Preventive Diplomacy-An Instrument of International Relations: The Study Case of Macedonia and Kosovo
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ABSTRACT
Diplomacy as a means of communication between states has been and still is the most effective way to achieve the goals set before a state. Special emphasis and importance is given to preventive diplomacy, which day by day occupies an increasingly important place in resolving disputes and preventing conflicts. The legal basis for the application of prevention in the process of prevention or escalation of conflicts is found in the Charter of the United Nations. The overall work of the UN is based on prevention and it promotes mechanisms and instruments for peacekeeping. Establishing a preventive mission is far more cost-effective than taking other post-conflict measures. The real importance of prevention is seen in this segment. In the former parts of the former Yugoslavia that gained independence, preventive diplomacy played a very important role. In the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the Republic of Kosovo, in the Republic of Macedonia, there was a need for a preventive mission on their territories. The establishment of the missions of the United Nations, the OSCE, and later of the European Union and the United States of America proved to be a good example of preventing the spread of the conflict and can serve as a model for future prevention missions based on the Balkan experience. The benefits of a preventive mission can be great, both for the host country and for neighboring countries.

INTRODUCTION
The peace is a universal value and the most basic condition for the existence and existence of any state. In the past, each state took care of its own survival and the imposition of peace as the most important category in running a state. The situation in this field today has changed markedly. Today, in the state of a developed system of collective security, there is a different situation, where the obligation of the states not to provide assistance and not to support the states that behave contrary to the international regulations comes to the fore. War, as a means of resolving conflicts, has already faded from use. International law prohibits war as a means of resolving conflicts. A new, far better way of solving problems between countries is being approached. The peaceful settlement of disputes comes to full expression through negotiations, direct contacts and frequent meetings between the representatives of two or more countries. That tool, which is increasingly used in the practice of communication between countries, is diplomacy. Diplomacy, as the most powerful instrument in representing the country internationally, is on the rise and it is inconceivable to conduct the policy of a country without having its own diplomatic network. Preventing a harmful phenomenon is a problem that is present everywhere in the world. Therefore, in terms of prevention, a lot of efforts are made in order to build a powerful prevention concept. In this field, the United Nations stands out as an international organization that has done a lot for prevention and is still working on it. At the same time, examples from the crisis in the former Yugoslav republics and provinces that gained independence have shown that, alongside the UN, other international organizations such as the OSCE can be involved in preventive diplomacy, so that we can reaffirm the role of the UN in prevention plan, but also the European Union as well as the United States. I will dwell in more detail on the UN preventive mission in Macedonia – UNPREDEP, Kosovo and Bosnia.

LITERATURE REVIEW
The Role of UNPREDP in the Balkans
With an authorized strength of a thousand men (to which were added thirty-five military observers (...) “While behind closed doors in Kosovo, “peacekeepers” were deployed in neighboring Macedonia along the border with Serbia and Albania (UNPROFOR, 1991).
This UN presence was requested by Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov in November 1992 and authorized the following month by the Security Council (resolution 795). It was the first preventive operation in the history of the United Nations, that is to say before the possible outbreak of conflict in the deployment area. In this case, the Macedonian authorities feared, on the one hand, the consequences of hostilities in Kosovo and, on the other hand, a potential aggression by Serbia.
At this point in time, the situation in Kosovo had not yet crossed the threshold of armed conflict and therefore only represented a virtual threat. But in the event that fighting broke out in the province, Skopje feared for various reasons that Macedonia would be drawn into turmoil: Albania could then decide to lend a hand to the Albanian fighters by channeling its forces through Macedonia, the Macedonian Albanians could also take...

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part in the conflict, and the predominantly Albanian-speaking areas of West Macedonia could serve as a base for Albanian operations in Kosovo.

A second scenario was grafted onto this scenario, that of an attack by Serbia against Macedonia launched either to flush out the Albanian enemy from its rear bases, or to satisfy an old ambition in a territory formerly called the “Southern Serbia”. And if, fortunately, no military operation took place in Macedonia, the authorities still feared the “destabilizing effect” for the country that a possible influx of refugees from Kosovo would cause ...

In any case, they added, the bigger picture could lead to a full scale Balkan war. In the end, barely two months elapsed between President Gligorov’s official request and the arrival of the very first “peacekeepers”.

