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Effect of Boko-Haram Insurgency on Economic Development of Nigeria: A Study of North-Eastern Nigeria

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ABSTRACT

Boko Haram Insurgency has constituted a serious predicament to the Nigerian state since its emergence in 2002. The sophistication and fluidity of the insurgent group within the North east geopolitical zone of Nigeria has made the group one of the greatest challenge to Nigerian socio economic and political landscape. Based on the above, this research work examined the effect of Boko Haram insurgency on the economic development of Northeastern Nigeria. The specific objectives were to investigate how insurgency affected infrastructural development in northeastern Nigeria, ascertain how insurgency affected agricultural production in northeastern Nigeria, and determine how insurgency affected gross domestic product in northeastern Nigeria. The study adopted the Frustration–Aggression Theory and the Poverty Theory for its theoretical framework. The research work adopted a qualitative descriptive method. Content analysis method was adopted to merge available relevant information from reliable source and critical analysis. According to the findings of the study, the emergence of insurgency in the North-eastern Nigeria was discovered to have paralyzed socio-economic activities in the region and has disrupted economic development in the region. With focus on the factors responsible for the emergence and sustenance of the insurgency, the study, therefore recommended the development and implementation of proactive and pragmatic education and economic policies in the region to curtail poverty, unemployment and illiteracy in the region.

INTRODUCTION

From time immemorial, man has been in pursuit of economic development in all its ramifications. Across the times and epochs, such quests have been necessitated by one circumstance or the other including human induced circumstances. The concept of economic development and the factors of development have been given attention over the years by different scholars.

One cannot conceptualize economic development without first invoking economic growth. This is because economic growth is one aspect of the process of economic development. According to Nnoli (2001:32). Therefore, economic growth is the increasing capacity to satisfy the needs and wants of the economy overtime. It is conventionally measured as the percentage rate of increase in real gross domestic product, or real GDP. On the other hand, economic development can be defined as the process of improving the quality of human life through increasing per capital income, reducing poverty, and enhancing individual economic opportunities. It is also sometimes defined to include better education, improved health and nutrition, conservation of natural resources, a clear environment and a richer cultural life”(Penn State University, 2008). There are three variables of economic development.

First, structural change as defined by Matsuyama (2001) “is a complex, intertwined phenomenon, not only because economic growth brings about complementary changes in various aspects of the economy, such as the sector

compositions of output and employment, organization of industry, etc but also these changes in turn affect growth and hence can be seen through the development of an economy.

Second, external influence on government, and international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF as well as MNCs, have the potential to decrease government control in its own country causing a loss of legitimacy (Riddell, 2001).

According to Miller (2001), external influence on local governments consists of political instability and policy instability. Political instability deals with the potential or actual change in the political system and the opportunities evolving from such changes. Policy instability refers to the instability in government policies.

Third, environmental conditions, which refer to “any change to the environment, whether adverse or beneficial, wholly or partially resulting from an organizations activities, products or services”(Service Canada, 2005). Economic development generally refers to the sustained, concerted actions of policy makers and communities that promote the standard of living and economic health of a specific area. It can also be referred to as the quantitative and qualitative changes in the economy. Such actions can involve multiple areas including development of human capital, critical infrastructure, regional competitiveness, environmental sustainability, social inclusion, health, safety, literacy and other initiatives.

Within each society, the above indices surface as the

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starting point in considering economic developmental analysis. As a matter of fact, in Nigeria, these indices are being monitored in the understanding of the extent of economic development in the nation by the scholars and policy makers. In north east Nigeria, these indices currently, are at stake following the activities of Boko Haram insurgents. Across the north eastern Nigeria, educational infrastructures, economic activities as well as agricultural activities have been paralyzed following the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency in the area.

According to Central Intelligence Agency (cited in Byman, et al., 2001:4-5), insurgency is

a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. Insurgent activity—including guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and political mobilization, for example propaganda, recruitment, front and covert party organization, and international activity—is designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy. The common denominator of most insurgent groups is their desire to control a particular area. This objective differentiates insurgent groups from purely terrorist organizations, whose objectives do not include the creation of an alternative government capable of controlling a given area of country.

Insurgency, one of the globally designated economic and development threat, can be defined as guerrilla warfare calculated against the existing state institution, with the ultimate aim of diverting attention, intimidating and drawing the state institution into negotiation for a particular cause. Insurgency is different from murder, assault, arson, demolition of property, or the threat of the same; the reason is that the impact of insurgency violence and damage reaches more than the immediate target victims (e.g., government or military)(Albinus, 2012). It is also directed at targets consisting of a larger spectrum of society (e.g., civilians or even society as a whole). Insurgency is distinct from regular crime because of its powerful objectives. The change is desired so desperately that the inability to achieve change is perceived as a worse consequence than the deaths of civilians. Insurgency acts are both (mala prohibita) acts and mala in se acts. (Mala prohibita) acts are crimes that are made illegal by legislation; mala in se acts are crimes “that are immoral or wrong in themselves (Chandler, 2007).

In recent times, insurgency has become a harsh reality in today’s Nigeria society; it has come in different forms of manifestations of kidnapping, suicide attack, self-suicide bombing, corruption, armed -robbery, and the like e.t.c (enders, 2002; Lake, 2002). Several attempts have been made to reduce the inflicts of these insurgency in the Nigeria economy, (Luechinger, 2003); The Nigeria government has tried using a counter insurgency force as policy deterrence, with the imposition of sanctions, to curb actual attempts by putting appropriate measures in place to reduce the menaces of insurgent in the country. Despite these, the level of insecurity in the country is still high, this has made Nigeria to consistently rank low in the Global peace index (GPI, 2012), signifying a worsened

state of insecurity in the country. Adagba *et al.* (2012), Uhumwuangho and Aluforo (2011) are of the view that the efforts of government have not yielded enough positive result.

The Nigeria economic growth with major focus on growth has witnessed an increase in spending on military hardware as well as equipping the personnel security systems and training to make them efficient to cope with the insurgent phenomenon and ensuring sustainability of economic growth (Ruys, 2004). Nigeria is considered to be an emerging power house, annual growth rates have averaged more than 70% per year, making the Nigeria economy one of the fastest growing economies in the world, (www.gallup.com). A study carried out by Salamki, Fatiamh, Gazi te al. (2012) shows that one unit of the Foreign Direct Investment increase in the oil sector will increase the GDP by 15-16 units. As a result of insurgency, foreign Direct investment has declined; FDI has dropped by 21.3% in 2012 from \$8.9 million in 2011 to \$7 million in 2012,(world Investment Report, 2013). It was recognized that this high dependency ratio is a centre of weakness for Nigeria, increased tensions between various ethnic communities, interrupted development activities, frightened off investors, inflamed religious tensions and upsets the nation’s social cohesion(Eme and Ibiatan, 2012) and this has generated concern among the Nigerian citizens. At a particular period in the history of Nigeria especially during the military era, the country witnessed serious economic crisis and political isolation. However, with the introduction of democratic government in 1999 the country was stabilizing albeit consciously. The peace and stability intolerance, ethnic confrontations and others.

There might be so many factors that can have a negative effect on the level of investment, but it is clear that no foreign investor would want to invest capital in an environment of fear, anarchy and insecurity. It is on the basis of the above that this study intends to assess the effect of Boko Haram insurgency on economic development of Nigeria.

Conceptual Clarifications

Effect and impact evaluation

According to Weiss (2001) people often use the terms effect” and “outcome” interchangeably. Effect is about what has happened as a result of any phenomenon, this being consequences the phenomenon has had on those exposed to it or on a larger community, both in the short and long-term. Impact is net-effect and net-outcome; outcomes that can be explained by the programme. Impact refers to outcomes, meaning the same as effects and results of events. This might be expected and wanted results, as well as unintended and less fortunate outcomes (Weiss, 2001). The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines impact as “the positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended” (DAC, 2007). Impact can be defined as a long term influence on

the state of the environment surrounding an organization (Sanginga, Adesina, Manyong, Otite, and Dashiell, 2001). The effect of a programme can be seen in relation to what the programme actually has done to the people who participated. According to Patton (2001) it is the actual programme outcomes in relation to the desired outcomes (goals). Monitoring is a continuous process that tracks what is happening within a program and uses the data collected to inform programme implementation and day-to-day management and decisions. Using mostly administrative data, monitoring tracks programme performance against expected results, makes comparisons across programs, and analyzes trends over time. Usually, monitoring tracks inputs, activities, and outputs, though occasionally it can include outcomes, such as progress toward national development goals (Paul, Sebastian, Patrick, Laura and Christel, 2010). Evaluations are periodic, objective assessments of a planned, ongoing, or completed project, intervention, or policy. Evaluations are used to answer specific questions related to design, implementation, and results. In contrast to continuous monitoring, they are carried out at discrete points in time and often seek an outside perspective from technical experts. Their design, method, and cost vary substantially depending on the type of question the evaluation is trying to answer (Paul, *et al.*, 2011). According to Imas and Rist (2009) evaluations can address three types of questions:

- Descriptive questions. The evaluation seeks to determine what is taking place and describes processes, conditions, organizational relationships, and stakeholder views.
- Normative questions. The evaluation compares what is taking place to what should be taking place; it assesses activities and whether or not targets are accomplished. Normative questions can apply to inputs, activities, and outputs.
- Cause-and-effect questions. The evaluation examines outcomes and tries to assess what difference the intervention makes in outcomes.

