



AMERICAN JOURNAL OF IR 4.0 AND BEYOND (AJIRB)

VOLUME 3 ISSUE 1 (2024)

ISSN: 2837-4738 (ONLINE)

PUBLISHED BY
E-PALLI PUBLISHERS, DELAWARE, USA

Challenges of Combating Terrorism in West Africa

Ishaku Hamidu^{1*}

Article Information

Received: August 12, 2024

Accepted: September 23, 2024

Published: December 31, 2024

Keywords

*Economy, Military, Synergy,
Terrorism & West Africa*

ABSTRACT

In recent times, terrorist activities have infiltrated all regions on the continent, including the West African sub-region. All efforts to tame their advances seem unfruitful. Using purposive sampling technique, some academic journals, books, newspapers and internet materials were explored. Those materials revealed that many nation-states affected in the sub-region responded militarily and expended more on military hard wares, personnel and other equipment but to no avail. Analyzing the content of the qualitative data mentioned, the notable obstacles include corruption, poor boundary demarcations and surveillance, political instability, inter-military rivalry and conflict, etc. The study concluded that unless and until states in the sub-region dismantle such barriers and face their common enemy together, national and international economic growth and relations will remain a mirage. It is recommended that all states cooperate, boost the morale and information sourcing of the military, obtain and deploy modern technological equipment, and synchronize their personnel, among others, as a panacea for halting terrorism.

INTRODUCTION

It is difficult to determine or say terrorism began in this or that place and region in view of the intricacies, dynamism, nature and activities of terrorists. This is because definition, categories, nature and effects of terrorism differs from state to state and from region to region. In both the developed and developing economies, there are lots of apprehensions, calamities, crisis and uncertainties attributed to terrorists groups operating either as unit or in collaboration with other like-minded groups. Some of such aggrieved persons or terror groups use religious, socioeconomic, political, extremists' ideologists as their motivating factors. Some of them desire to establish their hegemony in some states and regions or even establish their own state. While some developed countries have tamed and halted the excesses of some of the terrorists groups on their continent and regions, the same may not be true for and in some West African countries. Terrorism in Africa is unique due to numerous sociological, political, ethno-religious, socioeconomic, international affiliations and trans-border issues. In the same vein, efforts made by individual and collective governments in the West African sub-region to combat or halt terrorism are affected or limited. What could be the challenges factors retarding national and sub-regional attempts to halt terrorism? Identifying some of those impediments and proffering some solutions prompted this study.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The study used a qualitative research method, utilizing the content of nine academic journals; fourteen news papers; sixteen academic books and twelve internet materials. The aforementioned materials were purposively and randomly chosen because of the quality of their content on the topic understudy and they have national and international spread in and across the West African sub-region. This is

to make the research more wholistic and cross-national in character; and a descriptive content analysis was adopted.

Conceptual Clarification

Terrorism and terrorist activities have become a household concept in most states on the continent, hence, the need to examine some views and descriptions. Terrorism is a violent tactics by state or non-state actors for political rationale against non-combatants, principally to instill fear in order to generate or send a message. To Ender *et al.* (2010), terrorism is "the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or sub-national group against non-combatants in order to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims". Base on the aforementioned definitions therefore, terrorism can be broken into domestic, and international or transnational terrorism. Domestic terrorism is the terrorist activities that are basically organized and carried out by local or domestic terrorists groups and targets the local population. The domestic aspect involves perpetrators, victims and audience from purely the host country. In contrast, International terrorism concerns and includes the perpetrators and the victims from two or more countries. This can take transnational aspects, when the terrorists plan or strategized an attack in one country and execute it in another country or use it affiliates to execute its desires elsewhere; assisting with ideas, personnel, weapons, finances, etc (Enders & Sandler, 1991). Both domestic and transnational terrorists use bombings, hostage taking, assassinations, suicide bombings, arson and armed assaults to cajole governments in to their sociopolitical and economic demands in response to public/audience pressure. It is therefore imperative to briefly examine the current terrorism on global and regional scale.