The fact that this detachment came from a force already present in neighboring republics had, it is true, significantly reduced the usual delays in deployment. But this speed of execution was also due to the will to act of the Security Council. The successive explosion of conflicts in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia had indeed given shape to a domino theory, overrated but striking, by virtue of which Macedonia could constitute the fourth - or fifth, according to the position occupied by Kosovo - of the “Time bombs” which seemed to be scattered throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia. And the “worst case scenario”, referred to by President Gligorov, according to which a destabilization of Macedonia could lead to a generalized war in the Balkans (Unics, 1993). The deterrent dimension of UNPROFOR became more evident in June 1993 after the United States proposed to add 300 of its troops to the Nordic battalion that had made up the force until then (Peacekeeping, 1992).

Confirmed by the Security Council in resolution 842 of June 18, 1993, the participation of the United States transformed the purely material assistance provided by UNPROFOR/FORPRONU into political support and had to make it clear, as B. Boutros then underlined, that “the international community does not accept the extension of the tragic conflict in this region” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

Consequently, the UN detachment no longer had the sole purpose of warning the Macedonian authorities of an imminent aggression, but rather of warning any aggressor of an immediate reaction. The American decision was motivated by the worsening of the situation in Bosnia after the failure of the Vance-Owen plan and the fear that the conflict would spread southwards. Paradoxically, the Macedonian authorities were not strictly speaking concerned about the impact on their country of the war raging at the time in Bosnia - which, it should be remembered, is not bordering on Macedonia - but threats from Serbia and Kosovo. So not only was the hypothesis adopted by the US administration largely baseless, but the reality was exactly the opposite.

Indeed, the Serbian regime, which proceeded with the withdrawal of the JNA contingents stationed in Macedonia as part of the preparations for the Bosnian war, was not in danger (if indeed it intended) to attack the first as long as he was busy with the second and at the same time was careful not to open a new front in Kosovo. Thus, the continuation of the war in Bosnia did not threaten Macedonia, but on the contrary granted it a reprieve. As what follows will show, it is after the conclusion of the Dayton Agreement that a new conflict will erupt which will affect this country much more directly (Riedel, 2010).

The American containment strategy was therefore flawed; it also had little impact on the real time bomb that was Kosovo. The Clinton administration reiterated this warning in March 1993 in particular, then again in August by (...) The presence of “blue helmets” on the outskirts of Kosovo had no influence whatsoever on the resolution of the problems, which arose in this region.

In other circumstances, the deployment of UNPROFOR could have taken on circumstances, the deployment of UNPROFOR could have taken on dissuasive value, if it had been a question of representing a vanguard ready to intervene in the event of a military offensive from Belgrade in the province. In December 1992, President Bush had also issued a warning to Slobodan Milosevic to this effect - the aforementioned Christmas Warning reiterated by Bill Clinton after his election.

The United States then said it was ready, in the event of a conflict in Kosovo provoked by Serbian military action, to use force against the forces of Belgrade within the province and in Serbia proper. However, beyond the posture taken by the American gendarme, the Serbian President knew that no consensus existed between the main powers to use force against his country and even more, that they shared his opposition to the independence of Kosovo (as recalled in the program of joint action of May 1993 by which Americans, Russians, French, British and Spaniards buried the Vance-Owen).

The Serbian President also knew that, devoid of the mandate, the means and the approval of the troop-contributing States - not to mention that of the host State - UNPROFOR was in no way intended to launch, in case of need, in a peace enforcement operation in Kosovo. And the presence in its midst of American soldiers did not make the slightest difference, on the contrary: in accordance with the doctrine then in force of “zero deaths”, the American administration did not envisage risking the lives of its GIs during a land counter-offensive.

In these conditions, UNPROFOR played no role with regard to the situation in Kosovo, neither that of dissuading Belgrade from taking a military initiative, nor that of preventing on the Albanian side any possible arms trafficking or preparations beyond. the borders (which it did not control) of Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia. Its only function was, if necessary, to report the arrival of refugees from the province. In the end, the action taken by the “blue helmets” to ward off the threat from the north was quite limited, just like the rest of the preventive initiatives taken while waiting for Dayton.
The Paradox of Preventive Diplomacy in the Balkans

- The Carrington plan had failed on the minority issue, the Dayton mediators feared alienating the Serbian President's cooperation and jeopardizing the conclusion of a Bosnia deal by raising other sensitive issues. However, just as the suspension of hostilities in Croatia comes at the cost of their outbreak in Bosnia, the separate settlement of the conflict in that republic was to precede the outbreak of that in Kosovo.