Impact evaluation is a particular type of evaluation that seeks to answer cause-and-effect questions. Unlike general evaluations, which can answer many types of questions, impact evaluations are structured around one particular type of question: What is the impact (or causal effect) of a program on an outcome of interest? (Paul, *et al.*, 2010). The terms impact assessment and impact evaluation is used interchangeably to mean an attempt to find out the effects of an intervention after it has occurred, and the term appraisal to mean an attempt to predict the effects of an intervention before it occurs (Momoh, 2015). Sanginga, *et al.* (2001) stated that impact analysis deals with the investigation of the changes that occurred or likely to occur on the people's life as a result of a project or intervention or any other phenomenon. In their study, their use of impact assessment tries to find out how far the introduction to technology have been successful in meeting the socio-economic objectives and how well agricultural technologies have satisfied the

needs and priorities of household and other units in the target population. Impact assessment is a special form of evaluation that deals with the effects of intervention programme output on the target beneficiaries. It is also the influence of social programme on its client and or its social content, the impact of a programme therefore, can be said to be what the service actually does to the people who receive them (momoh, 2015).

In conducting impact assessment, researchers often use "with" and "without" impact method, while others use the "before" and "after" method. The "with" and "without" approach to impact study involves the study of population, villages or communities that benefited or did not benefit from the execution of a project (Momoh, 2015). Rossi, Howard, Freeman, Wright (2001) observed that the primary objective of any impact assessment study is to estimate the net effects of an intention. Changes traceable to the intervention are the net effects, devoid of effects of other elements present in the situation under assessment.

Having an impact focus in evaluation means, according to Patton, looking at the direct and indirect impacts a programme has, both on those exposed and on the larger community (Patton 2001). The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines impact as "the positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended" (DAC, 2007). Sanginga, *et al.* (2001) defined impact as a long term influence on the state of the environment surrounding an organization. As illustrated above, the term "impact" is somewhat vague and a bit differently defined by different authors. The above definitions have similarities; they include both intended and unintended changes that might happen directly or indirectly to the participant or to the community as a whole. For this work the term "impact" is in accordance with conceptualization of DAC (2007) and Sanginga, *et al.* (2001). The long time influence of insurgency in northeastern Nigeria was analyzed putting into consideration the positive and negative changes it has brought which could be directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.

Insurgency

According to Powell and Abraham (2006) insurgency refers to a violent move by a person or group of persons to resist or oppose the enforcement of law or running of government or revolt against constituted authority of the state or of taking part in insurrection. Insurgency as defined above becomes violation of the constitution's criminal law and the international treaty obligations of a nation in the same circumstances. These circumstances include when it constitutes an attack on defenseless citizens and other property resulting into injuries, loss of lives and properties as well as forced or massive internal displacement of people out of their habitual places of residence, when it drives business/investors away from an insecure area and also when it constitutes domestic and international crimes punishable by law such as treasonable

felony, terrorism, murder, crimes against humanity and genocide (Powell and Abraham, 2006). Traditionally however, insurgencies seek to overthrow an existing order with one that is commensurate with their political, economic, ideological or religious goals (Gompert and Gordon 2008). Kilcullen (2006) noted that insurgency is a struggle to control a contested political space, between a state or a group of states or occupying powers, and one or more popularly based non-state challengers. The author further draws a line between classical and contemporary insurgencies indicating that the latter seek to replace the existing order, while the former sometimes strive for the expulsion of foreign invaders from their territory or seek to fill an existing power vacuum. These worldwide manifestations of insurgencies include Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Syrian Islamic Liberation front in Syria, Hamas in Palestine, the Taliban's in Pakistan among others. Africa which is also not left out of this social hazard, has become a breeding ground for various insurgencies such as the Al-shabaab in Somalia, the Lord's Resistance Army in Central African Republic, the M23 Rebels in Democratic Republic of Congo, the National Movement of Azawad (MNLA), the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali to mention a few. Thus, the most devastating effects of these insurgencies all over the world have been the high toll of humanitarian crisis in the form of rise in internally displaced persons (IDP's), refugee influx, food insecurity, spread of diseases, gender and sexual based violence (Hughes, 2012).

The phenomena of arm struggle in Nigeria have been evident since her independence in 1960. Some of these include the twelve-day revolution by Adaka Boro (1964), the civil war (1967-1970) to the various ethnic militias' attacks such as the Oduduwa People's Congress (OPC), the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) and the Niger-Delta insurgency. The most recent is the "Ahlal-sunnati wal Da'awawal Jihad", popularly known as Boko Haram which has been operating in Northern Nigeria since the early 2000 (Fwatshak and Larab, 2004; Ikelegbe, 2010). Boko Haram is the insurgent group in this study hence effort is made to bring out key information about the group.

It is on record that Boko Haram was initially operating under the name Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization with Mallam Lawal as the leader since 1995 but leadership of the group shifted to Mallam Mohammed Yusuf when Mallam Lawal left Nigeria to continue his education in Saudi Arabia (Ekanem, Dada and Ejue, 2012). It is the leadership of Mallam Mohammed Yusuf that allegedly opened the group to political influence and popularity. By implication, therefore, Mallam Mohammed Yusuf is the one that officially founded Boko Haram in 2002 in the city of Maiduguri with the aim of establishing Sharia government in Borno and neighbouring states (Gilbert, 2014). The understanding of Nigerians on insurgency

is multidimensional and there are different reactions of Nigerians to the real identity and motive of Boko Haram sect. Most Muslims liken it to Maitatsinesect which was established in 1945 to bring turmoil to Islam as it was confirmed that Maitatsine was not a Muslim until his death. A reasonable number of Christians see it as an attempt to Islamize Nigerians while some are indifferent (Shehu, 2014).

According to Agomuo (2011) what started around 2006 in the far flung North East geopolitical zone of the country as a regional disturbance, became a national embarrassment of international magnitude. The emergence of the deadly group whose activities assumed a worrisome dimension in 2009 led to a reign of terror in the affected parts of the country for five years. Since then, people in these areas have not known peace. The emergence of the fundamentalist Islamic sect, has led to the flight for safety and security of most Nigerians residing in the north east, especially Christians (Nwakaudu, 2012). Boko Haram grew out of a group of radical Islamist youth who worshipped at the Al-Haji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri, capital of Borno State, in the 1990's (Walker, 2012). Its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, began as a preacher and leader in the youth wing of Shababul Islam of Ahl-Sunnah, a Salafi group. His literal interpretation of the Quran led him to advocate that aspects of western education he considered as contradictory of religious knowledge (such as theory of evolution, the big bang theory of the universe development and elements of chemistry and geography) should be forbidden in Hausa (Crisis Group Africa Report (CGAR), 2014). While critical of the government, Yusuf was involved in official efforts to introduce and implement Sharia in several northern States in the 2000s. The failure to fully achieve this partially explains Muslim youths' anger over government deception and insincerity and the call for an authentic Islamist revolution (CGAR, 2014). Boko Haram's principal goal is to create a strict Islamic state in the north that it believes would address the ills of society, including corruption and bad governance. The sect's core beliefs are strict adherence to the Quran and the Hadith (sayings of prophet Muhammed), and their interpretation as sanctioned by Ibn Taymiyyah. Abu Qaqa, the group's best known spokesman, explained that the group's agenda is to destabilize Nigeria and take her back to the pre-colonial period when the Sharia law was practiced (CGAR, 2014). In the early stages, the Boko Haram sect was widely known to have mobilized its membership from women and children, school dropouts and unemployed university and polytechnic graduates, most of who tore their certificates. The rationalization is that unemployment, underdevelopment, and the general hopelessness pervading the society were caused by the government, which imposed Western education on them and failed to manage the resources of the country to their benefit. Therefore, "western education is sin"; and this is the literal interpretation of Boko Haram in Hausa Language (Gilbert, 2014). Although from the outset

the sect's mission was to impose Sharia on Nigeria, the leadership went about its preaching and interpretation of the Quran as a recipe for violence and an affront to constituted authority (Anyadike, 2013). More than 9,500 civilians have died in the Boko Haram conflict since 2009 with over 2 million people being displaced (Human Rights Watch, 2016).