¹ Department of Political Science, Federal University of Kashere, P.M.B 0182, Gombe State, Nigeria

* Corresponding author's e-mail: Ishakuhamidu1041@fukashere.edu.ng

Terrorists Groups and Activities across the Globe

Since September 11th 2001 attack on the United States of America (USA) by Al-Qaeda and the reactions of U.S.A and its western allies, national and international socioeconomic and political relations on the globe has not remain the same. The activities of terrorists organizations and the claim of fighting against terrorism has spread widely even to developing economies in Africa. Corroborating the above, Gaibullov *et al.* (2013) argued that modern era of transnational terrorism that is orchestrated by organized armed groups has aggravated the anxieties and uncertainties of both individuals and sovereign nation-states globally since 1968. They opined that the attack on World Trade Centre (WTC), New York in the United States (US) by Al-Qaeda on 11th September, 2001 which recorded huge casualty figures and destroyed property kept the world confused and apprehensive. On his part, D'Anieri (2010) noted that such well organized, coordinated and executed plot by hitherto despised aggrieved groups or persons have opened a new debate and interest on the capacities and abilities of both domestic and transnational terrorists' organizations across the globe. Consequently and besides the above, several terrorists organizations have sprang up in several parts of the world for various reasons, claiming nexus with the well known similar or sister groups existing within and outside Africa and other continents like the Al-Qaeda in Iran/ Islamic State of Iran and the Levant (ISIL); Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (MIFM); Maoists (India); New People's Army (NPA); Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; Terik-i-Taliban, Pakistan (TTP), among others (Maiangwa, 2014; Baily, 2010). Some of these groups were able to carry out their activities within their respective nation-states single handed or in collaboration with other related groups across their stronghold or breeding states (Buba, 2017).

Terrorists Groups and Activities in West African Sub-region

Africa is a continent on this planet earth with numerous countries and populations. West Africa is among some regions on the African continent. It is a geographical location in the western part of the African continent, with no fewer than fifteen countries. As a political unit, the countries in the West African sub-region in 1970s established socioeconomic, cum-political association known as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This socioeconomic grouping also had its military wing, which was powerful in the 1980s to early 1990s, called ECOWAS-Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). In this region, there are Anglophone and Francophone speaking countries operating different system of government. Like other continents and counties across the globe, in some West African countries like Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali and Nigeria, ethnic and religiously induced conflicts have metamorphosed into rebellion, insurgency and terrorism both at domestic

and transnational capacity. For instance, the Tuaregs together with other tribes such as the Arabs and Peuls make up northern Mali. They constitute a nomadic group of approximately 1.3 million people who mainly practice a moderate but conservative Sufi Islam (Cline, 2007; Zounmenou, 2012; Harding, 2013). Tuaregs' first uprising was between 1962 and 1964 and the Malian government troop completely crushed the Tuaregs rebel (Alvarado, 2012). The second Tuaregs' crisis was in June 1990 when police stations were attacked in Menaka. This further led to serious armed conflict between the Tuaregs and the Malian army, where many lives and property were lost. At this time, the Tuaregs seem to be well equipped and prepared until Algeria brokered a pact in April, 1992. However, in 2012, the security situation in the Sahel region became even worse with the emergence of irregular insurgencies in northern Mali. On 6 April 2012, the Tuareg rebels of the Movement National de Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) and some jihadists from both Ansar Dine and the Mouvement pour l'unicité et le djihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) declared the northern Mali an independent state. The insurgents benefited from both the regional context of the collapse of the Gadhafi's regime and the military coup that ended what used to be a stable regime of Amadou Toumani Touré (Alvarado, 2012). Earlier on, in January 2012, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) was ready to engage in the rebellion that began as a quest for independence and ended up in multiple insurgencies since the MNLA made temporary alliances with the Islamists groups like Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) and Ansar Dine (AD) (D'Almeida, 2012). In February, it became clear that ethnicities were being instrumentalized by the different armed groups which made it possible to establish links between those groups and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) regarding logistical support (Avoine, 2012). In Nigeria, Boko Haram which started sometimes in 2002, with the mission of preaching Islam in its 'truthful way' and to establish a caliphate came to limelight between 26th to 30th July 2009, when the group clashed with members of the Nigeria Police Force. Subsequently, the military were deployed to combat or halt the advances of the group, which led to the capture of Mohammed Yusuf, leader of the group; who later died while in Police custody and other members of the sect (Davieson, 2014). The sect later transformed into insurgency and was branded or tagged a terrorists group due to its activities (Clement, 2014). The group's stay in isolated frontline remote areas like Sambisa Game Reserve/Forest in Borno state which shares international borders with Cameroon and the other base of the group around the Lake Chad which Nigeria share with Chad, Niger and other countries in North and Central Africa, made it easier for the group to get more weapons and fighters beyond the shores of Nigeria (David, 2001; Batolotta, 2015). The group also became active in Chad, Niger & Cameroon Republic (Blair, 2015). On 7th March 2015, Boko Haram pledged