- For at least three reasons: after The Hague and London, the Albanians of the province are once again sacrificed in the name of superior interests, abandoned to their fate and in the grip of a regime now praised for its contribution to peace. In the region; for a certain number of them, Dayton legitimizes the use of force as the means to be heard and to obtain victory (s) of cause;

- Guarantor of the Peace Agreement, Slobodan Milosevic holds the Westerners in dependence, who wish to retain their assistance in consolidating the fragile edifice which has just been developed. Dayton is thus a trompe l'oeil peace, which certainly marks the end of two appalling wars in the region, but contains the seeds of future conflicts.

- The first reason is that the West is focusing on their favorite subject, Bosnia - this "little Yugoslavia" whose destiny seems to guide that of the former Yugoslavia as a whole - and on the timetable for the implementation of the agreement. of Dayton. In this regard, that the organization of the September 1996 general elections in Bosnia served as a criterion for the withdrawal of the UN force from Macedonia speaks volumes.

- The second factor of inattention, the prospect of a Balkan war, which inspired most of the preventive initiatives before Dayton, seems to be fading for good. Peace is restored in Bosnia and Croatia and war no longer seems to threaten at the gates of Macedonia, after the normalization which took place in 1996 with Athens and Belgrade.

- There are still a few gray areas on the board, and in particular the troubled situation in Kosovo. However, to the great satisfaction of Westerners who claim to support him by discrediting him, Ibrahim Rugova remains attached to non-violence while his most virulent opponents do not (yet) call to arms. The UCK as far as it is concerned is ready to embark on a new military expedition.

- The violation of the municipal elections of November 1996 won by the opposition, the new President of the FRY had to face in Serbia itself a wave of protest like he had never known. From this ordeal and other electoral setbacks, Slobodan Milosevic thus concluded that peace, in truth, was not succeeding for him and that, contrary to his calculations, the population was not grateful to him but aspired to change.

- Twelve months after Dayton, a “need for war” thus reappears to create a diversion, stifle protest and reconnect with the National-Communist exaltation of yesteryear.

- In the end, the West did not imagine that the situation in Kosovo could deteriorate so quickly, nor that a new conflict could arise only a few months after an end to the nightmare in Bosnia.

- They imagined it all the less since in their eyes, each entity resulting from the former Yugoslavia had now found its place and its rank, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia but also Kosovo which was to remain within from the borders of the FRY.

- They clung to the idea, generated by themselves, that Dayton marked a both final and regional settlement of the “Yugoslav conflict”. The policy of the ostrich which was then carried out gives the measure of their illusions.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The aim of the paper through research methods methodology is to facilitate the development of a comprehensive understanding of the principles, techniques and processes that underpin successful research in international relations. In this paper, we will study the philosophical basis of knowledge claims in the social sciences and will consider emerging ethical issues. You will address the divergence that exists between different research paradigms and methodological traditions and be able to explain these differences from first principles. Knowledge of a wide range of contemporary research methods will be provided and you will practice applying them in context.

The “why?” and the “what”

Thus, it is desirable to avoid armed conflicts, to prevent violent confrontations between communities, ethnicities, nations, states, to declare their extent or, at least, to limit the lasting effects, not to have a new one. When time runs out, then there is much Latin “si vis pacem, para bellum” place, human societies in which they sought the means by which they were thrown down from the Pacific means that they have the ability to recover, except the organs of self defense, “big means”, or war.

About 500 av. J.-C., the Chinese Sun Tsu, in his Art of war, demonstrate the advantages of dissociation - exert force to not deviate from use - as the ultimate means of checking the peace all at its finest. In the same line, of other pens, strategists, political scientists - Machiavelli, Clausewitz, the abbey of Saint-Pierre in the XVIII century (in his Projects of the perpetual path), are engaged in this search.