Economy and Development

The Economy is regarded as the wealth and resources of a country or region especially in terms of the population and consumption of goods and services. Also according to the business dictionary, the economy is an entire network of producers, distributors and consumers of goods and services in a local, regional or national community e.g. Nigeria's economy.

Over the years, since 2009 which was the inception of the violent insurgent activities of Boko Haram, socio-economic development in Nigeria, especially in the North-Eastern region has been destroyed. According to the Borno State commissioner for information, Mr. Inuwa Bwala, it will take the state twenty (20) years to recover from the current predicament it has found itself. According to the commissioner:

It is only natural that when you have such a situation as we have now, it will affect the economic fortunes especially when people go out to do business under the atmosphere of fear. So there is no doubt that the crises has taken its toll on our economy, it will take us a very long time, not less than 20 years to recover and get to the position where they were before the crises stated (This Day 2012:3). (Madlioni, 2012:5), asserted that:

Business in North-eastern Nigeria today has gone to almost zero percentage, there is no way anybody can come and put any investment where there is insecurity. The transport owners are complaining, social life in the North is gone.

The concept of development also has to be considered as it is critical and essential to the sustenance and growth of any nation. Development as a concept is a victim of definitional pluralism. It is difficult to define; however, attempts have been made by erudite scholars to conceptualize development and I will be exploring some of these definitions. Gboyega (2003) captures development as an idea that embodies all attempts to improve the conditions of human existence in all ramifications. It implies improvement in material well being of all citizens, not the most powerful and rich alone, in a sustainable way such that today's consumption does not imperil the future, it also demands that poverty and inequality of access to the good things of life be removed or drastically reduced. It seeks to improve personal physical security and livelihoods and expansion of life chance. Naomi (2001) believes that development is usually taken to involve not only entomic growth, but also some notion of equitable distribution, provision of health care, education, housing and other essential services all with a view to improving the individual and collective quality of life.

Chrisman (2001) views development as a process of societal advancement, where improvements in the well being of people are generated through strong partnerships between all sectors, corporate bodies and other gurus in the society. It is important to know that development is not only an economic exercise, but also involves both socio-economic and political issues and pervades all aspects of societal life. He posits that development can be viewed in various contexts which include social, political, biological, science and technology, language and literature. According to Okereke, (2000) ,the term "Development" as used in contemporary social science literature is not only vague and nebulous, but is also polemical. For instance, the use of such terms as "growth", "change" and in some instances "industrialization", interchangeably with development, tends to complicate the problem of arriving at a universal acceptable definition for the term. The Marxian or radical scholars' perception of development is quite different from that of their liberal counterparts. In their view, development rather than being an abstract economic category is a multi-dimensional process. When viewed from the dialectical materialist binocular. Development rather than being restricted to macro-economic variables focuses on man and his wellbeing. As result of this, human beings constitute the fulcrum on which it revolves it is thus contended by these theorists that a thorough and comprehensive understanding of the meaning of development provides the most functional path towards overcoming the endemic problem of backwardness. In the same vein a lopsided or faulty understanding provides a veritable avenue for tackling its symptoms rather than its viruses. Thus, radical scholars reject various liberal definitions of development. This is primarily because the correspondingly lead to faulty policy options, which in most cases worsen and deepen the problems of development. The failure of Liberal scholars "expert advice" to ginger up genuine development in the backward areas has constrained the radial scholars to take a hard look at the concept of development. In the words of Walter Rodney which encapsulate Marxist expositions on development. He notes that;

Development in human society is a many sided process. At the level of the individual, it implies increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and material well being ... at the level of social groups; it implies an increasing capacity to regulate both internal and external relations... In the past, development has always meant the increase in the ability to guard the independence of the social group.

The above excerpt from Rodney's work sets the tone and provides the basis for our understanding of development in the Marxist perspective. They view development from three broad levels; these are the individual level, social group level and mode of production level. At the individual level, human beings are seen as the epicenter of development. Therefore human development is seen as the requisite for real development. In line with this reasoning, development at the individual level implies

mental and academic sophistication, moral rectitude as well as martial well being. It is contended that the acquisition of this aspect of development will inevitably catapult the society to the frontiers of genuine development and this explode the shells of backwardness. For instance, the development of man will lead to increase in productivity ability to harness the forces of nature and the capacity for man to eke out a living in the face of harsh natural forces. It is noted that this process is not influenced much by the increases in capital or the rise in GNP. In view of this, the radical scholars forcefully maintain that the first step towards development is the overall improvement of man who is expected to be the harbinger of transformation and change.

According to Chukwudum (2014), in the economic development context means the improvement of people's lifestyles through improved education, incomes, skills development and employment. It is the process of economic and social transformation based on cultural and environmental factors. Socio-economic development therefore is the process of social and economic development in a society. It is measured with indicators, such as gross domestic product (GDP), life expectancy, literacy and levels of employment

Theoretical Framework

Frustration-Aggression Theory

In 1939, researchers at the Yale University Institute of Human Relations published a small monograph that had a tremendous impact, directly or indirectly, on almost all of the behavioral sciences. Led by Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears (2001) the group attempted to account for virtually all of human aggression with a few basic ideas (Berkowitz, 1989). Aggression is always a consequence of frustration, meaning that the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration and the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression (Dollard *et al.*, 2001). A frustration is an interference with the occurrence of an instigated goal-response at its proper time in the behavior sequence, while aggression is any sequence of behavior or the goal-response to which is the injury of the person toward whom it is directed" (Dollard *et al.*, 2001). Expectations of punishment can evoke inhibitions against the open display of aggression (Dollard *et al.*, 2001). According to Dollard *et al.* (1939) several aspects of the thwarting that presumably affected the strength of the resulting instigation to aggression are: the strength of the drive whose gratification was blocked, the degree of interference with this drive satisfaction, and the number of frustrated response sequences. The greater the satisfaction anticipated on attaining their objective, the more aggressively inclined people will become when kept from reaching their goals; the strength of the resulting instigation to aggression will be reduced by whatever partial gratifications are obtained, and the frustration-generated aggressive inclinations will summate over repeated instances of unsatisfied

expectations (Berkowitz, 2001). Persons unfairly prevented from reaching a desired objective are often more angry and aggressive than those exposed to socially approved barriers to goal attainment (Kulik and Brown, 2001). People become angry and aggressive on being kept from reaching a desired goal to the extent that they think that someone had intentionally and unfairly produced this interference or had deliberately and wrongly tried to hurt them (Averill, 1982). Deliberately provoked subjects are spurred to stronger attacks on their tormentor when they receive indications that their initial punishment of that person is hurting him (Baron, 2001). Dollard and his colleagues regarded aggression as not merely the delivery of noxious stimuli but as an action having a fairly definite objective: the infliction of injury. The exact nature of this response is not always the same from one occasion to the next (Berkowitz, 2001). Anticipations of punishment could lead to indirect forms of aggression rather than a direct attack on the target and any interference with the instigated aggression is also a frustration and thus would strengthen the thwarted persons' aggressive inclinations (Dollard *et al.*, 2001).

However, even when aggression is not initially the dominant response, if the person persists in trying to reach the goal but the thwarting continues, the nonaggression reactions will extinguish and there will be an increase greater probability that the instigation of aggression eventually will be dominant (Miller, 2001).