allegiance to Islamic State of Iran and the Levant (ISIL). This linkage or nexus upgraded the group to be known as Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), making them a transnational non state actor (Elbagir *et al*, 2015). D'Anieri (2010) described transnational actors "as actors whose activities cut across state boundaries, especially non-governmental actors". Base on the above description of an international and transnational actor, there are many organizations whose activities either for good or for bad takes place across sovereign nation-states; including terrorists groups who recruit personnel, obtain weapons, solicit and transfer money, establish camps and carry out training across states, regional and continental boundaries successfully (Festus, 2014).

Discussion on the Effects of Terrorism on West African States

Having a basic understanding on the modus operandi of terrorists groups across the globe, their activities on the West African sub-region, particularly as an emerging economy will no doubt have negative and devastating consequences. From the literature explored, terrorists' activities had numerous negative effects on nation-states in the West African sub-region and beyond. The under-listed are conspicuous.

1. Discouraging or impeding foreign investment. The activities of both the national and transnational terrorists groups have caused lot of damages in sovereign nation-states in West Africa. For instance, states like Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Mali, Niger, among others with large arable land have failed in their quest to woo foreign investors to come for investments in multifarious sectors of those countries' economy. This was due to terrorism or insecurity as noted by (Baily, 2010). The individual and collective effort by successive administration in most of those vulnerable states to diversify the economy by boosting agriculture in view of the arable fertile land has remained under serious threat. This is because most of the farmers, fishermen/women, pastoralists and other agriculturalists have either left the rural areas or are afraid of going into the bush to cultivate/plough and plant for fear of being abducted or killed by some armed men, believed to be terrorists.

2. Promoting of illegal possession and use of fire-arms. Terrorism as orchestrated in various nation-states created the platform for the emergence or formation of various ethnic militia or vigilante groups for self defence against the terrorists. Hamidu (2024) argued that owing to their access to fire-arms, terrorists' groups have and do invade communities in most West African states to abduct people, carry away their victims' property and demand for ransom money. Both the terrorist attacks and the attempt to for self defence by citizens, increased the demand, possession and use of illegal fire arms by non states actors or security operatives, resulting in the loss of lives and property on daily basis (Maiangwa, 2014).

3. Prompting national and international forced migrations. Terrorists' activities in the sub-region have

increased the volume of migration of people from one spot to another in both local and international dimensions. For instance, Boko Haram/ISWAP terrorism in Nigeria has forced other ethnic nationalities like the Igbos, Yorubas initially doing business in states like Adamawa, Borno and Yobe to move to other safer places or to their states of origin. Some of the indigenous people of the aforementioned states affected by terrorism migrated to neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republic (Hamidu, 2017). Some Malians migrated to Sudan, Morocco, etc due to fear of insecurity orchestrated by terrorists. Such force migration caused over crowdedness, over stretching of existing facilities in the host communities, malnutrition for women and children on transit, affected educational/schooling system, children's health and psychology negatively as noted by (Ejike, 2015).

4. Causing food insecurity. Most of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa, including those in West Africa are blessed with ample natural endowments that could meet national and international food and other agricultural needs for human beings and industries. Unfortunately however, terrorist activities in most of the rural areas/communities in and around the affected countries chased away the farmers and other agriculturalists, some were abducted, and others killed. These were corroborated by (Hamidu, 2021; Ering, 2011). Such activities of terrorists caused shortage of food and other agricultural product as could be seen or is experienced in Nigeria, Niger and Mali, etc.

5. Threatening national security and cordial sub-regional relations. Terrorism in one state affects other several African countries due to proximity and the nature of the border demarcation. For instance, both Nigeria and her neighbours like Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republics face security challenges along/across their common boundaries (United Nations, 2013). Burkina Faso, Mali and its neighbours also suffer same. Terrorist activities affect socio-cultural and economic relations, as well as create or rise suspicion between and among citizens in and from the affected countries. Mbaegbu (2018) disclosed that beside socioeconomic activities, revenue generation, infrastructural development and other progressive or developmental projects are either destroyed or could not be established as at when due in most of those countries in sub-region, due to terrorist activities.