International organizations - SDN, ONU, Council of Europe, etc. - created by lend of large global conflicts in the “Jamaican tea!” space, without the pacifist currents or at least surrogates on the civil society and the UNHCRs activating a part, are they intended for the purpose of finding “the magic formula”, the “comment?” and for the whole, inevitably, to interfere with the “who?” (Why did you get there? How did you get there?)
The tragic events that take place in the course of these last years in the Balkan region - in the ex-Yugoslav space and beyond - are intended to be questioned at the level of the preconceptions of all those, politically responsible, strategically responsible individuals concerned by the peace of mind and stability which condition the “live ensemble”. Human communities.

The methodological approach tested in this chapter proposes a rationalization of this reflection effort; it offers a certain number of “tracks”, in Esperanto, in all modesty, contributes to feeding this search. In this optics, the notion of “methodology” must be In Europe, Westerns do not occur to be, in fact, pluton plunged into a debutant system which, as a result, qualifies as a “new world order” and does not have to be measured the conflicts of the Balkans serape the dramatic illustration. The American political scientist G. John Ikenberry, from the University of Pennsylvania, (quoted by Brzezinski in his “Grand Echiquier” masterpiece) is the author of these “complex systems” which serve to “dominate” the relations between the main European States of Europe and Europe.27 Central (French-German integration European integration, OTAN, negotiated solutions to questions raised like the Sudetenland, the Saut-Tyrol / Haut Adige, Trieste, etc.) . On the contrary, it is evident that today, Europeans and their transatlantic alliances are no longer present à “domestique” of convincing relations between the peoples and the States of the Balkans.

From the need to “invent” a methodology susceptible to extending this success story versus South-East of the continent. A condition, be it red, that the “recipe” memes are only applicable ...

Search for “magic formula”

In order to provide, you can process procedures according to a process to be decomposed, chronologically, in two distinct stages (in their application on the ground, certain superpositions, are invisible) - The first stage is called the alert.

But it is consistent in identifying the longest possible speeds in advance of the precursor symptoms of the appearance of degenerative conflicts in violent encounters, their profound causes, apparent or occult, their potential actors and their precise localization. In particular, the footsteps of an ad-hoc device, of a “democratic veil agency” being evoked in this apparatus. An agency, with permanent access to a network of correspondents present on the ground, periodically and prioritizing addresses, reports to relevant international organizations (UN, NATO, OSCE, European Union, Council of Europe) et aux Very good members. It is also possible to configure the test piece and propose solutions to identified problems.

This agency, provided by a secretariat, derives the benefit of a suffix dependent on the status of the Affiliates by analyzing and coordinating all data collected by organizations, groupings or persons, particularly qualified, covered ‘homme, democracy, rights and protection of minorities, cultural rights, humanitarian rights, all of which are complemented by their own information and analysis.

Most places of international organizations destination reports obtained by the agency charge for transmitting incommensurable missions to the government at a later time and conforming to the collecting rules recognized and stamped by the international texts. - When in the second stage, it will pour into the diagnostic cell.

In effect, prevent conflicts that are essentially diagnosed because of their exact nature, their causes - real, explicit or implicit-, their degree of danger - notation for which is the correct approach to the risks of a eventual territorial delimitation - in a weather, proceed to an analysis of the data obtained in the first stage, to determine the opportunity of an intervention, the case, position, moment and conditions of the most adequate.

The conscientious objection constitutes an essential phase of all prevention policy. To take a recent example, as the performance of the Bosnia-Herzegovina war - direct consequence of the composition of the “second Yugoslavia” - at the stake, take all the court money (unless ...), by contrast, the conflict of Kosovo is, therefore, totally preventable et long-time program in advance.

Explain all that what “saves”, or what saves you from, does not happen because of the need for time to prevent it? The explanations are multiple and diverse. This inertia, this “car policy” symbolizes due to the ignorance of what is actually going on or what is going to happen in this part of the Balkans, and whose experience is being lost all over the wars of Croatia and Bosnia.

On the other hand, those who are politically responsible, strategists, governors, prioritized by others, as well as international organizations, often preferring “not savoir”, laisser faire, or those who perceive the illusion that “they do not arrive at all”, incorporated as an ensemble of concepts permitting fire on the ground, at the moment, within a given perimeter, conforming to a preset plane, to a system of values , utensils or coats thereof each observation, respect and assurance in view of a final degree.