Dollard and his associates believed that all aggression could be traced to one or more prior frustrations, although they did not specify how this previous influence would operate. This supposition seems to neglect the possibility that aggression can be learned instrumental behavior. People at times attack others, not because they have been thwarted in the past, but because they think this action will bring them some other benefits (other than the infliction of injury) (Berkowitz, 2001). Dollard *et al.* (2001) also appeared to assume that aggression was always primarily aimed at doing harm. Such an assumption fails to recognize the important distinction between instrumental and hostile aggression first made by Feshbach (2001) and now widely accepted by most social psychological investigators of aggression. In hostile (or emotional) aggression, the primary goal is to do harm, whereas instrumental aggression is oriented mainly to the attainment of some other objective such as money, social status, or territory. Dollard and his associates apparently were thinking only of hostile aggression, forgetting that instrumental aggression can be learned much as other instrumental behaviours are learned (Berkowitz, 2001). Maslow (2002) maintained that the Dollard *et al.* theory held only for those frustrations seen by the afflicted individuals as a "threat to their personalities." According to Pastore (2001) only illegitimate frustrations produce aggressive reactions. When people are engaged in hostile aggression, information that their attacks on the target have hurt that person should have a reinforcement value even when no extrinsic rewards are obtained.

Furthermore, especially in the case of hostile aggression, the information about the target's suffering when provided shortly after the aggressor starts attacking the intended target, can also serve as an incentive to even stronger acts of aggression (Berkowitz, 2001). People are more strongly instigated to attack their frustrators when they think they have been deliberately and wrongly kept from reaching their goal than when they believe the interference has only been accidental, and they may be inclined to inhibit their aggressive reactions when they think the thwarting was socially proper (Berkowitz, 2001). The frustration-aggression theory is useful in explaining the reasons behind the unprecedented attacks and pains the Boko Haram insurgents have unleashed on Nigerians and West Africans at large. Boko Haram is believed to have this dream of establishing Sharia government in Borno State, even a bigger dream of establishing an Islamic caliphate across the northeast of Nigeria.

The goal of this group did not go down well with the government, and in order to frustrate this goal, the Nigeria police, Borno State command used brutal force to the extent of killing their leader in custody without giving him a fair trial. As a result of this extrajudicial approach by the government security agent, members of the group became frustrated and scattered only to re-group and re-emerge in 2010 with aggressive activities that have killed thousands and caused more than a million people to be displaced from their homes.

Empirical Review

In a study, "Security Challenges in Nigeria and the Implications for Business Activities and Sustainable Development" Achumba, et al (2013), examined the insecurity situation in Nigeria and its implications for business investment, operations and sustainable development. The study adopted the content analytical method. The study revealed that lack of institutional capacity resulting in government failure, pervasive material inequalities and unfairness, Ethno-religious conflict, weak security system, porous borders, rural-urban drift, unemployment, poverty, among others are the remote and immediate causes Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The Paper also observed that the situation where reaction/response to insurgency situation usually come after the crime has been committed and a lot of harm done was counterproductive instead it advocates a change in attitude and approach by being proactive. The study emphasized the need to evolve a safe business environment that allows for effective business activities and a sustainable development process. Accordingly, the study recommends all-inclusive approach where the government, civil society groups, business organizations and individuals must fight insecurity so as to create an enabling environment where business organizations will feel free and secured to achieve their full potentials and the country will itself be safe to achieve sustainable development.

In another study, "Insecurity and Socio-Economic

Development in Nigeria", Ewetan and Urhie (2014), examined the pertinent issue of insecurity in Nigeria and its implications for socio-economic development. The study adopted descriptive method and content analysis. However, the following were the findings of the study: that the level and dimensions of insurgency over time was on the increase, which constitutes serious threat to lives and properties, hinders business activities and discourages local and foreign investors all which stifles and retards Nigeria's socio-economic development. The study recommend, that government should be proactive in dealing with security issues and threats, through modern methods of intelligence gathering and sharing among security personnel training, logistics, motivation and deploying advanced technology in managing security challenges. It further recommends the acceleration of the pace of economic development by government through creating an economy with relevant social, economic, and physical infrastructure to support business and industrial growth as the real solution to the insurgency challenges in Nigeria.

Ahmed, Mussawar, Imran Abbasullah and Gul (2012), examine the economic effects of insurgency on hoteling industry of swot. The study adopted descriptive method and content analysis. However, the following were the finding, that the number of small and medium enterprise were badly affected after terrorist activities. The study recommend that loan on soft term for small and medium enterprises, special packages for affected industry employees, participation of levels leaders were a major ingredient of economic activities in the study are.

Levitt (2009) studied the issue of foreign fighters and their economic impact on Syria and al-Qaeda in Iraq. The study adopted descriptive methods and content analysis. The following findings were that foreign fighters use third-party countries for training, fundraising, and transit, which is not merely an operational phenomenon, but it is an economic one as well. The study recommend, that government should develop realistic strategies to contend with foreign fighters networks that operate in the third party countries and developing a holistic understanding of phenomenon including its economic impact.

Olabanji and Ese (2014) examined the pertinent issue of insecurity in Nigeria and its implication for socio economic development. The study adopted descriptive method and content analysis. The following findings were pervasive material inequalities, porous borders, rural-urban drift are the remote causes of insurgency in Nigeria. The study recommend that government must be proactive in dealing with security issues and threats, through modern methods of intelligence gathering and sharing among security personnel I trading, logistic, motivation and deploying advance technology in managing security challenges.

Adebanjoko and Okorie (2016) assessed corruption and challenges of insecurity in Nigeria and its political economic implications. The study adopted descriptive method and content analysis. The following findings were corruption is a major causes of insurgency in the country.

The study recommend that Nigeria government should find lasting solutions to crises while giving top priority to eradication of corruption in its transformation agenda. Garba (2016) reviewed the long term cost implication of insurgency to economic development. The study adopted descriptive method and content analysis. However, the following findings were the result and effect of any uprising affects the socio-economic activities of an economy thereby thwarting its progress. It's therefore recommend that economic opportunities should be made available to the teeming populace via the construction of social amenities.

Odita and Akan (2016) examined the book Haram menace and their implications on Nigeria's stability. The study adopted descriptive method and content analysis. The following findings were the high menace of bombings and sporadic attacks impacted negatively on economic growth and development of not just the north east but also the entire country. It's therefore recommend that there is need for government to improve on the state of security with all machineries at her disposed that will help identify, unravel, foretell and prosecute Boko Haram insurgents.

Effect of Boko Haram Insurgency on Economic Development of Nigeria

Boko Haram violent activities of attack has brought a serious paralysis to business, banking sector, markets, tourism, transport system, hospitality, internal and external investment, companies and other economic activities. According to Okereocha (2012), due to attacks on banks, markets, parks and government departments in northern Nigeria, human capital and investors collapsed and became threat against economic development because of attacks on commercial areas which has led to the migration of people to other parts of the country. Boko Haram attacks has caused economic backwardness in Nigeria and necessitated increase in poverty, unemployment, insecurity and failure in sustainable human development that is not only in the northern part, but the entire country as well as neighbouring countries like Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin. According to former minister of information, Mr. Labaran Maku said that the Kano which served as the commercial centre of not only the North, but the entire neighbouring countries since before the evolution of Nigeria, Kano has been the commercial centre of Western Sudan for the past of 500 years; it has been destroyed by terrorist attacks. The more you destabilized peace in Kano, the more you destabilized the foundation of economic and social well-being of northern region (Suleiman, 2012).

The insurgency of Boko Haram has created a serious confusion in Nigerian political system and reduced its performance in the affected areas where its visions and missions reduced and became unrealistic due to the terrible militant activities which jeopardized the whole society and put the nation into trauma as well as the political performance of politicians and other activists.

The activities of Boko Haram spoiled the image of Muslims especially from non-Muslims who considered that all Muslims are extremists and fundamentalists particularly the Christians who do not mingle with Muslims. The insurgence of Boko Haram juxtaposed a terrible relationship between Nigeria and other nations of the world due to foreign nationals kidnapping and hostages without demand for ransom which caused the United States of America warned its citizens not to visit northern states affected by Boko Haram attacks. The Boko Haram attack forced foreign nationals to leave the country, and school, universities, ministries, companies and other government protocols and politicians to migrate from the affected areas for their safety. According to Anyandike and Nkechi (2013) noted that, the attacks of Boko Haram do not consider age, sex or nationality, but it affected entire nations and survivors of the attacks are afraid to send their children to schools because of insecurity while the attack by Boko Haram is not limited to urban or rural areas, but it cut across the boundaries which affected the neighbouring countries. According to Alozieuwa (2012) as cited by Anyadike (2013) "the challenge juxtaposed by Boko Haram in Nigeria is not only the threat of its terrorist acts of propagation Islamic law in the country, but the confusions of exact causes of the violence in Nigeria such as socioeconomic, political and religious factor."

