incentives are offered before or during performance, but the psychological literature strongly supports the undermining effect when rewards are perceived as controlling (Jiang, 2025). This underscores the importance of incentive framing and context. To this extent, new forms of incentives have also emerged. Gamification—the use of game-like elements (e.g., points, badges, leaderboards) in non-game contexts—has gained attention as a way to tap into intrinsic motivations for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Similarly, “prosocial” incentives that highlight the social impact of work can motivate employees beyond monetary compensation.

Recent empirical studies continue to refine our understanding. Zhuo (2025), for example, explored extrinsic and intrinsic incentive mechanisms in rural outreach, incorporating personality traits. Jiang (2025) also applied a multitask principal-agent model to data-market regulation. These studies illustrate the ongoing evolution of incentive design in complex, real-world settings.

Despite these advances, several gaps remain. First, most principal-agent models assume a single principal and agent, whereas many organizations involve multiple principals (e.g., boards, stakeholders) and teams of agents. Second, the dynamic effects of incentives over time—how repeated interactions, learning, and habit formation alter responsiveness—are underexplored. Third, cultural and individual differences in response to incentives require more systematic study. Finally, the ethical implications of incentive design, particularly in the era of algorithmic management and digital monitoring, demand greater attention.

This paper therefore urges that future research should adopt more interdisciplinary approaches, combining rigorous experimental methods from psychology with formal modeling from economics. Longitudinal field

studies are needed to examine the long-term impact of different incentive schemes on motivation, performance, and well-being.

This study adopts Principal-Agent Theory as its primary framework, which has been extensively used to analyze contractual relationships characterized by information asymmetry and conflicting interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The theory posits that the principal (the educational institution) delegates tasks to the agent (the tutor), whose efforts are often difficult to monitor directly. Consequently, designing appropriate incentives—such as timely and adequate payments—is essential to motivate agents to act in the principal’s best interest (Laffont & Martimort, 2002).

In the context of distance education, payment practices serve as the primary extrinsic incentive to motivate tutors to exert effort and uphold instructional standards. When payments are delayed or perceived as inadequate, tutors may reduce their effort or prioritize other income-generating activities, leading to suboptimal teaching outcomes (Eisenberger & Rhoades, 2002). Conversely, well-structured payment systems aligned with institutional objectives can foster higher motivation and accountability. Principal-Agent Theory also emphasizes the importance of reducing information asymmetry through contractual design and monitoring (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). While direct supervision might be limited in distance education, incentives embedded in payment practices act as proxies for monitoring effort. Therefore, understanding how payment strategies influence tutor motivation through this theoretical lens provides valuable insights into improving contractual arrangements in distance learning settings.

Overall, the integration of incentive theory and principal-agent principles underscores that strategic payment practices are crucial for aligning tutor effort with institutional goals, ultimately enhancing the quality and sustainability of distance education programmes.

This review has outlined the foundational theories and current debates surrounding incentive mechanisms, motivation, and principal-agent relationships. The principal-agent framework provides a powerful toolkit for designing contracts that mitigate moral hazard and align interests, but it must be complemented by psychological insights into motivation to avoid unintended consequences such as crowding out of intrinsic motivation or ethical breaches. The integration of economic and behavioral perspectives is yielding richer, more nuanced models that better capture the complexity of human motivation in organizational settings. As the nature of work evolves, continued interdisciplinary dialogue will be essential for developing incentive systems that are both effective and humane.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

This study employed a mixed-methods research design, combining both quantitative and qualitative approaches to gain a comprehensive understanding of the impact of payment practices on tutor motivation within the UCC CoDE weekend online distance learning programme.

This methodological choice was guided by the need to capture measurable data on payment perceptions and motivational levels, while also exploring in-depth experiences and perceptions of tutors and administrators.

Research Population and Sampling

The target population comprised all tutors involved in the UCC CoDE weekend online distance learning programme spanning the period of 2022/2023 academic year through to the 2024/2025 academic year, totaling approximately 150 tutors. To ensure representativeness, a stratified random sampling technique was used, dividing the population into strata based on years of experience, subject areas, and contractual status (full-time vs. part-time). A sample of 60 tutors was selected for the quantitative survey, representing 40% of the population. For the qualitative component, 15 tutors and 5 programme administrators were purposively sampled to provide rich, contextual insights.