States Response to Terrorism

One of the obligations of state is to ensure the security of lives and property of not only its citizens, but other nationalities within and even outside its immediate territory. To do this effectively, Maiangwa (2014) noted that states have military and other para-military operatives. Such units are funded by the state from the citizens' taxes and other sources and the personnel are trained to be combatant ready to be deployed promptly as the occasion demand. In response to terrorists' activities in

the sub-region, states in the West African sub-region have responded to the terrorists' menace both at individual and collective levels. One of such ways was the deployment of security operatives, particularly troops of soldiers. Corroborating the above, Hamidu, (2017) for instance, noted that when the issue of terrorism started in Nigeria, authorities deployed the conventional police as it was seen to be civil unrest or minor issues. The conventional and police mobile force tried their best but could not halt the situation. Authorities thereafter deployed the soldiers to combat and quell the upheaval. The Nigeria Army was able to establish their hegemony and arrested the ring leader or arrow-head of the group, Mallam Mohammed Yusuf and handed him over to the police. Unfortunately, he was reported killed while in police custody. This extrajudicial killing was a factor that aggravated the Boko Haram terrorism in the country. The military were able to calm the situation forcefully and went back to Barrack allowing the police and other security operatives to maintain law and order base on the nation's constitutional provisions. The terrorists however went underground and isolated themselves to Sambisa forest where they re-grouped and re-emerged powerfully from 2010 upward. The new wave of attacks by the terrorists made the state to redeploy the military again in 2012. Ever since then, the Nigerian armed forces (now comprising the Army, Air force and Navy) are battling with the domestic terrorists that later snowballed into international/ transnational terrorist organizations (Nurudeen & Adekola, 2014). The Nigeria's military capacity was strengthened by respective authorities with increased financial allocation to the defence sector to acquire more weapons, boost the personnel morale and other logistics, including hiring of mercenaries (Odebede, 2015; Soriwei, 2015). Beside the use of conventional security forces trained to combat any form of vices that seem to threatened national and international security, some states in West Africa used non-conventional armed security groups. This was conspicuous also in North East Nigeria where some youths in Maiduguri organized themselves, who were later known as Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) to fight against terrorism (Maiangwa & Hassan, 2018). These young men have demonstrated gallantry, wisdom and zeal to end terrorism in the three restive micro-states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, by going all out against the terrorists both within and outside their immediate environment (Maiangwa, 2014; Hamidu, 2017). The C.J.T.F was able to use it prowess to contend terrorists' activities in North East Nigeria both physically and militarily (Ayodeji, 2018). Another notable response was the formation of Multinational Joint Task Force. The incessant terrorism, killings of lives and destruction of property and escaping to neighbouring countries taking advantage of the vastness of the boundary paradigm of Mali and its neighbours as well as that of Nigeria; prompted authorities in some West African countries to visits each other, to mobilize and deploy troops against the terrorists. Through the support of other countries, donor agencies for instance, Mauritania, Niger, Mali,

Chad and Burkina Faso formed the G-5 Sahel and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in 2014 and 2015 respectively (Adetayo, 2015). This Multinational Military Alliance (MMA) was to watch over their respective territory; share credible intelligent report and fight the transnational terrorist groups. Military personnel and officers from Chad, Niger, Cameroon, Nigeria; other supporting countries include Benin and Guinea Republics were co-opted and kept at alert. Such international collaboration or synergy has aided the fight against transnational terrorism in the sub-Saharan Africa at large (Ismail, 2014). Western countries and the auspices of African Union assisted the joint military operations. As a demonstration of its commitment to the war against terrorism across the globe, United State donated \$5 billion (N985 bn) to the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), according to US Assistant Secretary Bureau of African Affairs, Linda Thomas- Greenfield at a news briefing at the African Union Summit in South Africa held between 15-16th June, 2015. It was also disclosed then that U.S has been working with and helping Nigeria and African Union against Boko Haram and other terrorists' elements (Mefor & Ejike, 2015). Such supports and collaboration has aided the affected states to contend with terrorists' activities in the region as noted by (Sule, 2015; Olugbode, 2019).