The north eastern part of Nigeria is a region which suffered from serious underdevelopment and lagging behind in terms of economic, infrastructure, education, security and other development indices, this vicious cycle of poverty and underdevelopment paved a simple way of embracing Boko Haram mission and activities by youths due to the high tension of daily life stress, the youths became the terrible militant that engaged in sporadic bombings of the major northern cities such as Kano, Kaduna, Maiduguri, Jos, Zaria, Damaturu, Adamawa, Bauchi and others. This caused the killings of both Muslims and Christians in mosques and churches; this proves that the Boko Haram insurgency is totally against the all nation which needs collective effort to fight against Boko Haram. Other concluded that Boko Haram has a connection with foreign terrorist organizations. The constant bomb attacks by Boko Haram have impacted negatively on lives and properties. The available statistics has indicated as Human Right Watch (2012) reported a total death of 935 persons in 164 attacks, 550 people were killed through suicide bombing, another 550 were killed in 135 attacks in 2011 alone (Amnesty International, 2012). According to Oluwaseun (2012), Boko Haram has wantonly destructed the property with worth of several billions of naira through bombing attacks (Oluwaseun, 2012). The Boko Haram attack has reduced the number of tourists because of fear of attacks which led to the cancellations of much national and international tourism in the country. According to Deemua (2013) the Boko Haram insurgency has led to the cancellation of international football games between Nigeria Super

Eagles and Samba Boys of Brazil in 2012, Arsenal 2012 tour proposal to Nigeria, the Nigerian Premier League between Jigawa Golden Star and Ocean Boys, English top-flight club in EPL 2012 and other national and international events were cancelled due to fear of attacks, these events cancellation negatively affected tourism which contributes to the Nigerian national economic and social development.

Effect of Insurgency on Infrastructural Development in The Northeast Nigeria

According to the 2015 RPBA, the conflict resulted in

over US\$ 9.2 billion in damages and losses to public infrastructure and services which, when combined with the total economic output loss across the six states for the same time period (US\$ 8.3 billion), highlights the scale and extent of the destruction that took place. In terms of the damage to infrastructure.

and services directly related to food security and disease exposure (notably agriculture, energy, health, transport, and water/sanitation), the total amount is estimated at US\$ 4.6 billion (table 6 below provides a breakdown of damages for these sectors, by state).⁴⁰ The RPBA also

Table 1: Overview of Damages to Selected Infrastructure and Services by State (2011–2015, in US\$)

Sector	Cost (USD)							
	Adamawa	Borno	Yobe	Gombe	Taraba	Bauchi	Federal	Total
Agriculture	457,854,653	2,377,729,000	868,717,883	4,884,447	11,970,825	7,562,550	—	3,728,719,358
Energy	31,852,500	16,032,500	4,295,000	—	6,991,250	—	129,537,500	188,708,750
Health	21,067,200	58,996,800	32,936,400	399,600	6,472,800	27,824,400	—	147,697,200
Social Protection	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Transport	73,808,500	306,137,824	116,852,000	29,043,500	—	—	—	525,841,824
Water & Sanitation	7,378,000	35,022,000	3,613,000	—	—	—	—	46,013,000
Total	591,960,853	2,793,918,124	1,026,414,283	34,327,547	25,434,875	35,386,950	129,537,500	4,636,980,132

assessed needs for post-conflict recovery, determined on the basis of requirements for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of essential infrastructure and the resumption of services for areas and population groups most affected by the conflict. A two-phase approach is recommended for addressing needs over a period of four years: a stabilization phase (years 1-2) focused on restoring essential infrastructure and services and recovery of (agricultural) livelihoods; and a recovery phase (years 3-4) focused on reconstruction of major economic infrastructure (transport, irrigation), housing and rebuilding of education and health facilities. The costing of recovery needs within this framework is based on the replacement value of assets and infrastructure, and

includes premiums relating to enhancements (on the basis of ‘building back better’ principles) and expanded capacity to cater to additional needs (notably of IDPs). On this basis total needs for reconstruction and rehabilitation for the 4-year period amount to US\$ 6 billion. For the sectors most directly relevant for addressing food insecurity and exposure to disease (agriculture, energy, health, transport, and water/sanitation), total needs amount to US\$ 2.9 billion for the same period (see table 7 below).

Elements of A Cost Benefit Analysis of Infrastructure And Service Recovery interventions

Medium to long-term development investments in infrastructure and services are essential for enhancing

Table 2: Overview of Recovery Needs for Selected Infrastructure and Services by State (2011–2015, in US\$)

Sector	Cost (USD)							
	Adamawa	Borno	Yobe	Gombe	Taraba	Bauchi	Federal	Total
Agriculture	141,109,690	485,443,689	170,029,316	18,487,489	29,700,262	36,602,990	—	881,373,435
Energy	31,852,500	15,938,500	3,318,000	—	3,391,250	—	92,477,500	146,977,750
Health	50,636,400	481,690,400	86,168,000	4,047,600	12,744,800	29,286,000	2,202,500	666,775,700

Social Protection	93,764,839	180,263,768	69,565,531	34,290,979	30,556,067	91,080,398	—	499,521,583
Transport	74,531,000	337,522,671	126,711,650	37,001,900	—	—	—	575,767,221
Water & Sanitation	25,890,554	115,323,061	17,211,969	2,955,809	4,682,627	5,788,496	—	171,852,516
Total	417,784,983	1,616,182,088	473,004,466	96,783,777	81,075,007	162,757,884	94,680,000	2,942,268,205

resilience to shocks at both individual and systemic levels, and can help address underlying structural constraints and deficits (including lack of adequate access and coverage of services, and productivity losses due to inadequate economic infrastructure). These benefits are illustrated in both quantitative and qualitative terms in the economic analysis of infrastructure and service rehabilitation interventions envisioned in the World Bank-financed Multi-Sectoral Crisis Recovery Project for North- Eastern Nigeria. For a total investment of US\$ 99 million targeting the BAY states, the project

aims to promote economic recovery by rehabilitating priority transport networks, reduce exposure to disease and promote agricultural productivity through improved access to clean water and irrigation, and reduce exposure to disease and morbidity. All three interventions are expected to generate direct.

In the above table it is observed that more public health care facilities were damaged in Bornu, 186 public health care facilities were destroyed, Adamawa 557 while in Taraba it was 19 and finally in Yobe it was 77 public health care facilities. This shows that Boko Haram insurgency

PHC Facility		Secondary Hospital			
State	Damaged	Destroyed	Damaged	Destroyed	
Adamawa	12	57	4	2	
Bauchi	257	-	3	0	
Borno	2	186	3	6	
Gombe	3	-	2	1	
Taraba	6	19	-	-	
Yobe	148	77	2	1	

Figure1: Public healthcare facilities destroyed by Boko Haram insurgency
Source: Nigerian (2016) Humanitarian Report.

has impacted negatively on infrastructural development in the northeastern Nigeria. Since the beginning of Boko Haram crisis there has been an increase in the number of children out of school;

on the average, about half (49.8%) of the children of primary school age and a similar percentage (49.6%) of the children of junior secondary school age are out of

NORTH EAST NIGERIA		
STATE	PRIMARY %	JUNIOR SECONDARY %
Adamawa	32.9	30.0
Bauchi	58.2	65.4
Borno	73.4	69.4
Gombe	38.6	41.3
Taraba	31.9	27.2
Yobe	63.5	64.3

Figure2: Out of school children by states due to Boko Haram Crisis
Source: The Nests Reports (2016)

school with Bornu state having the highest population 27.2%, respectively). These show that number of schools of out of children in both categories (73.4% and 69.4%, in the northeast Nigeria have drastically affected by Boko Haram insurgency respectively), while Taraba state has the least (31.9% and

Table3: A Chronology of Reported Boko Haram Insurgency attacks in North Eastern States, 2009 to August, 2017