Data Collection Instruments

Data collection Involved Two Primary Instruments Structured Questionnaires

Developed to measure tutors’ perceptions of payment practices (timeliness, adequacy, consistency) and their motivation levels. The questionnaire included Likert-scale items, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Validity was established through expert review, and reliability was tested with a pilot study, yielding a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.82.

Semi-Structured Interviews

Conducted with selected tutors and administrators to explore nuanced perspectives on payment practices, motivational factors, and suggestions for improvement. An interview guide was used to ensure consistency across sessions.

Data Collection and Analysis Procedure

Quantitative data were collected via self-administered questionnaires distributed electronically through email and WhatsApp platforms over a period of four weeks. Follow-up reminders were sent to maximize response rates. Qualitative data were gathered through in-depth interviews conducted either face-to-face or via Zoom,

depending on participant availability, each lasting approximately 30-45 minutes. All interviews were audio-recorded with participant consent and subsequently transcribed for analysis.

Quantitative data were analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics with SPSS Version 26. Descriptive statistics summarized respondents’ perceptions of payment practices and motivation levels. Inferential analysis involved Pearson’s correlation and multiple regression to examine relationships between payment practices and motivation.

Qualitative data were analyzed thematically using NVivo 12. Transcripts were coded inductively to identify emerging themes related to payment perceptions, motivational factors, and suggestions for policy improvements. To ensure reliability, two researchers independently coded the data, and discrepancies were resolved through discussion.

Ethical Considerations

The study adhered to ethical standards for research involving human participants. Ethical approval was obtained from the University of Cape Coast Institutional Review Board. Participants provided informed consent before participation, and confidentiality was maintained throughout the research process. Data were stored securely and used solely for research purposes.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section presents the key findings derived from the analysis of the survey questionnaires and interview responses collected from facilitators and tutors involved in the UCC CoDE Weekend Online Distance Learning Programme. The findings are linked to the research questions and hypotheses outlined in the study, providing a comprehensive understanding of how payment practices influence motivation.

Research Question 1: What are the Prevailing Payment Practices in the Program?

Findings

The survey responses indicate perceptions of the timeliness and transparency of payments among facilitators. The results in Table 1 summarize the responses to key payment practice statements.

Table 1: Facilitators' Perceptions of Payment Practices

Statement	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Percentage Disagree/Strongly Disagree
Payments are made on time as scheduled.	30	40	15	10	5	70%
The amount paid to me is sufficient to motivate my efforts.	25	35	20	12	8	60%
Payments are consistent from semester to semester.	30	15	20	10	15	45%
The payment process is transparent and clear.	31	45	12	8	4	76%

Delays in payment are common and affect my motivation.	25	30	10	5	0	8% (disagrees with delays affecting motivation)
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Discussion

The data suggests that most facilitators perceive payments as generally not timely and transparent, with a majority reporting payment delays-concerns, which immensely affect motivation. The high percentage disagreement on transparency indicates the lack of communication between Management and employees on effective communication in their remuneration payment processes, but delays remain a notable issue that could impact on motivation.

Research Question 2: How Do Payment Practices Influence Motivation Levels?

Findings

Survey data from the motivation section reveals a strong link between payment practices and facilitator motivation. The responses are summarized in Table 2.

Discussion

The data indicate that the majority of facilitators recognize

Table 2: Impact of Payment Practices on Motivation

Statement	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Percentage Agree/Strongly Agree
I feel motivated to perform well because of the payment I receive.	5	10	10	35	40	75%
Financial incentives influence my effort and commitment.	3	7	15	40	35	75%
My motivation to teach is primarily driven by the desire to support students, not just payment.	15	20	10	30	15	45%
When payments are timely and adequate, I am more willing to put extra effort.	4	8	12	38	28	73%

the influence of payment timeliness and adequacy on their motivation. The perception that financial incentives are a significant motivator aligns with the hypothesis that payment strategies directly impact engagement.

Research Question 3: What Challenges are Associated with Current Payment Strategies?

Findings

Qualitative data from interviews identified shared challenges, summarized in Table 3.