Major Findings on the Factors Affecting the Combating of Terrorism in West Africa

In spite of the aforementioned efforts and attempts at both national and international levels, terrorism has not ended in West Africa, what could be the reasons? From the literature examined, there are some noticeable theoretical, technical and administrative challenges inhibiting the prowess of the Multi-National Joint Task Force and G-5 Sahel from humiliating and ending terrorism on the region. Deducing from the writings of Mutum, (2015); Gambo (1988), Dockins (2014), Agbe *et al.* (2015), Ahmed (2013), Adesomoju, (2015), Agbe (2015) and Hamidu (2020); those scholars opined that:

i. There are traces of suspicion and issue of superiority versus inferiority among the members of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF). For instance, in fighting the terrorists operating in and outside Nigeria, Nigeria sees herself as giant in the sub-region therefore condescending and submitting to the hegemony of her neighbours' military formations/authorities may not look nice;

ii. The initial lack of cooperation and supports from Chad and Cameroon Republics to Nigerian authorities against Boko Haram/ISWAP terrorism in Nigeria, made Nigeria sceptical and suspicious on the sudden vigour the two countries are demonstrating against the terrorists;

iii. Previous and current inter-state conflict in the sub-region affect the war against terrorism. For instance, Nigeria- Cameroon long border conflicts made Nigeria reluctant in accepting the assistance of Cameroon since the commencement of Boko Haram terrorism;

iv. Suspicion and mistrust among African leaders also serves as impediments. For instance, Nigerians initially sees Cameroon and Chad as supporters of the Boko Haram/ISWAP terrorism in Nigeria. This is because when the terrorist attack in Nigeria, they run and hide in those places unhurt. It was due to the terrorists' recent attacks of the local indigenes of Cameroon and Chad that compelled the authorities of those nations to react militarily;

v. Resisting or reluctance in the involvement of fellow African military in domestic affairs of another country was detrimental. In Nigeria for example, some top Nigerian armed forces/military personnel seems not to accept direct involvement of Nigeria's neighbours military personnel in the nation's armed conflict with the terrorists for national security reasons;

vi. Lack of strong financial support and backing for the MJTF from foreign organizations/donors as at when due, affected the operational skills and prowess of the military on the field;

vii. Disrespect of other countries military personnel or unguarded comments by other states' authority, limit military cooperation among fellow African states, and it therefore demoralizes the combatant's troops. The calling or describing the Nigerian armed forces as 'coward' by a top Nigerian authority or security personnel made Nigerian military authority to respond angrily and suspiciously, thereby affecting synergy and cohesion needed to fight terrorism;

viii. Poor communication and lack of synchronising of the inland and border attacks by members of the MJTF also retard the onslaught against terrorism on the continent;

ix. Lingua franca disparity between and among African states military also serves as inhibiting factor. For instance, Nigeria speaks English while all of its neighbours, like Chad, Cameroon and Niger Republics speak French. This hinders smooth regional military cooperation and warfare;

x. The claim and arrest of some military personnel as coup plotters by political leaders in Niger Republic in December 2015 affected the morale of the military and availability of arms and ammunition for the military to use against the terrorists over there;

xi. The numerous alliances and sometimes splitting of terrorists groups to various factions affected the war against terrorism. In Nigeria for instance, breaking of the terrorist into Boko Haram and ISWAP with different strongholds in Sambisa and Lake Chad axis respectively poses a new challenge to the domestic security forces, as well as the MNJTF;

xii. The sudden withdrawal of military support and personnel from the war front demoralizes the army on the battle field. For instance, the withdrawal of the Chadian soldiers from it base along the Lake Chad in December 2019 gave the terrorists groups' opportunities to attack Nigerian soldiers in Baga axis. That attack gave the terrorists more weapons, which enable them to also

carry out some attacks around Maiduguri-Damaturu road and even mount roadblocks/checkpoints conveniently;

xiii. Shortage of military personnel in and from most West African countries is another militating factor. Owing to insecurity, natural factors, years in service, among others, several countries have lost many of their armed forces. Some were and are engaged in fighting with other criminal elements in other parts of their countries or managing some conflicts within or outside their immediate countries. Consequently, the number of armed forces personnel needed or expected to manage certain location in the country and some border regions are minimal. So, terrorists sometimes overpower them or move freely within and across countries in the sub-region;