S/No	Date	States	Location	No Of Deaths/ Disapprences	Injuries And Destruction
1	26th-29th July 2009	Borno, Yobe Bauchi	Maiduguri, Bauchi, Potiskum, Wudil	1000+	14
2	7th Sept 2010	Bauchi	Bauchi prison	5	721 inmates freed from prison
3	4th Nov 2011	Yobe	Damaturu	150+	18; churches, Banks and police stations destroyed
4	5th-6th Jan 2012	Adamawa, borno, Gombe	Mubi, Yola, Maiduguri & Gombe	37 +	21; churches and business centers destroyed
5	25th Dec 2012	Borno, Yobe	Maiduguri, Potiskum	27+	several churches were destroyed
6	19th-20th April 2013	Borno	Baga town	228+	29
7	6th July 2013	Yobe	Mamudo Government secondary school	41 students; 1 teacher	
8	29th Sept 2013	Yobe	Gujba college massacre	44+students and teachers	
9	10th Oct. 2013	Borno	Damboa	20+	15
10	19th Sept. 2013	Borno	Benisheik	161+	12
11	29th Oct. 2013	Yobe	Damaturu	128	
12	11th Jan 2014	Borno	Kawuri massacre	85+	
13	11th Feb 2014	Borno	Konduga	39+	1000+ houses destroyed
14	25th Feb 2014	Yobe	Federal Government collegen Buniyadi	59+	
15	14th March, 2014	Borno	Giwa Barrack		Comrades freed from detention
16	14th April 2014	Borno	Government Girls Secondary School Chibok	276+ Girls abducted	
17	5th May 2014	Borno	Gamboru Ngala	300+	38
18	1st June, 2014	Adamawa	Mubi	40	
19	2nd June 2014	Borno	Gwoza	300+	
20	20th-23rd June, 2014	Borno	North & Central Senatorial Districts	-----	200+women and children were kidnapped
21	3rd-7th Jan 2015	Borno	Baga	100	2000+unaccounted for
22	30th Jan 2016	Borno	Dalori village	86	62
23	16th Jan 2017	Borno	University of Maiduguri	1 Professor; several others killed	
24	1st August 2017	Borno	1Chad Basin oil exploration	69+	3 university staff held captive

25	2nd August 2017	Adamawa	Midlu Village of Vapura	7 +	
26	From 2009-August, 2017 Borno	Borno	University of Maiduguri	5 lecturers killed About 70 lecturers left for other Universities;	and 3 held captive, students population dropped

Source: *National Human Development Report (2018)*

The Effect of Boko Haram Insurgency on Agricultural Production in Northeast.

Terrorism is becoming a global phenomenon. The world is becoming an evil jungle. The killing of people and destruction of properties are seen as an everyday affair and gradually becoming a way of life. The safety of lives and properties are no more guaranteed. Terrorist attack is in the news on a daily basis and the intensity of religious terrorism is increasing every day (Council on Foreign Relations, 2011). The number of death from terrorism is increasing on yearly basis and the world death toll in 2013, increased by 61% when compared to 2012. And about 10,000 attacks in 2013. It has been observed that the 21st century terrorism is done through religious ideology supported by some Islamic groups called Al-Qaeda, Islamic State, Boko Haram and the Taliban. These groups are Islamic militant that do irrational bombing and suicide killing of innocent people. The worst terrorist attack ever noticed in the 21st century was September 11, 2001 attacked on the World Trade Centre in New York which killed about 3,000 people, the terrorist attack on India Parliament in December 13, 2001 and the July 7, 2005 attack in London city. These attacks are in connection with Al-Qaeda militant group. The violent gun shot in a shopping mall in Kenya in 2013 and the recent killings of innocent university students in the country have made the world very unsafe to live. The persistent attack by Islamic sect called Boko Haram in Nigeria and some of the neighbouring countries are unbearable. These groups attack on different countries is a fight against Western culture and education (Olaide, 2013).

There has been a general notion by some Islamic extremists that Western education is bad and must be eradicated. This has been followed by terrorism in different countries aimed at destabilizing the peace of the world and making living together in harmony without discriminating against any other forms of worship. Religious violence and terrorism are increasing and becoming a threat to the world business environment. These notorious groups are violent Muslim extremists who interpret religious ideologies to suit self-desires. The 21st century religious terrorist group such as Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Boko Haram etc justify their actions on Islamic principles. They believed that violence is the only means to fight an existing government and to cause change.

Literature has adduced that terrorism in Nigeria and some other countries in Africa is caused by porous borders, poverty, weak security, inconsistent government

policies and disagreement among Muslim scholars. The Boko Haram group in Nigeria and neighborhoods and the Al-Shabaab in Kenya are enough to discourage Westerners from doing business with Africa. More than 1.5 million people, mostly farmers, have been forced to flee their homes as Boko Haram intensified its insurgency in the past years according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The worst-hit states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa produce staple foods such as cowpeas, rice, millet, sorghum, corn and yams as well as tomatoes, onions, fish and livestock for both local consumption and export markets.

Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state in Nigeria has been deserted by both indigenes and foreigners, as the people there have been jobless. The movement of these people is under restriction due to the curfew imposed by the government or the Boko Haram activities. This violent set of people have bombed bridges, communication gadgets and other social amenities which are necessary for habitation linking Nigeria with neighbouring countries in the north eastern part of Nigeria. Some bridges linking villages where major famers dwell in Yobe State have been blown up. Fish farmers in Yobe State are unable to transport their products to the South. Instead of forty trucks per week, only a maximum of seven trucks of fish products can be transported to South thereby causing increase in prices. The fear of the notorious group has stopped farmers from going to farm even when the climatic condition is very favourable and could have led to a bountiful harvest. The attacks on villagers, burning down homes and indiscriminating shooting have forced survivors to relocate to the South especially in Borno State (Sahara Reporters, 2015).

The government has also been spending a lot to cater for refugees. The situation has led to an increase in government expenditure. Boko Haram has brought pain and death to Nigerian business especially in the agricultural sector of the nation. The aftermath of Boko Haram is hunger as it has displaced farmers from their settlements and buyers into untold hardship. Each attack in Borno, Yobe or Adamawa States kills human beings and destroys farm products. The Boko Haram insurgency which started in 2002 lunched its full-scale attack in 2009 and since then became more violent each day. The hot zones are Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States which have the largest farm land in the country dominated by different kinds of farmers. These States produce stable foods such as corn, cowpeas, rice, millet, tomatoes, yams,

onion, fish and livestock. The fear of Boko Haram has prevented farmers from cultivating their farm land and the few that did have lost their farm products to the terrorists who set them ablaze, killing the farmers and destroying their products. These States are closer to Niger, Chad and Cameroon where agricultural business activities were booming especially in area of export of groundnuts and groundnut oil (Mustapha, 2015). These activities are now becoming history due to Boko Haram attacks. The government must use all means to fight these terrorist to allow farmers go back to business in order to boost the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country.

Moreover, agriculture's decline as a share of GDP has more implications in the Northern States, where it is a source of livelihood. With the influence of Boko Haram, the share of people engaged in subsistence agriculture will continue to reduce if nothing is done to arrest the situation. Although GDP can depend on macroeconomic activities, agriculture in Nigeria is also a major source of GDP and therefore cannot be left to be destroyed by a violent sect called Boko Haram. The main thing that will reduce poverty and create employment in Nigeria is agriculture. Agriculture in Nigeria is beyond food for man and animals. It is a source of income to the country through exportation and raw materials for industries in the country. The importance of agriculture in the creation of employment, industrialization and poverty reduction cannot be over emphasized.

In summary, the contribution to government revenue has been decreasing since independence due to the oil boom, political instability and lack of continuity in government policies coupled with corruption. The recent reoccurrence of Boko Haram is very devastating to the Nigeria business. The contribution of agriculture to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has reduced drastically due to the discovery of oil and neglect of the agricultural sector, and to worsen the situation is the displacement and death of farmers', their products and their marketers. Business thrives only in stable environment. Boko Haram has made agriculture business environment in the Northern States of Nigeria very turbulent. The factors of production which are land, labour, capital and entrepreneurship are not stable. The bombing of farm products and lands destroys both the future outputs and makes the lands not viable for the next farming season. The killing of youth and also using them for violence complicates the situation. The male youths who are more active with much strength and can be a good source of labour are people the Boko Haram is using for attacks. Capital is the amount invested in the business. Capital can only be invested when the risk associated with it can be controlled or minimized. No farmer will want to invest in a business where the risk in the business environment is very high. Entrepreneurs are the owners of the business. They have to run for safety and divert to another business in a peaceful environment.