“New order” or “new order” world?

It is not uncommon for the impulse of the USSR and the edge of the Berlin Wall to mark the dispersion of the world order based on bipolar antagonism, the ratio of forces between the two “grands” and the equilibrium of the terrain, the absence of the “new order” appealed to the replayer without having to deal with certain problems, to find certain failures, which font which is required, in reality, before retrieval the balance and stability necessary for a new “live ensemble” then, on the other hand, erroneous appraisal, mauve evaluation of the data of the problem, which can be cone, correctly analyzed, from other matrices and the confluence also avoided. A very recent example, however, has been the lack of sensitivity of leading conductors and analysts since the publication of the famous Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, which, since 1985, has been announced.
as a trauma between nationalists serbes.
At the very least, it can be said that the duration and intensity intensifying the Kosovo war are essentially due to repeated diagnostic errors. Finally, the third stage of the prevention process extends to the therapy, from which effective.
When for the first time measures are taken to avoid the detection of the announced conflict, it established diagnostics and in case of refusal to cooperate with the governing body in the first place, continuously disengaging the measures of classical contingencies, such as economic embargo, exclusion or suspension of certain international organizations, impossibility members of the government or administration to obtain visas for their deployments in different countries, etc. These measurements must be applied rapidly, in a coordinated manner, with the addition of force and coherence which the cell is not present in, although it is not such sanctions have been set against the R.F.Y. with different sucks for this day.
It is also important that, in order for the “democratic process” alert process to take place expeditiously, for the correct diagnostic steps to be established, for which the therapy adopted is effective, certain sectors may be required. object of special attention all along the action of preventive enterprise: the various traffic (drugs, prostitution, smuggling, etc.) that suppress and support certain uncontrolled military activities, the measures of psychological warfare which, by their nature, occult by definition, risk due to diagnostic and including certain media processes such as intoxication and disinformation. On the contrary, it leads to the value being just as valuable as the role of the media, but - and then again - when it acts critically, independently and without any “politically correct” effect, in measuring or failing actively participating in the awareness process and in disabling the alert process. It remains that the key to this methodological approach, the essential condition of its success or failure is not to fall into error in the approximation of parameters that determine the contingency or evolution of which can be prevented or circumscribed. For the whole, la rigueur in the analysis of faults and situations and the application of adequate “therapy” - with any pathology in therapy - not implied at all moment: before and after.