xiv. Lack of congruent between some francophone countries in West Africa with their former colonial masters in Europe led to the suspension and later expulsion of foreign military bases and operatives from Republics like Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, etc. These caused some vacuum in those places left; it exert pressure on the national armies to double their efforts and it affected the political and social cohesion and vigour needed to mobilize military and citizens to fight terrorists within and outside each nation; and,

xv. Political instability in neighbouring countries, in form of power tussle and coups in places like Chad, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, etc affected the war against terrorism as the political, national and sub-regional cohesion needed to strategize and fight terrorism is not readily available. Beside the above scholars, others further added that:

xvi. There is high level of poverty among the people. This is founded when graduates are not employed, industries are non-functional and agricultural sectors are not developed to attract the able bodied young men and women, poverty becomes the order of the day. In the quest to get what to eat and meet other needs, some citizens and nationals join or conspire with others to embark on terrorist activities within and across their immediate state for monetary benefits (Hamidu, 2020).

xvii. Poor boundary or border surveillances and management in Africa is also critical. It is claimed that most local and international boundaries in most African states were not well demarcated, supervised, managed and developed. As a result, terrorist gangs exploit such ungoverned spaces to import and export mercenaries, small and light weapons, contraband intoxicant and engage in human trafficking (Nuhu & Hamidu, 2017). These have exacerbated the propensity of terrorism. Similarly, terrorist groups exploit the terrain to carry out their nefarious duties. For instance, due to poor boundary management and control, weapons from Libya find their ways to the Republics of Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Cameroon and vice versa. This made the Republics of Mali, Somalia, Sudan, etc insecure and unstable for positive socio-political and economic activities to thrive.

xviii. Corrupt practices in almost all sectors and departments in the civilian and military sectors in most of those West African countries facilitates terrorism and

hinders all effort to halt it, as noted by (Ayodeji, 2018). Some terrorists give some financial inducement to some political officials or security operatives to have free and uninterrupted transporting and distributing of their weapons and facilities or to rescue their apprehended colleagues. Leaders in not only West, but in Africa generally, workers and military personnel have history of corrupt practices in various aspects of governance and state functions. These do affects pragmatic effort for ending crime and terrorism (Ahmed *et al.*, 2013).

xix. errorists' alliance with other bigger groups is also crucial. Several domestic terrorists groups in most West African states have established links with Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups to carry out their duties (Hamidu, 2020). The alliance of Boko Haram with ISIL. Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other affiliates on and beyond the African continent for instance, has posse more dangers to national and international military operations in Africa (Batolatta, 2015). Such synergy made the military of various countries confront multiple sects and sets of terrorists with different motives (Mbegbu, 2018).

CONCLUSION

It is a fact that terrorism is real and thriving on the West African sub-region with numerous sociopolitical and economic effects. This prompted sovereign nation-states to deploy their military. However, as the menace persevered, the various countries established strong military alliances, which include the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), comprising countries like the Republics of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger; and the Groups of five, G-5 Sahel, formed by the Republics of Mauritania, Niger, Mali, Chad and Burkina Faso. These international military frameworks were principally to contend terrorists operations and provide security in the sub-region. Beside the individual and collective government expenditure on military personnel, wears and equipment, some members of the international community or great democracies too supported both the MNJTF and G-5 Sahel with necessary materials and funds. Unfortunately, however, terrorism is still ravaging the sub-region; threatening national and international security and retarding socioeconomic development in numerous countries in West Africa. This study is to help governments and military authorities to know and understand the missing link or gap in the war. This is why it identified some of the theoretical, administrative and tangible impediments militating against the total eradication of terrorism on the sub-region. Until and unless all the states in the sub-region recognize and rise against each and all the identified challenges collectively, national and international socioeconomic stability and development in the West African sub-region and sub-Saharan Africa at large, will remain a mirage. Respective governments on the region should and must not compromise the vital role of the state, which is the provision of security and creating environment to enhance individual, national and international development.