No nation can afford to treat with levity the security of its territorial region and of its people. Indeed every aspect of human endeavour, be it health, environmental, food, economy, political, social, education, sport and physiological etc, stands to be greatly affected by the state of security or insecurity of that nation. It is no longer news that in recent time, Nigeria has been burdened with challenging security issues chief among which is the Boko Haram insurgency (Adebayo, 2014). According to Abidde (2014), Boko Haram made its presence known in 2004, in Yobe State and by 2011 it made its presence known to the global community by bombing the United Nations headquarters in Abuja. Especially in the last two years, it has willfully attacked hundreds of buildings and killed many innocent Nigerians. Until recently, the Nigerian security and intelligence agencies knew very little about the group's origin and philosophy, its *raison d'être*, and its goals and end game (Abidde, 2014). In the past, Boko Haram insurgents have used Cameroon as a safe haven for initiating hit-and-run attacks on neighbouring Nigerian territory. The Nigerian government responded by deploying a military presence on the northern border. Further attempts to prevent the sect extremists from accessing targets across the porous boundary have culminated in official closure of the Cameroon border (Merrick and Li, 2014).

The North wields 78% of Nigeria's land which supports most of Nigeria's agriculture (food, cash crops and livestock) (Innocent, 2012). With increased intensity of bombings in the north, there was strategic mass movement of individuals from the most affected northern states especially in early 2012. This was accentuated by the uncertainties surrounding the fuel price crisis at the time. The movements were of a strange kind since both Southerners and Northerners simultaneously moved from Boko Haram strongholds. While the affected areas of North move to the South-East in hundreds, others relocated to the South-West (Innocent, 2012). According to Merrick and Li (2014), the sect has inflicted violence in northern Nigeria for the past five years. Boko Haram means "western education is forbidden." It upholds its principles by targeting schools, Christian churches, and more recently, the entire towns. Since 2009, Boko Haram insurgency is believed to have killed thousands of people and destroyed properties valued at over a billion dollars. This includes government buildings, livestock and produce. The insurgents continue to torch public buildings and steal large quantities of produce, thereby destroying livelihoods of farmers and forcing hundreds of businesses to close or relocate. With Boko Haram's northern insurgency concentrating where agricultural activity is highest, Nigeria's national government is becoming increasingly concerned with threats to food security (Merrick and Li, 2014). Either way one looks at the group, its activities have been very damaging both physically and psychologically (Abidde, 2014).

Agricultural output (kg) on yearly basis in Nigeria

Table 4: Agricultural output (kg) on yearly basis in Nigeria.

YEAR (Period 1, 10 years before the insurgency)	Agricultural output to Nigeria GDP	YEAR (Period 2, 10 years during the insurgency)	Agricultural output to Nigeria GDP
1994	38.8108824	2004	34.21028658
1995	32.06099353	2005	32.75542177
1996	31.13372236	2006	31.9987955
1997	34.03135991	2007	32.71417898
1998	39.0478495	2008	32.85021918
1999	35.30644453	2009	37.05016484
2000	26.03397777	2010	23.89370408
2001	33.7537884	2011	22.28919858
2002	48.56594018	2012	22.05428761
2003	42.70726998	2013	20.99639753

Sources: World Bank (2015)

A Specter of internal Displacement Within Host Communities

The United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement states that Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are: “Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.”

(UN1998:1)The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) for its part describes IDPs as “probably the largest group of vulnerable people in the world” (UN, (1998:1). The National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCREMIDS) recorded an increasing number of IDPs in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa which in 2014 stood at 102,560 in Adamawa State; 257,694 in Borno State, and 76,354 in Yobe State. In 2015, Borno state alone had about one million five hundred IDPs according to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA).




Figure3: Internally Displaced Persons in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States

In sum, the various types of attacks led to displacements of thousands of people in the region, with Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states recording the highest number of IDPs. The rise in the number of IDPs in registered camps of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states as presented in figure 4.3 above, confirms the strong relationship between the Boko Haram violence and the unfolding humanitarian crises. In 2016 an estimated 1,687,703 were displaced in various camps in the three states alone, with

the larger percentage being women and children. The immediate consequence of the influx of IDPs has been the concurrent increase in food insecurity, poor health services, inadequate water supply and poor sanitation in the registered camps. An assessment conducted by the NEMA in March 2015 reported that in Borno state 70 percent of IDPs living with host families reported that water and sanitation facilities were overstretched as a result of the influx of populations from high risk LGAs

to low risk LGAs. In Yobe State, only 60 percent of the IDPs living with host families reported that access to water and sanitation in the LGAs covered was adequate while in Adamawa state, 65 percent of IDPs living with host families reported that the availability of water supply had decreased from an estimated pre-crisis availability of 75 litres per person per day to an average of 20 litres per person per day and that access to water treatment chemicals had also become increasingly difficult and that water utilities establishments in most parts of the affected LGAs had become moribund (Sidi, 2015). In all, the poor living conditions in IDP camps, as well as in the host communities, are a source of great concern. Reports from both domestic and international agencies have shown that IDPs have as far back as 2009 lacked adequate facilities and endured poor sanitation with remarkable increases in diseases such as malaria, acute watery diarrhea, measles and pregnancy related diseases.

Given the magnitude of the crisis, the federal government and indeed, the Borno state government faced capacity challenges to offer protection to all the displaced persons. It proved difficult to ensure that IDPs do not suffer rape and thefts and that women and girls do not resort to vices such as prostitution as an alternative means for self-support. Moreover, it proved difficult to ensure that food or non-food items are not stolen from IDPs or that armed groups do not live or circulate within the camps. The situation was further compounded by the insufficient number of health and education facilities as well as the personnel to cater for these two critical basic needs. And whereas there were NGOs and other non-state actors present in Maiduguri it was reported that they appeared to be in competition with each other rather than working collaboratively, often leading to the duplication of efforts instead of meeting the actual needs of the IDPs.




Figure4: Number of Internally Displaced Population By States
Source: Nigerian (2016) Humanitarian Report.




Figure5: IDPS And Refugees In The Region Due To Boko Haram Crisis
Source: Nigerian (2016) Humanitarian Report.

The Effect of Insurgency On Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

According to Beland (2005) insecurity entails lack of protection from crime (being unsafe) and lack of freedom from psychological harm (unprotected from emotional stress resulting from paucity of assurance that an individual is accepted, has opportunity and choices to fulfill his or her own potentials including freedom from fear. As Achumba and Ighomereho (2013) puts it, those affected by insecurity are not only uncertain or unaware of what would happen but they are also not able to stop it or protect themselves when it happens. In respect of the factors responsible for insecurity and conflicts, Collier (2006) stressed that countries which have a substantial share of their income (GDP) coming from the export of primary commodities are radically more at risk of conflict. The most dangerous level of primary commodity dependence is 26% of GDP. According to him, conflicts and insecurity is concentrated in countries with little education, fast population growth and economic decline. This was also the views expressed by Aderoju (2007). The effect of Insecurity on economic growth has been

described to be negative. Stewart (2004) analyzed the effect of conflict and insecurity on development for twenty five countries between 1960 – 1995 and found that economic growth was almost always affected, agricultural sector was badly hit, exports were negative, production fell, there was a shift from international to domestic markets, imports went up dominated by military expenditure and essential consumption goods, usually leading to a shortage of foreign exchange for economic inputs., consumption per head fell, government revenue as a share of GDP mostly fell and foreign and private investments including government investment fell. This was further corroborated in SIPRI yearbook 2015, where they observed that threats to security can have socioeconomic roots, including contests over natural resources, spillover effects of environmental degradation, economic and social inequalities, economic and political migration, natural disasters, among others. On the whole, this study is a departure from most of the existing literature as it examines the effect of insecurity on economy growth from a purely economic perspective.

Table5: Impact of Boko Haram Related Conflict on Northeast State Output and Prices 2011–2015

State/Category	GDP (Bill of Naira)	Inflation, All Items	Food
Adamawa	-314.0	10.4	9.0
Bauchi	-86.3	-4.5	-22.6
Borno	-708.2	10.0	11.3
Gombe	-280.9	12.7	46.3
Taraba	-49.1	-2.9	0.0
Yobe	-222.3	6.6	0.7
Primary Affected States	-1244.5	27.0	21.1
Secondary Affected States	-416.3	5.3	23.8
Accumulation 2011–2015	-1660.8	5.4	7.5

Source: Nigeria RPBA Volume II – Component Reports, March 11, 2016




Figure6: Nigerian oil and non-oil GDP 2000-2014 (Before and during Boko Haram)
Source: Central Bank Of Nigeria, BNP PARIBAS (2015)

Effect on Oil Production, export and Oil revenue

Exports were invariably negatively affected. This resulted from the general fall in production, a shift towards domestic markets, and disruptions in international markets. Foreign receipts from oil witnessed a steady

drop from a high of \$99,878 in 2011 to an all-time low of \$45,365 in 2015, representing a 55% decrease over the figure in 2011. Consequently, oil production also declined steadily from 1974.80 barrel per day in 2011 to 1748.2 in 2015.