Discussion

The challenges of delays and lack of clarity negatively

Table 3: Challenges Reported by Facilitators Regarding Payment Strategies

Challenge	Frequency	Sample Comment
Payment delays	12	"Payments often arrive late, which affects my planning."
Lack of clarity in payment schedules	8	"It's sometimes unclear when to expect the next payment."
Inconsistent payment amounts	5	"The amount varies without prior notice."
Lack of transparency in processes	4	"I am not always sure how payments are calculated."

influence facilitators' motivation and performance. Addressing these issues could improve overall satisfaction and engagement.

Principal's Perspective: Findings and Discussion on Facilitators' Submission Practices

Data Results

The qualitative data collected from interviews with UCC administrative officers and online learning platform monitors highlight a recurring concern regarding facilitators' reluctance or delay in submitting their claim

Table 4: Facilitators' Submission Practices and Administrative Concerns

Issue	Frequency	Representative Comment
Delayed submission of claim forms	15	"Many facilitators submit their claims well past the scheduled deadlines, which hampers timely salary payments."
Late submission of Continuous Assessment forms	12	"Some facilitators delay submitting CA forms, which delays processing and affects their motivation."

Refusal to submit claims at all	5	"A few facilitators outright refuse or neglect to submit their claims, citing indifference or misunderstanding of procedures."
Lack of communication about delays	8	"Facilitators often do not communicate delays, leaving us uncertain about when to expect submissions."

forms and Continuous Assessment (CA) documentation. The key findings are summarized in Table 4.

Discussion

The data indicate that a considerable proportion of facilitators are not adhering to scheduled submission timelines for claim forms and assessment documentation. This behavior results in delays in processing salaries and disrupts the overall payment cycle, which can negatively influence facilitator motivation and the smooth operation of the program.

The reluctance or refusal to submit documents on time may stem from several underlying issues, including:

- Lack of awareness or understanding of submission procedures: Some facilitators may not be fully familiar with deadlines or the importance of timely submissions.
- Perceived administrative inefficiencies: Facilitators may feel that delays or errors in previous payments diminish their trust in the process, leading to indifference.
- Attitudinal factors: A sense of complacency or lack of motivation to comply with procedural requirements.

The findings suggest that addressing these issues requires a multi-faceted approach, including better communication, capacity building on administrative procedures, and fostering a culture of accountability.

CONCLUSION

This study confirms that payment practices are a significant determinant of facilitator motivation in the online distance learning programme. The findings reveal a strong correlation between payment punctuality and motivation levels; while most facilitators view current practices positively, persistent delays and inconsistencies remain notable concerns that directly undermine engagement. Furthermore, administrative opacity regarding payment processes exacerbates this demotivation, validating the hypothesis that effective and transparent payment strategies are crucial for sustaining facilitator commitment and, by extension, programme success.

To leverage the positive link between timely payments and motivation, it is recommended that the institution move from ad-hoc processes to a fully systematized payment framework. This involves establishing clear contractual terms and shifting to fixed, predictable payment cycles, such as monthly schedules, which would allow facilitators to plan their finances reliably. Such a proactive approach would reduce administrative friction and prevent the cash flow disruptions that erode trust, thereby building a foundational sense of reliability.

Building on this foundation, the institution must adopt clear and transparent payment policies to directly

counteract the demotivating effects of opacity. A straightforward policy document should be developed and communicated, detailing how pay is calculated, the exact schedule, and dispute resolution procedures. In tandem with this transparency, performance incentives should be carefully designed to support, rather than crowd out, intrinsic motivation by linking rewards to both quantitative and qualitative outputs, fostering a supportive environment for sustained engagement.

Finally, the sustainability of the payment system depends on addressing reciprocal responsibilities. Facilitators' own delays in submitting claim forms and assessment documentation were identified as a key administrative bottleneck impacting salary timelines. To improve compliance, the institution should implement enhanced communication with regular reminders, provide targeted training on procedural requirements, and streamline submission processes. Beginning with an audit of current workflows and piloting changes with facilitator feedback will demonstrate a commitment to continuous, evidence-based improvement.