Recommendations

In view of the foregoing, the under-listed become imperative and urgent:

1. States and political leaders in and from West Africa must stop viewing and treating terrorist groups as mere local insurgent or domestic terrorists; but should view and treat terrorists as a sub-regional and possibly global issue;
2. States in West Africa should pragmatically synergize and collaborate to end the menace of terrorists by contacting other international personalities/organizations to assist them both in cash and in kind with logistics, weapons and credible sources of information against terrorists activities;
3. MNJTF and G5 Sahel security networks/alliances should be merged and empowered to deliver within a specific time frame;
4. Government of the various states should boost agriculture, create job opportunities and attract investors into their countries. This will help to get the teaming youth in those West African countries employed or positively engaged;
5. There should be proper education and orientation of the citizens and other nationalities using all local languages to expose the ills/ evil of terrorism, and to clearly explain or differentiate terrorism from religion. This will reduce the temptation of joining and supporting terrorists groups by youth in West Africa; and,
6. African Union, United Nations Organizations and others, should support and empower the states in West Africa to end terrorists' invasion of some states in the sub-region. This will boost national, sub-regional, regional and global peace and security for socioeconomic growth and development.

REFERENCES

- Adesomoju, A. (2015, February 4). *Media, international community obstructing anti-terrorist war*. NSA. www.punchng.com
- Adetayo, O. (2015, June 12). *Mnjtf to deploy contingent july 30*. www.punchng.com
- Agbe, G. (2015, October 20). *Military to pmb: weather, logistics affecting war against boko haram*. www.leadership.ng
- Alagbe, J., Adetayo, O., & Adeoye, G. (2015, February 14). *Nigerian, nigerien armies' row over coward claim*. www.punchng.com
- Ahmed, H. G., Oladeji, B., Alohan, J., Nkwocha, S., & Oluwartotmi, A. (2013, May 23). *Saboteur soldiers spy for boko haram*. www.leadership.ng
- Alvarado, D. (2012). *Independent azanawad: Tuaregs, jibadists, and an uncertain future for mali*. Notes Internationals Barcelona Centre for International Affairs,
- Avoine, P. A. (2012). *Insurgencies in northern Mali: A tentative assessment on the current conflict*. Published by: John & Elnora Ferguson Centre for African Studies (JEFICAS) University of Bradford, UK.
- Ayodeji, G. I. (2018). Corruption and boko haram