Table6: Oil Exports & Production Data

Year	Oil Exports (Millions \$)	Production (1,000 b/d)
2011	99,878	1,974.80
2012	96,905	1,954.10
2013	97,818	1,753.70
2014	82,586	1,807.00
2015	45,365	1,748.20

Source: OPEC Bulletin, 2016

Insecurity And The Economy

The present situation in the northern part of the country is a very clear evidence of the impact of insecurity on the nation's development in general and on the economy in particular. Lives are lost in the bombings, properties destroyed and businesses collapse as some business men who are not indigenes of the affected states leave and migrate to other states. Even the indigenes are taken to refugee camps leading to increase in government

expenditure that doesn't yield anything. It is argued that the security situation in Nigeria is having adverse effect on the economy which affects how ready we are to join the league of the 20 largest economies in the world by 2020. This is confirmed by the CBN 2012 report which reported for the 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 fiscal years, that the total expenditure set apart for both internal security and defence in the approved budgets were 292.7 billion, 276.5 billion, 422.9 billion and 563.2 billion respectively.

Table7: Nigerian GDP, Foreign Direct Investment, Exp. And ExR before and during Boko Haram insurgency

Year	FDI	GDP	EXP	EXR
1999	4,035.50	117,000	1,188,969.80	92.693
2000	16,453.60	121,000	1,945,732.30	102.105
2001	4,937.00	126,000	1,867,953.90	111.943
2002	8,988.50	131,000	1,867,953.90	120.970
2003	13,531.20	136,000	1,867,953.90	129.356
2004	20,064.40	145,400	1,867,953.90	133.500
2005	26,083.70	156,004	1,867,953.90	131.661
2006	41,734.00	169,304	5,752,747.79	128.651
2007	4,324.86	634,656	6,838,888.94	134.054
2008	4,659.156	674,888	7,053,065	132.372
2009	3,810.251	716,949	6,808,831	132.601
2010	3,810.25	801,700	6,764,450	128.270
2011	5,304.112	901,300	2,011,317	146.680
2012	3,199.89	261,855	2,011.3117	150.20
2013	6,	285,	1,646,175	156.00

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria statistical Bulletin (2014)




Figure7: Showing FDI in Nigeria – 1999 to 2013

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin

From Table 1 above, one can understand as illustrated in the chart, the trend of FDI in Nigeria from the year 1999 to 2013. The first glimpse at the chart reveals so significantly a continuous rise in foreign investment in Nigeria from the year 2001 to the year 2006 when it reached its peak for the period in review. The year 2007 down to 2013 marks a period of low and unsteady flow of FDI into the country. Yet before 2001 as shown in the chart, it was unsteady but not as low as it is seen in from 2007. What then does this imply? In as much as many other determinants of FDI has been identified, national security remains one common and major factor seen by many researchers as having a serious impact on FDI. This goes to say that the trend of FDI in Nigeria as seen in the chart above is caused by a factor not far from national security. The above assertion is made based on the trend of national security challenges in the country over the period in review. In the 1990s, most of the security challenges faced were mostly of local content and scope, involving majorly robbery, rape, ethnic, political and religious crisis. Therefore, even when it has some level of impact on business, the foreign investors may not have the information of its existence since they are mostly low key security challenges affecting very few locations and resources in the country. Ruling out other determinants of FDI; the above trend of security challenges account for the unsteady but relatively high FDI in the country in the late 90s and early 20th century. Then by Mid 20th century, the militancy in the Niger Delta rose and attracted in a higher proportion the attention of the international media to the security situation of the country because of the kidnapping and assassination of foreign expatriates in the struggle for the Control of oil revenue and the emancipation of the Niger Deltans between the federal government and the Niger Delta militants. In October 2009, the Yar'Adua/Goodluck led government granted amnesty to the militants of the Niger Delta leading to the stop in kidnapping of expatriates and a smooth run of oil business which had earlier been halted by the activities of the militants. Yet the steady growth of FDI in the

period in review is from 2002 to 2006 when it peaked. But from 2007 when it failed again, it became low and unstable till 2013. This raises a question; does that mean that the security challenge posed by the militants who were still operating by the period our FDI peaked in 2006 did not frighten the foreign investors? The answer to that is found in the theory we adopted, the Eclectic paradigm, which reasons that the investor considers three factors of FDI which are ownership, location, and internalization of market information. This goes to say that the foreign investors may have seen the militancy issues as an opportunity to explore more of our oil resources while we are busy fighting one another. The country own part of what was being lost in the struggle (ownership) and the conflict affected the price of oil in the international market (marketing knowledge), therefore exploited the opportunity and invested more.

Nevertheless, as militancy was dying down, the Boko Haram insurgency was rising. The insurgency started as religious agitation, and rose to such a sophistication of qualifying as terrorism as it is seen today. Moreover, it has taken many dimensions to even political undertone. The Boko Haram insurgency does not only threaten the lives of those at the affected parts of the country, but the national security and sovereignty of the nation. It was reported that in 2012 alone, 815 people were killed in 275 suspected Boko Haram attacks. The killings are not targeting on individuals but on locations with the use of bombs which destroy properties and lives (including security officers). Therefore, it goes to say that, the combination of the militancy in the Niger Delta, the Boko Haram insurgency in the North, and other national security issues that are arising in relation to the political situation of the country, which have made some international bodies predict Nigeria a failed state, all culminated to effect on the perception of the foreign investors on Nigeria. This is evidenced in our chart as the sudden decrease and unsteady flow of FDI is recorded from 2007 to 2012.




Figure8: Foreign Direct Investment and Local Investment In Nigeria Economy Before And During Boko Haram Insurgency

Sources: Nigerian (2016) Humanitarian Report.

CONCLUSION

The North East region of Nigeria, comprising of Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba States, has been ravaged by the Boko Haram insurgency since 2009. Estimates of the negative impacts of the crisis include approximately 14.8 Million people adversely affected, about 2.3 Million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), including over 200 Thousand Nigerian Refugees in neighbouring countries, over 20 Thousand deaths and even more people severely injured or missing. Many of the region's residents now live in IDP camps, with host families away from their original homes and in host communities. Many host communities are severely stressed, having to cater for the large influx of displaced people from places directly hit by Boko Haram.

The Boko Haram crisis has also resulted in extensive damage to social, economic, health and market infrastructure. Numerous homes have been destroyed. Many schools, hospitals, markets and places of worship have been destroyed or closed. Many communities have been completely abandoned, especially in Borno and Yobe. Returning the region to normalcy is one of the highest priorities of the Nigerian Government which will require a huge fortune from the domestic economy as well as foreign donations. The major findings of this study include among other things, insurgency have indeed distorted the economic development and progress in north-eastern Nigeria such as agricultural productions; the incidence of insurgency in the Northeast has greatly impacted negatively on the economic growth and development such as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of not just the North east but also the entire country and, that the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East has devastated the infrastructural development in the region.

Recommendations

In order to tackle the Boko Haram induced challenges in Nigeria and ensure sustainable socio-economic development the study makes, the following recommendations

- The Federal Government should formulate and effectively implement policies and programmes capable of addressing the root causes of Boko-Haram in North-Eastern Nigeria such as poverty, unemployment infrastructural degradation, dearth of infrastructural facilities, uneven development, among others.
- The government should include peace studies and security management in school curriculum at primary, secondary and tertiary levels in Nigeria. This will enable the Nigerian Youths to appreciate the importance of peace and security in a secular state like North-Eastern Nigeria and shun all negative behaviours that would cause a breach of peace.
- The Federal Government should re-organize the country's intelligence gathering system and build a capable and more proactive security apparatus in Nigeria. This will add more values in checking incessant bombings, robbery, kidnapping and other violent crimes/crisis by

hoodlums in Nigeria.

- There is need for a serious sensitization and re-orientation of the citizens, especially on the issue of violence and crime in order to forestall the germination of arms struggle among the youth.
- The effort of the Nigerian government to foster inter-religious dialogue should be intensified and the Islamic clerics should be persuaded to be active participants, in the collaborative effort to ensure peace and unity in the country with a view of enthroning favourable environment for socio-economic development activities.
- There is need for Nigerian government and stakeholders to strive very to make Nigeria a better place for children by providing adequate education and security with a view of enthroning socio-economic development.

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