Prevent or Cure
Churchill, quoted by Ibrahim Rugova, did not say that “the Balkans produce more history than they consume”? The “civilian” guerrillas who are being derailed in the Yugoslav space by the course of the last decency do not contradict this shot. More precisely, the four annuities of “non-war” in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the international quasi-protector stationed in Kosovo, have different points of departure, at least two common paths: one terminates by compromises of exchange and interest and, above all, illustrative the outline of the prevention policy of conflicts. This box, all of them, is not complete, in the measurement of which it is not intended to be provided by a verifiable apparatus, which supposes a return to a normal interethnic coexistence, and stabilization.
The consolidation of this situation of “no peace, no war” justifies the maintenance of the forces of peace - SFOR and KFOR - and civil administrations under international mandate. Do Bosnia and Kosovo warriors stay terminally unaccounted for? Yes and not ... This response contradictory reflects lightly accurately ascertaining its value on the terrain. Western, some progress has been registered in Bosnia (with recent international elections being held by moderate parties and ethnically diverse communities, with the exception of “separated by Kosovo”), the refuges are retouched (LeMonde, 2000). However, the inversion of the ratio of assisting forces, the collective violence programmed by the Serbs against the Albanians, has been replicated by acts of individual violence - vengeance, revenge, retaliation - perpetrated by Albanians against Serbs rested in place. Whether or not these manifestations of racial harassment are conducive to all, they are relative, even if they are less than the “ethnic netting” that preceded them.
Mario Bettati, the title of Droit international chair at the University of Paris II shall exercise its right to exercise its right to freedom of expression in Kosovo in order to ensure that international conflicts are more or less the source of the internal violations of the right to self-determination; on commence, dit-il, by attacking the senses, après quoi on “internationalize”.
The aerated power to prevent conflicts in this region also raises another question: by asking which of the “just” guides and counts only what, if any, the paix n’est, in somme, that the absence of the guerre, is it certain, in the chancelleries and in the major states, that all the announcement must be made? Policies and strategies on the ground - even if, in certain circumstances, you can take the risk of raising tensions to degenerate, to quit any revenue stream, to reconstruct, to repair and assimilate the victories of the best opportunities to develop and prosper in a context of restored democracy? What is required to be requested, which is passed in the Balkans, and the location Popularity of “you want to prevent it from happening” is an absolute absolute value or the Realpolitik can avoid other necessities ... Jacques Rupnik fails to remark on this proposal “the international community does not mean to avoid a clear idea of the target object and the means by which it is intended to be conserved” (Rogier, 2000)
“No peace-no war-ni paix, ni guerre” is epilog of our analy concerning the geopolitical situation on the Balkans. The currently “gelled” antagonisms in Bosnia and Kosovo at the risk of other apparatuses, in which the peninsula is surprised by “the feathers whose geography suffers only to expose itself”? “Sensitive zones”, which persistently inertia and problems solved suspiciously, do not occur in the region.
Single or multi-ethnic states like Albania or Macedonia, “Serbian provinces” like Vojvodina (like Hungary, a member of the Alliance Atlantic, a place in the top line)
or other, the “Yugoslav republics” like Montenegro or Serbia are always there, whether on the fence, or not “prevalent” now, not embracing at any moment. In the long run, the ideal solution consistently's “Europeanizing the Balkans”, which is to accommodate the wings, regions and feathers that live in a geopolitical space without all the potential for armed conflict. is exclue. At the very least, force is intended for accords such as those of Dayton or Kumanovo, as well as similar or complete assemblies of Security Council resolutions, such as 1244, as well as ambiguity and interpretation to which it is intended. , we do not have solutions also that do not want to create the crop. But it is not at least if you continue to search, within the framework, in particular, for a policy of prevention which should be compressed and matched, durable solutions that ensure stability, stability and a certain degree of occupancy a European region.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

In this paper, the role of preventive diplomacy-instrument of international relations is reviewed, where the case study is Macedonia and Kosovo.

The results we derive from this paper are listed as follows:

1. From the analysis of the cases of Macedonia and Kosovo, we see that preventive diplomacy maintains relations between states and is considered the art of agreements.

2. The intervention of diplomacy leads to the realization of national interests and the protection of the goals of the national foreign policy, as happened in the case of Macedonia and Kosovo.

3. Preventive diplomacy in the Balkans during the 1990s, which was undertaken with an intensity inversely proportional to the probability of risks, highlights a paradox, the failure of preventive diplomacy in Kosovo that was inappropriate to the situation.

4. The negotiations that took place in Kosovo, which had access in two directions, ended in a deadlock related to the disputed sovereignty of Kosovo, here it can be seen that preventive diplomacy did not have the desired effect.

5. Establishing a mission for Macedonia is fundamental, neutrality and objectivity are essential principles, especially if it is done in different ethnic groups. The success of the mission depends on consistency and impartiality that promote trust.

CONCLUSION

The concept of preventive diplomacy has captivated the United Nations since it was introduced by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld half a century ago. This concept, provided for in Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations, authorized the Secretary-General to draw the attention of the Security Council to anything that could represent a threat to peace and security. Since the beginning of the United Nations, Secretary-General Trygve Lie had relied on this article to gather information on situations, to establish contacts with those concerned, to send envoy to closly assess situations and to do whatever it was necessary, in its power to counter international crises or contain them. Secretary General U Thant has made Dag Hammarskjöld's vision a reality. Its role in averting a nuclear confrontation during the Cuban Missile Crisis must rank in the annals of the United Nations as the most spectacular example of preventive diplomacy. The UN archives contain detailed documentation of his efforts. I will come back to this later. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim continued to practice preventive diplomacy. He was successful in resolving border disputes between Iraq and Iran in the 1960s. He made appeals in dangerous situations such as the Arab-Israeli war in 1973. He quickly sent soldiers to UN peacekeeping to check and control this situation and is appreciated for these efforts.

REFERENCES