- insurgency in Nigeria, 2010-2015. In S. Ibrahim, S. Hassan, & A. M. Okolie (Eds.), *Elections, Security Challenges and African Development* (pp 101-135). Nigeria, TIMEX, Enugu.
- Baily, N. M. (2010). Economic policy following the terrorist attack. *International Economic Policy Briefs. Institute for International Economics, october.*
- Batolotta, C. (2015). Terrorism in Nigeria: The rise of boko haram. *World Policy Journal*. Retrieved from www.worldpolicy
- Blair, D. (2015). *Boko haram is now a mini-Islamic state, with its own territory*. The Telegraph. Retrieved from www.telegraph.co.uk
- Buba, A. (2017). The islamic state of iraq and levant and global security threats. *Yar Adua University Journal of Social and Management Sciences, 1(3)*, 200-225.
- Cline, L. (2007). Counterterrorism strategy in the sahel. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30(10)*, 889-899.
- Clement, E. (2014). *Just in UN security council approves sanctions on boko haram's leadership*. Retrieved from <https://www.naij.com/66830.html>
- D'Anieri, P. (2010). *International politics: Power and purpose in global affairs USA; Wadsworth Cengage Learning* (pp 333-361).
- David, C. (2001, September 26). *The rise of boko haram in Nigeria*. Retrieved from www.ctc.usma.edu
- Davieson, A. (2014). *Boko haram and its suicide squad*. USA, Lexington, KY.
- D'almeida, S. (2012). *Mali: la rébellion du MNLA n'aura donc servi à rien*, *Slate Afrique*. <http://www.slateafrique.com/91185/mali-mnla-tout-ca-pour-ca-ansar-dine>.
- Dockins, P. (2014, April 7). *Some military commanders working with boko haram soldier*. www.dailytrust.com.ng
- Ejike, E. (2015, March 17). *Insurgency: hunger, killing idps in borno, adamawa mountains*. www.leadership.ng
- Elbagir, E., Cruickshank, P., & Tawfeeq, M. (2015). *Boko haram purportedly pledges allegiance to ISIS' CNN*. Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/03/07/africa/nigeria-boko-haram-isis>
- Ender, W. Sandler, T., & Gaibulloer, K. (2010). *Domestic versus transnational terrorism: Data, decomposition and dynamics*.
- Ender, W., & Sandler, T. (1991). *Causality between transnational terrorism and tourism: The case of Spain terrorism*. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576109108435856>.
- Ering, O. S. (2011). Trans-border crime and its socio-economic impact on developing economies. *Journal of Sociology & Anthropology online*.
- Festus, O. (2014, March 18). Exclusive: Nigeria, france, cameroon, three other countries sign deal on massive, the joint offensive against boko haram. *Premium Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/156947>
- Gaibullov, K., Sandler, T., & Sul, D. (2013). *Common drivers of transnational terrorism: Principal component analysis*. A Research paper published by Forthcoming Economic Inquiry, USA.
- Gambo, M. (1988). Television and national security. In R. Akinfeleye, (Eds.), *Contemporary issues in mass media for development and national security* (pp 57-62). Lagos: Unimedia Publication Ltd.
- Hamidu, I. (2020). Fallacy: A major cause for the unending boko haram terrorism in north-eastern Nigeria. *Journal of Social Sciences and Public Policy, 12* (1) 1-21.
- Hamidu, I. (2017). *Political science made easy, Nigeria* (pp. 169-205). God's Will Publishers, Yola.
- Hamidu, I. (2021). The challenges of insecurity in Nigeria's fourth republic. In K. Bello (Eds) *Book of readings on Nigeria's fourth republic* (pp 269-282). Nigeria; G.I Nwase Printing & Publishing Limited Keffi.
- Hamidu, I. (2024). Impact of gun trafficking on the political economy of Nigeria. In J. Elier, (Eds) *Gun violence and prevention-connections, cultures, and consequences* (pp 52-67). IntechOpen Publication.
- Harding, L. (2013, January 30). Mali's ethnic tensions erupt as troops hunt down suspected Islamists. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/29/ethnic-tensions-mali-troops-islamists>
- Maiangwa, J. S. (2014). *The concept of terrorism in Africa*. Nigeria, Pyla-Mak Publishers, Kaduna Ismail. M. Nigeria: tension in yola as boko haram invades hong.
- Maiangwa, J. S., & Waziri, H. (2018). Revisiting the role of civilian defence in violent conflict: Assessing the responses of civilian joint task force to recurrent security threats in borno state of Nigeria. In S. Ibrahim, (et'al) *Security and governance in Nigeria* (pp 105-114). Nigerian Political Science.
- Mbaegbu, C. C. (2018). Governance and cross border terrorism in Africa: A reflections on leadership failures. In S, Ibrahim, S, Hassan, and A. M, Okolie (eds) *Elections, Security Challenges and African Development* (pp. 85-98). Nigeria, TIMEX, Enugu.
- Mefor, C., & Ejike, E. (2015, March 28). *Insurgency: Us donates N985bn to mnjtf*. www.punchng.com
- Mutum, R. (2015). Nigeria stalls onslaught against boko haram-Chad Daily Trust Wednesday, 36(83).
- Nuhu, M. B., & Hamidu, I. (2017). Comparative analysis of armed conflicts in Africa: A study of Nigeria and Mali. *Umaru Musa Yar' Adua University Journal of Social and Management Sciences, 1(3)*, 261-273.
- Nurudeen, S. L., & Adekola, A. A. (2014). International terrorism and national security in Nigeria: An appraisal. In I. B. Bello-Imam, (Eds) *National security and development in contemporary Nigeria* (pp 148-163), Vol. II. Nigeria; College Press, Ibadan.
- Odebede, I. (2015, March 13). *F.G hires european mercenaries to fight boko haram*. www.punchng.com
- Olugbode, M. (2019, October 3). *Military frees 25 children linked to boko haram*. www.thisdaylive.com
- Soriwei, F. (2015, February 4). *Chadian soldiers, not violating nigeria's integrity, says dhq*. www.punchng.com
- Sule, K. I. (2015, March 12). *Niger military says 513 boko haram fighters killed, 347 captured*. www.dailytrust.com.ng

- United Nations. (2013, January 25). Crisis in Mali having far-reaching impact on rest of west africa, warns UN envoy. *United Nations News Centre*, [online]. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44003#>. UQmu-UrBMVd
- Zounmenou, D. (2012). The Sahel: Is there a solution to the tuareg insurgency in Mali?. *Institute for Security Studies*. http://www.iss.co.za/iss_today.php?ID=1450.