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Annexures

Appendix A: Data Collection Instruments

Part 1: Survey Questionnaire

Preamble to the Survey Questionnaire

Dear Participant,
 Thank you for taking the time to participate in this study titled “Principal-Agent Perspectives on Payment Strategies and Motivation: A Case Study of UCC CoDE Weekend Online Distance Learning Programme.” The purpose of this survey is to gather your perceptions and experiences regarding the payment practices and how they influence your motivation and engagement in the program. Your responses will provide valuable insights that can help improve payment strategies and enhance motivation among facilitators and tutors involved in the program. The questionnaire is anonymous, and your participation is voluntary. Please answer all questions honestly and to the best of your ability.
 Your input is highly appreciated. Thank you for your contribution to this research.

Part 2: Interview Guide Administered to Online Tutors
Preamble to the Interview Guide

Section 1: Payment Practices

Statement	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Comments/Remarks
Payments are made on time as scheduled.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	-----
The amount paid to me is sufficient to motivate my teaching efforts.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	-----
Payments are consistent from one semester to another.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	-----
The payment process is transparent and clear.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	-----
Delays in payment are common and affect my motivation.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	-----

Section 2: Motivation Levels

I feel motivated to perform well because of the payment I receive.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	-----
Financial incentives influence my effort and commitment in teaching.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	-----
My motivation to teach is primarily driven by the desire to support students, not just payment.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	-----

Demographic Information (to be filled out by respondent)

Question	Response	Comments
Age:	_____	_____
Gender:	<input type="checkbox"/> Male <input type="checkbox"/> Female	_____
Years of experience:	<input type="checkbox"/> Less than 2	<input type="checkbox"/> 2–5
Contractual status:	<input type="checkbox"/> Full-time	<input type="checkbox"/> Part-time
Subject area:	_____	_____

Dear Participant,
 Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview as part of our research on “Principal-Agent Perspectives on Payment Strategies and Motivation” within the UCC CoDE Weekend Online Distance Learning Programme. The purpose of this interview is to explore your firsthand experiences, perceptions, and suggestions regarding payment practices and their influence on your motivation and effort in delivering the program.

Your insights are invaluable and will contribute significantly to understanding how payment strategies impact engagement and performance. The interview is confidential, and you are free to share as much or as little as you feel comfortable. There are no right or wrong answers; we are interested in your honest perspectives. Thank you once again for your participation.

PART 3. Interview Guide for Administrators and Online Course Monitors

Question	Response/Notes
Can you describe your experience with the timeliness and adequacy of payments for your tutoring services?	_____
How do payment practices influence your motivation and effort in teaching?	_____
What challenges have you faced regarding payment delays or inconsistencies?	_____
What suggestions do you have for improving payment processes to enhance your motivation?	_____
In your opinion, what policies could the institution implement to better align incentives and improve tutor motivation?	_____

Preamble

Dear Participant,
 Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview as part of our research on “Principal-Agent Perspectives on Payment Strategies and Motivation” within the UCC CoDE Weekend Online Distance Learning Programme. The purpose of this interview is to gather insights into the challenges and attitudes of facilitators regarding the submission of claim forms and Continuous Assessment (CA) documentation. Your responses will help us understand the factors affecting timely submissions and their impact on salary payments and facilitator motivation. The interview is confidential, and there are no right or wrong answers—your honest perspectives are highly valued. Feel free to elaborate on your experiences and suggestions. Thank you for your valuable contribution.

Interview Questions and Response Spaces

1. Can you describe the current procedures for facilitators to submit their claim forms and CA documentation?

Response:

2. What challenges do you face in ensuring facilitators submit their claims and assessments on time?

Response:

3. How does facilitator non-compliance with submission deadlines affect the timely payment of salaries?

Response:

4. What measures have been put in place to address delays or refusals to submit claims?

Response:

5. In your opinion, what are the main reasons facilitators delay or refuse to submit their claims and assessments?

Response:

6. How do facilitators typically communicate issues or delays in submission?

Response:

7. What strategies could be implemented to improve compliance and ensure timely submissions?

Response:

8. How does the attitude of facilitators towards submission impact the overall effectiveness of the payment process?

Response:

9. Are there any institutional policies or practices you believe should be revised to address these challenges? If so, please specify.

Response:

10. Any additional comments or suggestions on improving the submission process and facilitator motivation?

Response:
